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I . INTRODUCTION 
International economic policy decisions have the same features as 
other decisions : a setting , a decis ion maker , goals and alternatives . 
The international economic policy decisions of France from 1956 to 1966 
are thus not, in principle , unique, but a r e only interesting because of 
the specific elements involved . The setting of the policy was the de-
velopment of the Eur opean Economic Community and the rising importance 
of Western Europe in the international economy . The pr incipal dec i sion 
make r was the strong but articulate personality of Gene r al Charles de 
Gaulle, President of France since 1958. The General ' s goals were the uni -
versa! goals of economic policy , namely growth , security and equity . The 
alternatives at stake were the classic forms of trading assoc i ations in 
international trade , of monetary systems in inter national finance , and of 
international institutions in international cooper ation. 
A. The Hi storical Setting : Western Europe 1945-55 
In 1945 the countries of Weste rn Europe we r e faced with the task of 
building a new Order after the economic chaos of the thirties and the 
Second World War . The Old Order had been destroyed in a burst of violent 
nationalism and preventing a r ecurrence of this was a major aim of all 
concerned . 
There was a need to revive the Eu r opean economi es from near 
collapse and to cope with an acute dollar shortage . The urgent 
need to restore Europe ' s economic health reflected not only the 
desire to improve the conditions of life of its people . It was 
also viewed as t he essential condit i on for dealing with the 
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g rowing Soviet political and military threat and for restoring 
Europe to a position of indepe ndence in a world dominated by two 
Great Powers and confronted with the challenge of African and 
Asian nationalism . Finally . . . it was hoped to find a means of 
binding Germany to the West and preventing recurrences of France-
German rivalry that had contributed to two World Wars .. • it be -
came obvious that some form of regional approach to these problems 
was essential. [Frank (42) , p. 10] 
In 1944 discussions at Bretton Woods estab lished the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) . In 1947 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) was established . It's major features were an agreement not to 
raise tariffs, except in emergencies, and a pledge not to discriminate 
among member nations in international trade policy . This was embodied in 
the "most favored nation" clause which ensured that bilateral tariff re-
ductions between any two members would be extended t o all other members . 
A program for the reduction of tariffs was also set up but progress was 
slow . The 0 .s. Administration did not have the authority to reduce ta r iffs 
across the board without Congressional approval . They had to fight for 
tariff concessions, domestically as well as internationally. Since the 
U.S. was the most important world trader and a member of GATT other 
countries hesitated to reduce tariffs because they would be extended to 
the U. S . by the " most favored nation" clause. However , reciprocal ta r iff 
concessions from the U. S . were not fo rthcoming . Thus, the result was a 
tariff freeze . 
Support fo r a regional approach to Western Europe ' s probl ems 
became evident soon after World War II. The Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation was established in 1948. It was given the task of 
distributing Marshall Aid. Therefore OEEC ensured some degree of 
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coordination and harmonization of national policies in Western Europe . 
In addition, it set up a timetable for the abolition of quotas and 
quantitative r estrictions on intra-European trade . This program was 
highly successful but it gave rise to the " low tariff countries' dilemma". 
Those countries that relied mainly on quotas to protect their markets 
rather than tariffs were known as " low tariff countries". As quotas wer e 
reduced under OEEC and tariffs were not reduced at the same rate under 
GATT the markets of the low tariff countries became progressively more 
open than those of the high tariff countries . The low tariff countries 
resented this lack of reciprocity and by the beginning of the 1950's 
they made it clear that they would not put up with the situation much 
longer . The other European countries were sympathetic but they did not 
want to make tariff concessions that would be extended to the US through 
the "most favored nation" clause in GATT without a quid pro quo from 
that country . Various solutions were proposed to this dilemma. By 
1955 the minds of the low tariff countries turned to some form of regional 
trading association as the answer. 
It was at this point that the economic drive for liberalizing trade 
in Europe linked itself with the political drive for the construction 
of European political cooperation. A large body of people in Western 
Europe wished to see greater political cooperation between their govern-
ments and some known as " Europeans" were striving ultimately for a 
United States of Europe . But even the most ardent of these realized that 
complete political union was a long way off in the 1950's , so they concen-
trated on achieving political unity through integration in economic and 
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military aff airs . They believed that the disequilibrium caused by in-
tegration of these sectors and non- integration of the surrounding ones , 
together with pressures from the community wide pol i tical activities , 
would result in an ascending spi rit of integration . The movement for 
integration was more successful in the economic sector than in mil i tary 
affairs. Nevertheless the "Europeans" were not discouraged because they 
realized that military power is founded on economic power . The lack of 
any other solution than economic integration to the low tar iff count r ies' 
dilemma also encouraged them . 
During the War Decade, 1938-48 , GNP increased in Canada by 803 , in 
the U. s . by 673 , but declined slightly in Western Eu r ope . (See Table I. l.) 
Table I.l . Indices of national accounts variables in Canada, the U. S. 
and Western Europe (1948 = lOO)a 
Variable GNP Gross fixed Private Public Exports I mports 
region and domestic capi - cons ump- consump -
year tal formation tion tion 
Canada 
1938 56 41 60 61 61 65 
1948 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1954 125 129 126 188 111 135 
u.s . 
1938 60 57 66 60 54 71 
1948 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1954 123 121 120 197 106 136 
Western Europe 
1938 102 97 101 100 137 116 
1948 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1954 140 135 129 135 188 135 
a Source : (87) 
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Gross domestic capital formation more than doubl ed in the U.S . and Canada 
but only increased sl i ghtl y in Western Europe. Private consumption and 
public consumption remained cons t ant in Western Europe and increased by 
over 603 in the U. S . and Canada . There were big increases in foreign 
trade in Canada and the U.S . but significant decreases in Wes t e rn Europe . 
However the situat ion changed f r om 1948 to 1954 . GNP rose by 4Cl°/o in 
Western Europe as opposed to about 243 in the U. S . and Canada. Gross 
domestic capital formation increased by 35% in Western Europe which was 
much higher than the North America n figur es . Private consumption in-
creased somewhat less in the u.s. than in Canada and Western Europe . 
World t r ade increased gr eatly during the period 1948-1 954. I n all three 
regions the increase i n i mports was about the same . The increase in ex-
ports from the U. S. a nd Canada was about 353. The lar ge r increase in ex-
por ts from Western Europe (883) occurred as she began to regain her pos ition 
in i nternationa l trade . There was a significa nt lag , however, in the 
g r owth of public consumpt ion in Western Europe (353) as opposed to Canada 
(883) a nd the U. S . (973) . Thus we see tha t European economic policies 
emphasized inves tment for growth and i mport substitution be tween 1948- 1954 . 
B. The Decision Maker: de Gaulle a nd Gaullism 
One of the most promine nt decision make r s in the inte rnat ional 
economy from 1956-1966 was General Charles de Gaulle, President of France. 
He came to power (for the second time) in June 1958 . At tha t time Fr ance 
was undergoing an acute pol i tical crisis due to t he fa i lure to bring the 
war in Algeria to a successful conclusion . The Fre nch economy was suffer-
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ing from an acute inflation with prices rising at 143 per annum. France 
had a serious deficit in her external balance of payments and was unable 
to fulfil her obligations to liberalize trade under OEEC and GATT . 
Because of the crisis the General was given full dictatorial powers 
for six months during which he wrote his own Constitution . This Consti-
tution was ratified and General de Gaulle was elected the first President . 
This gave him very wide powers. For example , in " times of crisis" the 
Pres ident may s uspend Parliament and rule by decree . However the Presi-
dent has a very large say in deciding when the re is a "time of crisis" 
and, therefore, he has great power over Parliament . Thus, because of his 
wide political powers and because of the fo rce of his personality, General 
de Gaulle is held responsible by international opinion for French political 
decisions . In brief, the policy of de Gaulle is held to be the policy of 
France . 
In international politics Gaullism has been strongly identified with 
the belief that the nation state is the decision making unit and that 
all policy making must explicitly accept this fact . 
For de Gaulle the nation state is the only real - perhaps the 
only legitimate - vehicle for pol itical power in the world ... . 
Monnet and, in somewhat differ ing ways, most other founders of the 
European Community all have i n common [the belief in] some degree 
of transcendence of the nation state . [Diebold (14), p . 98] 
This belief in the dominance of the nation state may be interpreted and 
sharply criticized as a reversion to old fashioned nationalism. This is 
often done in the popular literature of the English speaking world . 
This passion for national power sets de Gaulle against the postwar 
tidal movement towards the coalescence of the West . He has a 
special grudge against institutions that include America or Britain , 
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Eor France cannot be top nation in them . But even on the 
continent of Europe, where France could , at least for a time, 
be the leader of the Six , he bitterly opposes the methods of 
working togethe r that have been evolved by Jean Monnet a nd other 
great Europeans and embodied in the European Communities . (76, p . 3) 
Such bitter criticism of de Gaulle , however, is not universally accepted . 
It has been said that 
Today , as the leader of a nation that is far more wealthy and as-
sured , and of a state built according to his wishes, de Gaulle ' s 
nationalism appears more subdued and his concern for the world is 
at least as great as his concern for France . [Hoffman (47) , p . 142] 
The wide differences of interpretation of de Gaulle ' s nationalism occur 
because the term nat i onalism means different things to d iffe r ent people . 
The nationalism of General de Gaulle is the pursuit of a policy which 
he believes will increase the welfare of the nation s tate called France 
and , in particula r , will ens ure the independence of Fr ance in a worl d of 
nation states . He r ecognizes that the interests of nation states overlap 
so he supports international organizations which pursue such common in-
terests . However, he maintains that the interests of nation states also 
clash and so he under takes no commitment that will weaken the bargaining 
power and authority of France in such conflict situations . 
Only the French government can be depended upon to look .afte r the inter -
ests of France in a conflict situation; no other nation state can be ex-
pected to do so . Thus he has said 
The fact that the Russians also n~ possess enough [nuclear power] 
to destroy the universe , and notably the new continent [ i . e . the 
U. S. ], makes it natural that America sees he r own survival as the 
principal objective of an eventual conflict , and envis·ions the 
moment and the degree and the methods of her nuclea r intervention 
for the defence of other regions [i . e . Europe] only as a funct i on 
of that natural and over rid ing necessity . (61 , p . 43) 
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In a conflict situation, the U. S. wil l put her own interests before the 
interests of France , and so must not be t rusted with t he interests of 
France . Neither will de Gaulle entrust the interests of Fr ance to an 
international or ganizat ion . Inte r national organizations a r e mer ely col -
~ 
l ect ions of self - seeking nation states each ultimately pursuing it ' s own 
i nt e r est in a conflict situat ion . This i s the " f unctionalist" appr oach 
to international organizations . Friendly discussions between hi gh govern-
ment officials should form the basis of international cooperation . In-
ternat ional organizatiorts are "inte rnational meeting places" to bring 
about coope ration t hrough "conf rontation", that is , requiring a country 
to defend her national pol icy at an internat ional gathering . 
The othe r approach to international organizations is called the 
" federalist" app r oach . I t ' s proponents bel i eve that international co -
oper at ion can best be a chieved by establishing "supra- national" organiza-
tions . An international organ i zat ion is supra-national if it can take a 
decision by majority vote which is binding on all the na tions t hat a r e 
members of it . In some sectors a functionalist approach was adopted a nd 
in others t he fede r a lis t s we re successful . While de Gau l l e was always a 
functionalist , Britain was federalist in military affairs but func tionalist 
in economic a ffair s . 
In economics there is a parallel distinction between " l ibe ral i s ts" 
and "dirig i sts" . Liberalists saw economic cooperation after the War as 
a means of "cleaning up the mess" left by the nationalism of the thirties 
and the War . They advocated a return to unconditional free t r ade with a 
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minimum of policy intervention in the international economy . Dirigists 
saw economic cooperation as necessarily entailing some coordination and 
harmonization of national economic policies particularly to minimize the 
harmful effects of free trade . Frequently dirigists were federalists 
because they wanted the harmonization of economic policies t o be imposed 
by a supranational authority . The free trade "liber alists" usually 
opposed supranational governments . 
However , Gener al de Gaulle is both a dirigist and a functionalist , 
that is, he favors harmonization of national policies but rejects supra -
national organizations with majority voting . This creates a wide area 
of apparent inconsistency in Gaullism which leads people to say that he 
is irrational . An appropriate slogan for Gaullism would be " an independent 
France within an independent Europe". However , the efficiency of har -
monizing national policies (dirigism) is greatly impai red when done on a 
cooperative (funct i onalist) rather than on an authoritarian (federalist) 
one, but to establish a federalist international institution would be to 
jeopardize French na t ional independence . Not enforcing harmonization (by 
establishing a federalist institu tion) jeopardizes economic integration , 
the g rowth of Europe as an economic power, and, ther efore , European in-
dependence . Thus we see that in the period 1956- 1966 General de Gaulle 
was obliged to formulate his international economic policy in the light 
of competing goals . Growth and independence of France and Europe emerged 
as major preoccupations of de Ga ulle . These are his goals of growth and 
security in the domestic economy and growth and national independence in 
the international economy . A third goal of de Gaulle was equity or 
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justice in the domestic economy or what we shall r efer t o as i nternation-
al reciprocity in the international economy . 
c . Goal s and Economic Policy Decisions 
The goals of nat i onal policy have ma ny of the cha r acteristics of 
public goods . Public goods are such that the consumption of a public 
good by one individual does not reduce the quantity available for con -
sumption by others . Since the production of these goods is costl y, they 
can only be produced by social action . However , the sha ring of the cost 
among the consumers is a major problem . 
For these goods it is in the interest of each individual 
taken separately not to signal his true preferences or at 
least to signal them incorrectly . [Breton (10), p . 377] 
Nevertheless , in the aggregate , people act in ways which indicate t hey 
place a large value on the goals of national policy . Thus economists 
have undertaken the s tudy of national goals by examining the actions of 
national governments . Breton (10) suggests that national governments 
have a goal of "nationality" expressed as the desir e to have national 
ownership of a major proportion of the nation ' s wealth . This, it seems , 
is merely one aspect of the goal of self determination , security or nation-
al independence. People also object to for eign owner ship of nat ional 
wealth because foreigners repatriate the income f rom this weal th to their 
home count r y. They do not want to work to increase the wealth of anothe r 
(competing) nation . Thus this obj ection i s concerned also with the dis -
tribution of income and so involves what we have called the goal of equity . 
Johnson (55) suggests that nations have a goal of " industrializa tion". 
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There is a minimum amount of industrialization which every nation wants , 
r egardless of the dictates of compa rative advantage . To this Mundell 
adds a goal oE a certain minimum amount of agriculture , and calls the 
1 
package the goal of a "balanced economy" . This, it seems , i s merely 
another manifestation of the broad goal of national security or inde -
pendecne as reflected in the desire for self sufficiency and avoidance of 
excessive dependence on foreign supply . 
For these reasons, in this study the traditional goals attributed to 
government policy are used , namely the growth, security and "equitable" 
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distribution of the national income . These goals may be complements , 
supplements or competitors from the point of view of the policymaker . 
Every selection of an economic policy alternative r eveals, to some extent, 
the r elat ive weights among these goals . The set of feasible policy de-
cisions (or outcomes from a decision) is represented in Figure I . l . Any 
point in the triangle represents a policy decision that favors the three 
goals in a unique way . Each vertex represents complete emphasis on one 
goal to the exclusion of the other two . If the policy maker takes the 
decision represented by vertex labelled growth , then this indicates that 
considerations of security and equity played no part in his decision . 
The more weight he assigns to them the further he moves from the growth 
vertex . The weight assigned to each goal by a policy decision is thus 
measured by the distance from the policy point in the triangle to the 
1Johnson cites this suggestion oE Mundell ' s in a footnote 
2 . b Tin ergen uses these three goals for a similar purpose in (84) 
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1 
0 
I 
Growth 
Equity 
I 
11/3 
I 
I 
Security 
/~i Acceptable set 
Figure I . l . A possible acceptabla subset of a pol icy triangle 
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side opposite the vertex representing the goal . Because the triangle 
is equilateral and of height one, the sum of the lengths of the perpen-
diculars from any point to the three sides is equal to one . This is why 
we call these lengths the weights assigned to the three goals . The 
centroid of the triangle represents a policy decision which assigns equal 
weights to the three goals . Given the political philosophy of the policy 
maker , that is, the general relative importance of the three goals to him, 
a subset of the policy triangle becomes the set of acceptable decisions 
to him. The region shaded in the figure represents such an acceptable 
set if the policy maker desires to satisfy certain minimum levels of each 
goal . 
The mechanisms by which the constraints on policy decisions due to 
these goals operate can be seen in Tinbergen 's approach to economic policy 
( 8~. Any macroeconomic model can be expressed as 
Ax + By + c = 0 
where x is a vector of endogenous variables, y is a vector of exogenous 
variables (their values are determined outside the model) and c is a vector 
of constants. If - A B = C and -A c = d then we can write the reduced for m 
as 
x = Cy - d • 
The endogenous variables are some function of the exogenous variables . 
Let us partition the endogenous variables into target variables and ir-
relevant variables, and the exogenous variables into instrument variables 
and data variables . Economic pol icy tries to reach a desired level of 
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target variables by the right manipulation of the instrument va r iables . 
If x 1 is the vector of target variables and y1 is the vector of instrument 
variables, the pa rtiti oning looks like this 
= 
Disregarding our irrelevant variables we have 
In traditional economic theory we plug in different values of the instru-
ments and examine what happens to the targets . In the Tin.bergen theory (83) 
of economic policy different values of the targets a r e fixed and we ex-
amine the required levels of the instruments . This is the " fixed target" 
approach to economic policy . It would mean that the acceptable region of 
1 
policy decisions would be only one point in Figure I . 1 . I f the target 
variables are allowed to vary within a certain range then we have the 
flexible targets approach to economic policy . In th i s case the r elative 
importance of the three goals would determine the r anges within which the 
targets might vary and the acceptable policy set becomes a r egion within 
the triangle . Thus the goals of national policy determine the range with-
in which the values of the targets are acceptable to the policymakers . 
The decisions of national policy can be classified according to 
which variables are selected as targets and which are regarded as ir-
relevant . Thus some decisions are conce rned with economic welfare, some 
with s ocial welfare , some with political power and so on . (See Figure I . 2) . 
1 
Assuming a unique combination of instruments to each level of targets, 
or that welfare is a function of tar gets only . 
Economic 
Trade 
Decision to 
reject a 
free t rade 
area 
Figure I . 2 . 
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16 
The classification scheme may be applied to policy choices in the domestic 
economy or the international economy . With respect to the international 
economy, policy choices try to control trade by tariff policieJand by 
international cooperation, and they try to ensure a system of internation-
al finance that will encou rage "desirable" international trade. Thus 
an international economic policy is a set of dec i sions about the growth , 
security and distribution of income within and between nations , as a re -
sult of permitting certain levels of international trade and financing it 
in a certain way . Some trade is better than no trade, but unconditional 
free trade has costs as well as benefits . Thus countries treat interna-
tional trade as a policy instrument . If a country wants to prevent the 
harmful effects of free trade then it can use ta r iffs to limit the t r ade 
or rely on international cooperation to minimize the harm . The firs t de -
cision of French international economic policy which we analyze in this 
study is the decision to reject a free trade area in Western Europe in 
1958 . This decision can be seen to be part of French tariff policy . The 
second decision studied is the 1965 decision to reject the attempt to tie 
the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Economic Community to 
political concessions from France . This dealt with that part of inter-
national economic policy that uses international cooperation to prevent 
the harmful effects of free trade . The third decis ion of French i nter -
national economic policy which was analyzed was the decision to buy gold 
and control U.S . investment in France . This decision involves the method 
of financing international t r ade in the international economy . 
1
In this study the term tariff policy includes all fo r ms of national -
ly imposed restraints on inter national trade . 
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To help put the decis ions in time perspective the important events 
that oc curred in the international e conomy f rom 1956 to 1966 , which af-
fected France , are chronicled in Tdble I. 2 . The thesis begins wit h a 
s tudy of the French decis i on to reject t he British proposal for a Western 
European Free Trade in 1958 after two years of negotiat ions . The ba ck-
ground of the 1965 cri s i s in the European Economic Community (EEC) when 
France decided to pur sue an " empty chair" policy within that organization, 
is our second topic . The French decision to buy gold and to limit U. S . 
investment in France is the subject matter of the last half of the thesis . 
Table I.2. Chronology of the e v e nt s in the international economy which 
we r e of interest to France from 1956 to 1 966 
Date Event 
1956 British propose a Western European Free Trade Area 
1956 Treaty of Rome establishing European Economic Community signed 
1957 Negotiations on the free trade area continue 
1957 National pa rliaments of France, Italy , Germany and the Benelux 
countries r a tify Treaty of Rome 
1958 Treaty of Rome comes into being . Gener al de Gaulle becomes 
President of France. French r eject f ree trade a r ea proposal 
1960 First p roposals by EEC on Common Agricultural Policy 
"Run" on U.S . dollar 
1961 New schemes t o str engthen international monetary system 
British apply fo r memb e r ship of the EEC 
1962 Histor ic decisions on CAP 
1963 Brit i s h appl icati on fo r membershi p of the EEC v etoed by Frarce 
Fr ench c ontrol foreign investment 
French propose creation of a Compos ite Reserve Unit 
1965 Crisis over financing the CAP . Fr e nch pursue " e mpty cha ir" 
policy . General de Gaulle proposes Gold Bullion Standa rd 
1966 Renewal of negotiations for CAP . Britain applies for member-
ship of EEC. Negotiations f or new international moneta ry 
reserves 
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II . TH.E DECI SION TO REJECT A FREE TRADE AREA 
A. The Issue 
By the beginning of 1955 two forces working for regional economic 
cooperation in Wester n Eu r ope had linked together , the quest of the low 
tar i ff countries for a regional trading association, and the strat egy of 
the "Europeans" for integration by sectors to foster an ascending spirit 
of integ ration, leading ultimately , they hoped , to political union . Bu t 
the plan for a European Defence Community (EDC) had failed in 1954 and 
the d r ive to European integration seemed to have come to a halt . 
In 1955 , however , a "relance" of the European movement took place . 
Jean t-lonnet resigned as Director of the European Coal and Steel Communi ty 
(ECSC) to work for the establishment of a European Atomi c Energy Com-
miss ion (Euratom) which met with considerable support . More important , 
however , Paul-Henri Spaak inspired a Benelux proposal to form a Western 
European customs union . The French and the Germans indicated their will -
ingness to participate and the British agreed to " observe" . The result 
was the Messina Conference in 1955 . It established the Spaak Committee 
to draw up a plan to establish a customs union. The Gritish , h~ever, ~ 
would not relinquish so posed a free t r ade area as an alternative to the 
economic union . In 1956 the Spaak Committee reported and the Treaty of 
was signed . During 1957 the Treaty was ratified by the parliaments of 
France , Germany , I taly and the Benelux countries . 
In 1957 the British accepted the fact that the Si x we re seriou sly 
intent on forming a customs union and so they proposed that the newly 
formed EEC should negotiate a free trade area with the other members of 
OEEC . Negotiations began in earnest . In June 1958 General de Gaulle came 
to power in France and in November the French gove r nment announced their 
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decision to reject the British proposal of a free trade a r ea . The rejec -
tion took the form of a statement by I nformation Minister Soustelle : 
It is not possible to fo r m a free trade area as has been wished 
by the British, that is to say , having free trade between the Six 
and the eleven other members of OEEC, without a co~on external 
tariff and without harmonization in the economic and social 
spheres . [Camps (12, p . 165)] 
The British r egarded the French statement as damning t he whole project 
for f orrning a regional trading association in Weste r n Europe . The nego-
tiations were postponed indefinitely by their British Chairman . But t he 
French explicitly stated that they wanted negotiations to continue : 
This [ rejection] does not mean that there is no solution ac -
ceptable to the countries of the Common Market and the other 
Western European count r ies in their efforts [to fo rm a regional 
trading association] . The French government, on it ' s part, is 
actively pursuing one . Also one should not interp ret the 
French position as closing the door [on negotiations] . The fact 
that the British proposal does not seem acceptable means that 
furthe r examination of the problem must be made . [ Camps (1 2 , p . 165)] 
I t is clear that the French woul d not accept a regional trading associa-
tion that did not have " a common external tariff and harmonization in the 
economic and social spheres . " This was equivalent to advocating at l eas t 
a customs union and in fact an economic union in Western Europe . Thus 
i t was a conflict over the type of trading association tha t should be es -
tablished which led to the breakdown of the negotiations for a Western 
European Free Trade Area in 1958. 
B. The Alternatives: Forms of Trading Associations 
There are many diffe r ent forms of trading associations but , in popu-
lar usage, no distinction is made between them. Thus, in 1957 , the 
European Economic Community (EEC) was formed by France , Germany, Italy 
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and the Benelux countries . This association is referred to by various 
names in the popular literature such as " customs union", or "common 
market", or "economic union" . These terms have been g iven precise meaning 
in economics . 
A free trade a r ea is an associat i on of countries which abolishes all 
tariffs and quantitative restrictions on trade between them but each 
country retains its own tariffs against the trade of third countries . 
Thus sorr~ commercial policies (especially tariffs against member count r ies) 
are completely unified though nominally each country r etains an indepen-
dent commercial policy against third countries . However , in order to 
have independent tariffs on the goods of non-members there must be pro-
visions preventing "trade deflection" . Trade deflection occurs if the 
finished or near fini shed goods of th ird countries can enter the trading 
association through the member with the lowest tariff, be processed slight -
ly, and then be re-exported to other members of the free trade area with-
out restriction . In this case there is in effect, a common external 
tariff (customs union) as third country products will only enter through 
the country with the lowest tariff wall . Thus each country does not, in 
fact, have an independent tariff policy against non- member countries and 
so there is not a free trade area . 1 
A customs union is an association of countries which abolishes all 
restrictions on trade between them and also establishes a common external 
tariff on the trade of non-members . Thus there is complete unification 
of commercial policies inside the association and a jointly determined 
1
This point was first brought to my attention in (82) 
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common tariff on the goods of third countries . A f r ee trade area without 
provis i ons against trade deflection would be a customs union with the 
low tari:f country determining the external tariff barrier . However there 
is a l ong history of customs unions that have been established de-
liber ately (cf . Viner, 108) 
A c ommon market i s an association of countries which abolishes all 
trade r estrictions between them, establishes a c ommon exter nal tarif f , 
and abolishes all r es trictions on fa ctor movements between members . The 
countries have a common comme rcial policy and common policies to ensur e 
the free movements of factors between t hem . 
An economic union is an associat ion of countries that establ i shes a 
common commerc i al policy , frees fa ctor movements be tween them and es -
tablishes some degree of harmonization and coordina tion of national pol i-
cies, i n order to remove discrimination due to dispa rities in t hese 
policies . The degree of ha r monizat i on in an economic union va ries . A 
completely integrated union comprises t he unif ication of national mone-
tary, fis cal, commercial and all other polic ies that have an impact on 
trading competitiveness, and the es t ablishment of a s up r a - national 
authority whose dec i s ions are binding on its rn~mbers . 
These were t he different alternat ives open to the policymakers in 
1958 . (They are s umma ri zed in Table II . l . ) The British led the Scandinavi -
ans , Switzerland and Austria in advocating a f r ee trade a rea for Western 
Europe, whil e the French were s upported by Ge r many , I t aly and the Benelux 
countries in favor of an economic union . 
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Table II.l . The alternative fo r ms of trading associations and their 
r equirements 
Requirement 
form of 
trading 
Association 
Free Trade Area 
Customs Union 
Common Market 
Economic Union 
Zero tariffs Common 
between external 
members tariff 
Yes No, except 
default 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
by 
Free move -
ment of 
factors 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
C. The Historical Setting 
Harmonization 
of national 
economic policies 
No 
l\o 
No 
Yes 
The economic situation in Europe and part icularly in France changed 
significantly during the period of the neg otiations for a Western European 
Free Trade Area . Between 1955 and 1958 the volume of GNP increased by 
143 in the EEC , by 63 in the U.K. and by 33 in the U. S . (See Table II . 2) . 
Capital formation continued to increase by more in t he EEC (173) than in 
the U. K. (113) and the U. S. (43) . Thus Europe , ten years after the War , 
continued to show a high rate of saving . Private consumption, however, 
increased in importance in the EEC countries, by 123, which was double 
the increase in the Anglo- Saxon countries . Public consumption declined 
relatively in Britain and increased twice as fast in the EEC (113) as in 
the U. S. Foreign trade increased in importance in all countries, though 
imports lost ground in the U. K. 
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Table II . 2 . Indices of national accounts variables in the U. s ., the U.K . 
and the EEC (1958 = l OO)a 
Variable GNP Gross fixed Private Public Exports Imports 
region and domestic capi- con- con-
y~ar t al formation sumption surnption 
EEC 
1955 88 86 88 90 81 80 
1956 93 92 93 95 86 91 
1957 97 97 97 98 95 98 
1958 100 100 100 100 100 100 
U. K. 
1955 95 90 95 104 91 97 
1956 95 95 95 104 96 96 
1957 99 100 99 102 98 98 
1958 100 100 100 100 100 100 
u.s . 
1955 98 104 95 93 90 88 
1956 99 106 97 93 105 92 
1957 101 105 99 98 113 96 
1958 100 100 100 100 100 100 
aSource : (36) 
On the political s cene during the period the r e occurred an event that 
gr eatly strengthened the movement towards European political union. The 
Anglo- French " Suez - operations" fa iled in the face of U. S.-U. S. S . R. oppo-
sition. This convinced many Western Europeans of their impotence in 
international politics while disunified , and converted many to European 
federalism . 
In 1958 France had an economic crisis . Between 1955 and 1957 con-
sumer prices rose by 33 in France which was in accord with the r est of 
Eu r ope and the U.S . (See Table II . 3 . ) In all these countries hourly gross 
Tabl e IL 3 . I ndices of cons umer prices and hourly gr oss wages (for i ndus try) for sel ected 
countries and yea r s (1958 = l OO)a 
Year Country 
France Germany I taly U. K. U. S. 
Con s umer Hourly Cons ume r Hourly Consumer Hourly Consumer Hourl y Consumer Hourly 
pr i ces gross prices gross prices gross prices gross prices gross 
earnings earnings earnings earnings earnings 
1955 83 76 94 78 93 86 89 nab 93 88 
1956 85 83 96 86 96 91 94 92 94 92 
1957 87 89 98 94 97 95 97 97 97 97 ""' .s::-
1958 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
aSource : (32 , 33 , 34 , 35) 
b na = not available . 
wages rose by about 8% per annum , over the same period . Between 195 7 
and 1958 consumer prices rose by 33 in Germany, 43 in Italy , the U. K. 
and the u.s . Wages rose by 63 in Germany, 53 in Italy and 43 in the U. K. 
and the u.s . In France , on the other hand, consumer prices r ose 143 and 
wages rose by 123. This caused a severe balance of payments crisis and 
led to two devaluations of the f ranc. To r estore equilibrium General de 
Gaulle introduced severe deflationary measures : the link between the 
consumer price index and wages was suspended and wages were frozen , sub-
sidies we re slashed and taxes were increased , an austerity budget was 
adopted in December 1958 . Without these measures France could not have 
fulf illed her obligations under the Rome Treaty and so the EEC would have 
been still - born . In addition the General slashed import quotas and took 
the crucial decision to proceed with tariff demobilization . Thus General 
de Gaulle played a vital role in gett ing the EEC started . 
The day af ter the French decided to reject the free trade area the 
London Times ran a leader entitled "France the Wrecker" which implied 
that France had wrecked any hope for Western European Unity . But the op-
posite view is now more generally accepted . (Diebold (14, p . 96)] 
There is no doubt that ending the negotiations str engthened the 
(European)Community . The best testimonial to that came in the end 
from the British in 1961, when they made it clear they wanted to 
become members of the Community and sugges t ed it would be possible 
for them to do things that had been inconceivable before . 
Thus in retrospect Gener al de Gaulle appears as one of the principal 
founders of the European Community . Indeed it is particularly ironic fo r 
the British to accuse the General of not wanting European cooperation be-
cause their views on political cooperation were closer to his than to any 
other members of the EEC . 
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... fo r the British, de Gaulle's emphasis on intergovernmental 
cooperation [ that is, his functionalist approach] seemed to re-
move one of the mai n obstacles to their joining the Community 
since they have never been able to accept the idea of having 
some supra - national body above Parliament . [Diebold (14 , p . 99)] 
Thus it seems more reasonable to accept the French reasons for r ejecting 
the free trade area at their fa ce value , (lack of common external tariff 
and harmonization of policies) and not to charge de Gaulle with a dis-
like of Western European Union . The French indicated their interest in 
European union but only a particular kind of union (a political confedera-
tion, not a federation) . In 1958 they rejected the free trade area be-
cause they wanted at least a customs union if not some form of economic 
union. If we accept " an independent France within an independent Europe" 
as the slogan of Gaullism then General de Gaulle must have felt that an 
economic union would best achieve these ends . In the next chapter we 
will examine customs unions to see what appeal they had for de Gaulle . 
In Chapters five , six and seven we will see what kind of economic union 
was envisaged by the General . 
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III . ECONOMICS AND TRADING ASSOCIATIONS 
The French government r ejected the proposal for a free trade area in 
Western Europe because they did not wish to join a trading association 
that did not have "a common external tariff and harmonization in the 
economic and social spheres . " To assess the validity of the French posi-
tion it is necessary to outline the reasons why the French wanted a com-
mon external tariff . (The need for harmonization of national policies will 
be studied later in the thesis, in another context . ) We are concerned 
here with that part of French international economic policy which deals 
with tariffs against the products of other countries, and why they felt 
that joining a trading association without a common external tariff would 
defeat their goals . In this chapter a survey of the economic theory of 
trading associations will be made to ascertain, in principle, the differ -
ential effects on the participating countries of customs unions as opposed 
to free ~rade areas . In the next chapter some relevant empirical data 
will be reviewed to ascertain the importance of the theory for France and 
Western Europe in 1958 . 
A. A Survey of the Theory of Customs Unions 
The theory of customs unions is concerned with effects on welfare 
through changes in the international division of labor , the terms of trade , 
economies of scale and economic growth . This study is conce rned with the 
effects of customs unions on the international division of labor (the 
location of production) and the terms of trade . 
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Much of the work on customs unions that has been done in English 
speaking countries has been on their effects on non- participating count r ies. 
Viner (108) began the modern study of cus toms unions (1950) with a book 
noted for its analysis of the effects on non- participating countries , 
while one of the most r ecent contributions is that of Vanek (1965) who 
sees "the problem of total world effects of customs unions as perhaps the 
most important question in the entire customs union issue" ( 107) 
This emphasis on non- participating countries is due to the fact that the 
English speaking countries have not participated in the major customs 
unions of recent times . France , however, has participated , and so we 
will be more concerned with the effects of customs unions on par ticipating 
countries . 
Prior to Viner ' s 1 950 contriou~ion (1om, the state of customs union 
theory has been summarized by Lipsey as follows ( 66, p . 497) : 
Free trade maximizes world welfare; a customs union reduces 
tariffs and is therefore a movement towards free trade; a cus -
toms union will therefore, increase world welfare even if it does 
not lead to a world welfare maximum. 
Viner's major contribution was to expose the fal lacy in this argument as 
follows ( 108, p . 44) : 
.. . The benefit from a customs union . . . derives from that portion 
of the new trade which is wholly new trade .... each particular 
portion of the new trade between the member countries which is a 
substitute for trade with third countries .. . is injurious to the 
importing country, for the external world and the world as a whole , 
and is of benefit only to the supplying member country. 
This is the classic exposition of the "trade creation" and "trade diversion" 
effects of a custom union. Lipsey gives a numerical example which explains 
these effects . Consider three countries A, B, C with fixed exchange rates, 
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and one commodity X. Each is initia lly self suffic i ent ~n x. Their 
costs per unit of X are given in Table IlI . l. If A levies an ad valorem 
tariff of 1003 this means that buyers in A must pay a sum in tax to their 
government equal to the price X is sold to them by foreigners when they 
import. In effect this doubl es the price of A's imports of X. In the 
c ase of a 1 00% tariff the formation of a customs union between A and B 
" creates trade" because r educed tariff c auses A's domestic production t o 
be replaced by cheaper imports from B. There is a shift to a lower cost 
source of supply , and so the union is desir able from the point of view 
of world efficiency and A' s consumers (but not A' s producers) . In the 
case of a 503 ad va lorem tariff the formation of a customs union will di-
vert trade from C to B. This is because prior to the union C supplies 
A and after the union the higher cost producer, B, supplies A. Thus there 
is a loss of world welfare . 
Table III . l . Unit cost of X in three countries at different tariff 
levels (shillings)a 
Tariff rate Country 
A B c 
03 35 26 2 0 
1003 35 52 40 
5~ 35 39 30 
asource: (66) 
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The case for and against customs unions does not rest on this 
analysis alone, however . The analysis ignores the efEects of the union 
on consumption patterns and the terms of trade . However, as Lipsey says , 
prediction of the relative strength of the Eorces for trade creation and 
diversion is a necessary condition for predicting the welfare effects of 
customs unions . He shows that the implication of Viner ' s analys is is 
that the more complementary are the ranges of products protected by the 
countries considering a union the more likely is trade diversion to re-
sult from the union . This says that the more competitive with each other 
are the industries of countries contemplating forming a customs union, 
the less trade diversion and the mor e trade creation is likely to occur 
as a r esult of the union . However, in this case, a customs union is more 
difficult to form . 
Makowe r and Morton (70) further developed the analysis to show that, 
given trade creation will occur, the gains from it will be larger the 
greater the difference between the costs at which the commodity is pr oduced 
in the countries . 
The next major development according to Lipsey was the analysis of 
the consumption effects of customs unions. Viner ' s analysis assumed that 
commodities are consumed in some fixed proportion which is independent of 
the structur e of r elative prices . In Figure III . l we have the space de -
termined by two commodities, Y which is produced in A (a small country) 
and X which is imported from the least cost producer C at terms of trade 
dictated by any taxes or tariffs levied in A. OZ indicates the proportions 
i n which X and Y are consumed in A; QA indicates total output of Y in A. 
Consumption 
of r 
0 B 
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Figure 111 . 1 . Yne effect of a tariff on the consumpt i on of two commodi-
ties , X and Y, when the proportion of consumption account-
ed for by each product is constant 
Cons um pt i~r;i 
of YA ' 
i1 
0 
c· 
Figure III.2 . 
c Consumption of 
x 
The effect of a tariff on the consumption of two commodi-
ties, X and Y, when the proportion of consumption ac -
counted for by each product varies 
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AC are the terms of trade given to A by C. Under free trade the consump -
tion point of A will be at E. If A put a tax on Y the external terms of 
trade would not be affected . The small country's expor t or consumption 
t ax would not change the price of its product to the consumer, so the 
consumpt ion point would remain at E. If, however, A put a tariff on X, 
the imported item, the consumption price in A would rise . Thus, the con-
sumption point would no longer be at E but , because of Viner ' s assumption 
of fixed proportions of consumption between X and Y, the new consumption 
point would also lie on OZ . The new point would probably be closer to 
the origin, say F . 
I n Figure III . 2 we assume the proportions i n which X and Y are con-
sumed can vary when the price ratio varies . (No OZ line is imposed . ) 
Thus the i mposition of a tariff will cause the consumption of X to fall 
and of Y to rise . Let AC again indicate the initial terms of trade . Sup-
pose that the effect on the terms of trade of a tariff on X is t hat indi -
cated by the slope of A'C' . Then the new consumption point is at H r a ther 
than at E , the point under f r ee market conditions . If H r epresents t he 
situation before the union is formed , let us show how trade division may 
cause welfare to rise . Through A draw a line tangent to that in-
difference curve which is tangent at H. At the point W, A' s welfare 
is less than at E . However if the f orrnation of a customs union leads 
to a domestic price ratio greater than that represented by the slope 
of AC , then even i f the union causes trade divers ion A's welfare will rise, 
relative to the pre- union point H. Thus ev en where trade diversion occurs 
a customs union may be beneficial to its participants . The conclusion 
of this analysis i s tha t if trade diversion is defined, as Viner does, as 
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a production phenomenon, we cannot look at it alone to decide whethe r a 
customs union will benefit its proposed members . The effects on consump-
tion patterns must als o be considered . 
Harry Johnson (57) r edefines trade creation to incorporate consump-
tion effects : 
The demand for imports increases [after a union J for two reasons : 
the replacement of domestic by par tne r production of the same 
goods - ' the production effect' - and i ncreased consumption of 
partner substitutes for domestic goods - the 'consumption effect ' . 
Corresponding to these two components, trade creation entails a n 
economic gain of two sorts : the saving on the r eal cost of goods 
previously produc ed domestically and now imported f r om the partner 
country, and the gain in consumer ' s su r pl us f r om the substitution 
of l0\'1er cost means of satisfying wants . (p . 53) 
He gives a geometric presentation of the trade creat ion and trade dive r sion 
effects . He assumes that partner and foreign supply a r e perfectly elastic 
f or goods imported . (A r easonable assumpt i on in the case of a small 
country . ) In Figure III . 3 PQR represents potent ial partner supply and 
P ' Q'R' for eign supply after the tariff is imposed . DD is the domestic 
demand and SS is domestic supply . With a tariff the country consumes OS ' 
of which OT ' i s produced domestically and T ' S' is imported . When the ta riff 
is eliminated because a trading association abolishes tariffs against its 
partners , domestic production falls to OT and c onsumption rises to OS . 
The saving on domestic production r eplaced by imports is QQ'M and the ga in 
in consumers sur plus from substitution of imports for other (high cos t) 
domestic products (substitutes) is R' NR , so that the total gain from trade 
creation is QQ ' M + R' NR . The area PP'QQ' represents a transfer of pro-
duce r s surplus to consumers su r plus, and the area Q' MNR ' is a transfer of 
tax r evenue to consumers surplus both of which cancel each other for t he 
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Figure III . 3 . Trade creation due to a customs union 
country as a whole . The consumers consume at a lower cost to themselves 
which increases their consumers surplus , while the producers receive a 
lower price for their output and so receive less producers surplus . This 
is known as trade creation . The more elastic is the country's demand for 
the commodity and the less elastic is it ' s supply, the more of domestic 
production that will be replaced by trade creation and the greater will be 
the transfer of surplus from producers to consumers . If demand and supply 
were relatively inelastic then demand would not rise by much in response 
to the fall in price (due to the abolition of tariffs) and supply would 
not fall very much . Thus less domestic production would be replaced by 
partner production and so trade creation would be less . 
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Trad~ diversion cannot take place unless there is a sh ift from a 
lower to a higher cost sou rce of supply . Let us assume that the partner 
country is an intermediate cost producer, that is that his costs of pro-
ducing the commodity are intermediate between the high costs of the other 
participating country and the low costs of the rest of the world . When 
the tariff is reduced between the ~wo union countries there is a substitu -
tion for some of the third countries ' supply by partner supply , of the 
commodity under consideration . In addition, commodities that close sub-
stitutes of the commodity will be r educed because of the change i n relative 
prices . This is trade diversion . 
The loss to the country from this source is measured by the 
difference in cost between the two sources of imports multiplied 
by the amount of trade diverted. (57, p. 54) 
Thus given that trade diversion takes place , it is obvious that the loss 
from it to the importing country is greater the larger is the cost differ-
ence between the two sources of imports . This is a logical extension of 
the .Makower and Morton conclusion which stated that , given trade creation 
will occur, the ga ins from it wi ll be l a rger the greater the difference 
between the costs at which the commodity is produced in the two countries . 
Thus if everyone's costs were similar, there would be no concern with 
either trade creation or diversion, but there would be no motivation for 
trade either as no country would have a comparative advantage . 
The trade diversion argument may be illustrated graphically as in 
Figure III . 4 . We assume, as in the trade creation case, that the foreign 
and partner supply curves are perfectly e lastic and represent them by PT 
and --R . P ' T' andjf ' R' are these curves after a tariff of PP' is imposed 
D 
Price 
p 
0 
f\\\\\\\l Public 
~ loss 
36 
revenue 
Quantity 
V7777J,iA Increased foreign 
~ exchange requi r ed 
Figure III . 4 . Trade diversion due to a customs union 
on imports . Before the union the country imports OS ' f rom the foreign 
country at a total cost of OPTS' . When the tariff on partner imports is 
eliminated (the union is formed) the country shifts to importing OS from 
the partner country . For it ' s previous consumption of OS ' it now pays a 
total cost of 01f RS ', representing an increase in cost (a loss) of P~RT . 
This is a loss of public revenue . The loss of public r eve nue must be 
weighted against the consumers gain of a reduction in cost from OP ' to O 
and an increase in consumption from OS ' to OS . 
When trade diversion takes place, the exports of intermediate cost 
partner countries replace third countries low cost exports . To prevent 
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this trade diversion , third countries must take a cut in the price re-
ceived for their exports in order to compete with the intermediate cost 
producer through the tariff barrier . (We have assumed that tariffs are 
fixed , not variable . ) The more inelastic is the supply of third countries, 
that is, the less att r active a re it ' s alternative export markets or the 
alternative uses for the resources in the export industries, t he more 
likely that the third count ries will accept the reduction in price and 
maintain the same amount of exports to the union . If the third countries 
cut their prices there will be a smaller loss to the high cost union 
country from trade diversion. The mor e elastic is the supply of the 
intermediate cost partner country the more effective will be a price re-
duct ion on the pa rt of the low cost third country, in its attempt to main-
tain exports to the union . This occurs because the intermediate cost pro-
ducer will be unable to lower its prices to compete with a price cutting 
low cost thi rd country . Thus a country is less likely to lose from join-
ing a union through trade diversion if supply is inelastic in third coun-
tries and the more elastic is the intermediate cost partner ' s supply . 
Thus if we r elax the assumption of perfect elasticity oE supply of goods 
from the intermediate cost partner count ry and third countries , the loss 
from trade diversion may not be so great . If partner supply is not per-
fectly elastic (if her costs rise as she produces mor e output) then as trade 
diversion takes place in her favor her supply price will rise . The more 
elastic is her supply the greater will be her response to this rise in 
supply price and so the smaller will be her increased output as a result 
of trade liberalization . 
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The relaxation of the perfect elasticity of supply assumption also 
has i~plications fo r the terms of trade . The inelasticity of third 
country's supply means that they will lower their prices to compete with 
the intermediate cost partner through a(fixed) t a riff barrier . This means 
that the prices of their exports will fall or> equivalently > the prices 
of the un ion ' s i mports will fall . If the demand by third countries fo r 
the union's exports i s relatively ine l as tic then the prices of the union ' s 
exports will probably r emain constant or rise because the internaliza -
tion of union exports may cause a fal l in world s upply . A decrease in 
the prices of the union ' s imports and c onstant or rising export prices 
means t ha t the terms of trade of the participating countries with third 
countries will improve w~n they join the union . Thus a country is mo re 
likely to gain in it ' s t erms of trade by joining a cus toms union the more 
inelastic i s the s upply of i mports f rom third countries and the mor e in-
elastic is thei r demand for exports . Such inelasticities are more likely 
if the union is a la r ge one . 
Johnson summarizes his conclusions thus : 
In the first place a country is more likely to gain f rom the creation 
of trade the higher is the initial level of its tarif fs , and the 
more elastic is the domestic demand for and supply of goods which 
the partner is capable of producing . In the second place , a 
country is less likely to lose from trade divers ion the smaller 
are the differences in cost between the par tne r and the foreign 
sources of supply for goods which both can produce , the more elastic 
is the partner s upply and the less e l astic is the foreign s uppl y 
of such goods , and the less the degree of s ubstitutabil ity in 
consumption between goods from part ne r and from f oreign sources . 
Thirdly the country is more likely to gain in its terms of trade 
with the foreign country t he more inelastic is the fore i gn supply 
of imports to it , and the more inelastic is the foreign demand 
for its exports . (57, p . 57) 
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The effect of establishing a customs union on the terms of trade of 
the participating countries has been extensively a nalyzed by Vanek (107) 
The analysis uses thr ee countries A, B, and C, where C is the r es t of the 
world and A and B form a customs union . There a r e two commod ities X and 
Y. A a nd C both export Y and impor t X. Bis the opposite and exports X 
and imports Y. Thus A and C a r e competitors fo r the import market of B. 
We assume per fect competition and no distortions except for tariffs . 
All tariffs are ad valorem and the revenue i s spent so that the government 
balances its budget . 
The offer curve of C, OC, is shown in Figur e III . 5 . It represent s 
the amounts of Y offer ed by C in r eturn for specif ic amounts of x. The 
terms of t r ade are r epresent ed by a r ay through t he orig in . If the off e r 
curve is i nfi nitely elastic with respect to the t e rms of trade the n it is 
a st r aight line through the origin a nd coincides with the terms of trade 
line . 
An Edgeworth Box i s shown in Figure III . 6, fo r countries A and Band 
commodities X and Y. Assume g ive n prices (a given terms of trade) and no 
international trade . The equality of the domestic price ratios and the 
marginal r ates of subs tit u tion determine the allocation of r esources be -
tween the two products in each country, and the "no-trade" consumption 
point P . (We assume there are no stocks . ) Now let us free inte rnational 
trade and hold t he international t e r ms of trade constant . A will now export 
some Y in retu rn fo r X and B will export some X in r eturn for Y. Thus 
the n~w consumption points fo r A and B will lie in the box PB . The con-
sumption po i nts wil l coincide if A and B trade only with each othe r . I f 
(Import>) 
good ) 
0 
Figure III . 5 . 
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Figure III . 6 . "Free trade" consumption points in an international 
Edgeworth Box 
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C enters the market they will not coincide . We move into the box PB 
unt i l we find the point of tangency of A's indifference map and the 
(co::istant) terms of trade . This point Ca we call A's "free trade" con-
sumption point . In a similar manner we find B' s " free trade" consumpt ion 
poi nt, Cb . Because A and C compete for B' s imports , and since B exports 
X and imports Y, then if C is trading, A+B must i mport Y and expor t X. 
Therefore Cb must lie to the west of Ca . 
The commodity space for A is abstracted in Figure III.7 . Give n the 
international terms of trade and the preference functions of the country 
we have determined the "no- trade" consumption point P and the "free trade" 
consumption point Ca. The international terms of t r ade and the domest ic 
terms of trade are the same . Suppose that A puts on an ad valorem tariff 
on its import X. Assume that the tariff does not affect the international 
terms of trade but that the domestic terms of trade shift . We repr esent 
the new terms of trade (domestic) by the line AB in the figur e . C*a i s 
the new " tariff " consumption point . It must lie on the constant inter-
national terms of trade and it must be the point of tangency of the domes -
tic terms of trade and the community indifference curve . Thus i t is unique -
ly determined at the inter section of the inter national te r ms of trade and 
the new domestic terms of trade . 
We now have the "no- trade" consumption point P, two "free- trade" 
consumption points Ca and Cb, and two " tariff" consumption points C*a and 
C*b . (See Figure III . 8) . Once again the trade with C will prevent C*a 
and C*b f r om coinciding and C*a will be east of C*b . The line C*aC*b 
is called the trading vector of A and B. Its l ength projected on the axes 
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Figure III. 7 . The determinat ion of the "tariff" consumption point 
for country A 
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Figure III . 8 . The trading ve ctor of two countries, A and B, under 
the assumption of cons tant inte rnational terms of trade 
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gives th~ deficits and surpluses of the combined countries with the rest 
of the world and the slope of the vector gives the international terms of 
trade . The. international terms of trade are also found by the i nter-
section of the r~st of the world's offer curve OC and the offer curve 
of the two countries OA+B . ( Sc.e Figure III . 8 . ) 
The effect of trade liberalization can be examined in terms of this 
trading vector . Suppose that A and B completely liberalize their trade . 
Let us retain our assumption that OC i s infinitely elastic . This means 
that we have no effects on the international terms of trade a nd so the 
slope of the trading vector remains the same . After the trade liberaliza-
tion the countries are at the "free trade" consumption points Ca and Cb . 
By examining the diffe r ence between the length of the new trading vector 
CaCb and the old trading vector C*aC*b Vanek distinguis hes three cases . 
If CaCb is greater than C*aC*b then the volume of trade between the union 
and the rest of the world remains the same after the union is formed , if 
CaCb is longer th~n the volume of trade has increased and if CaCb is shorter 
then the volume of rade has contracted . Trade liber al ization due to the 
formation of a union lowers prices in the combining countries and so raises 
the income of the individuals in them. Thus Vanek makes the change in the 
length of the trading vector depend on i ncome elasticities . Trade with 
third countries is more likely to rise, the lower the income elasticity of 
the union's exports and the higher the income elasticity of the union ' s 
imports . 
The assumption of an infinitely elastic offer curve of C is relaxed 
in Figure III . 9 . Prior to the union the trading vector of the combined 
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Figure III . 9 . The trading vector of two countries, A and B, under the 
assumption of variable inte rnational terms of trade 
countries and the rest of t he world is OP' . After the union is formed if 
t he length increases there is a new trading vector OP" and t he terms of 
trade of the union de teriorate . If the l e ngth of the trading vector de -
creases then the trading vector becomes OP" ' and the terms of trade of the 
union i mp rove . Thus the terms of trade effect of the un ion depend on the 
same conditions as the change in t he length of the t rading vector . If 
the i r deoand for the commodities which they export to third countries is 
not very responsive to the rise in income then their supply of expor ts to 
third countries will tend to r ise and they will drive down the price of 
their own exports . If their demand for i mports f rom third countries i s 
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responsive to the rise in income th~n they will drive up the price of 
thei~ im?orts . The price of their imports rises and the price of their 
exports falls and so the terms of trade of the participating countries 
deteriorate when they join the union . Thus the less income inelastic is 
their demand for the ir own exports and the more income elas t i c is their 
demand for third country imports, the more likely that the terms of trade 
will move against the combining countries when a trading association is 
established . 
Viner (108) showed that any movement closer to free trade is not 
nec~ssarily desirable if it does not bring about complete free trade , es -
pecially if it involves trade discrimination against third countries . 
Similarly, in recent years, it has been realized by economists that any 
movement away from free trade, by imposing a tariff for example , does not 
necessarily harm everybody ' s welfare . Thus there is a large literature 
on the theory of the optimum tariff . The existence of the optimum can be 
seen from Figure III . 10 . Suppose that A and Bare trading under free 
trade . Their equilibrium is at E and the international terms of trade 
are given by the slope of OE . If A imposes a tariff then it shifts it's 
offer curve to OA' and the new international terms of trade are given by 
the slope of OP . A gains because of the move to a higher indifference 
curve II . A continues to gain until she imposes that rate of tariff that 
shifts her offer curve to intersect OB at T where her indifference curve 
III is tangent to OB . The international terms of trade are given by the 
slope of OT . This tariff level is the O?timurn tariff level and has been 
found to be equal to the elasticity of the foreign offer curve minus one . 
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Figure III . 11 . Equilibrium under tariff warfare 
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This analysis ignores the effects of A's actions on B, however . At 
T, where A is on her highest indifference curve B has suffered a loss of 
welfare . It will now pay B to impose her own optimum tariff to move her 
domestic terms of trade and offer curve to OB' where it intersects OA" 
so that OA" is tangent to B' s highest indifference curve . (See Figure 
III . 11) . This is known as retaliation or tariff warfare . This retalia-
tion may go on until A' s indifference curve is tangent to B' s offer cur ve 
where B' s indifference curve is tangent to A' s offer curve . This was the 
conclusion of Scitovsky (79 ) . Johnson (58), however, pointed out that 
Scitovsky ignored the possibility of the optimum tariff being a reduction 
in the previous level of tariffs . In this case there may be a " tariff 
cycle" with both countries raising their tariffs, then reducing them , 
then raising them, and so on. In this situation the countries will prob -
ably meet together and negotiate a settlement to ensure stability in their 
trading relations . The incentives to other countries to negotiate such a 
settlement with an economic power such as Western Europe , and the amount 
of bargaining p""7er of Western Europe are both likely to be much larger 
under a trading association with a common external commercial policy, a 
customs union , than one without one, a free trade area . 
B. A Survey of the Theory of Free Trade Areas 
Unlike customs unions, free trade areas have received little attention 
in economics . Much of the work done on customs unions, however, has some 
application to free trade areas . The most interesting application , from 
our point of view, has been made by Shibata (82 ) . 
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Shibata ' s model has two countries, Hand L, and one commodity . Both 
countries have fixed ad valorem tariffs, Tl in L and Th in H. He assumes 
that both countries are deficit in the production of the commodity, so 
the tariffs are effective . The country with the highest costs, H, has a 
higher tariff than the lower cost country, L. If Pw is the world price of 
the commodity then Pl = Pw + Tl and Ph = Pw + Th. Let Pu be the price of 
the commodity in a trading association formed by L and H. If the t r ading 
Pl + Ph assoc~ation is a customs union then (in general) Pu = 2 
If the trading association is a free trade area without effec tive measures 
against trade deflection then Pu , de facto, becomes Pl . We are interested 
in the case of a free trade area with effective anti - trade deflection 
measures . 
Let us assume perfect elasticity of supply for the rest of the world . 
(Shibata demonstrates his conclusions without this assumption in an ap-
pendix . ) This assumption means that the world price Pw is unaffected by 
the actions of the trading association . In Figure III . 12 OSI is the "no-
trade" domestic supply curve of country L. Suppose the world price is 
represented by Pw and that L permits international trade subject to a fixed 
tariff Tl . The supply curve facing L ' s consumers now becomes ~SR , the 
"tariff" supply curve . Tne lower hor i zontal section PW is used because 
if Pw is greater than Pl L ' s output will be exported. If the demand curve 
of L is DL (it intersects OSI above S) then L ' s consumers wil l be supplied 
OA Of the good . Of this ON will be from domestic production and NQ will be 
imported . The price in L will be Pw + Tl . If the demand curve of L is 
Dl' (it intersects OSl below S) then L's consumers will be s upplied OM of 
Price in L 
=PL 
P' 
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the good at a price Pl . All this supply will be :rom domestic sour ces . 
We assumed L to be a deficit producer so we are only interes t ed in the 
case where DL is the demand curve of L . 
In Figure III . 13, OSh is the " no- trade" domestic supply curve of 
country H. H is a higher cost producer than is L , so at any price whe r e 
Pl = Ph , the quantity supplied by L wi ll be greater than the quantity sup -
pl i.?d by H. The world pr ice is again Pw and H permits inter national trade 
subject to a fixed tar i ff Th . (The figure depicts the case where Th i s 
greater than Tl . ) The supply curve facing H' s consumer s becomes PW ' TU . 
(The "tariff" supply curve . ) If the demand curve of H is Dh ( it i nte r sect s 
OSh above T) then H' s consumers will be supplied OK of the good . Of this 
OJ will be from domestic production and JK will be i mported . The pr i ce 
will be Pw + Th . If the demand curve of H is Dh ' (it intersects OSh 
above T) then H's consumers will be supplied OI of the product at a pr ice 
Ph . All this SU?ply will be from domestic sources . Since we assumed H 
to be a deficit producer and has high costs we are only interested in the 
case where the demand curve is like Dh . 
When a free trade area is formed we add the two supply curves hor i -
zontally to get their joint supply curve . However, there is one restric tion 
that must be placed on this curve . Ignoring the political difficulties 
involved, the definition of a free trade area we have employed permits 
the intermediate cost producer, L, to export all its output to H and to 
satisfy its own consumers by importing f r om the least cost pr oducer in 
the rest of the world . This means that in practice there is a maximum 
on L ' s production equal to her domestic consumption+ H' s c onsumption . 
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When a free trade a r ea is formed , the price of the commodity in the 
area is e~ualized for both pa r ticipating countries . Let us call this 
price Pu . If Pu i s less than Pw then the production of the commodity i n 
the area will be exported to the rest of the world . The maximum amount 
that can be exported is PW from L (see Fi gure III . 12) and PW ' from H 
(see Figure III . 13) . Thus there will be a lower horizontal stretch of 
the joint supply curve facing the consumers in the f r ee t r ade area , repre-
sented by PW* in Figure III . 14 . PW*= PW +PW' . As Pu r ises above Pw, 
the supply curves of L and H are added horizonta l ly to get the joint sup-
ply curve, until Pu = Pw T Tl . In Figure III . 14 this str etch is r epre-
sented by W*S* . At Pu = Pw T Tl, the supply offe r ed to t he consumers of 
the free trade area is ON from L (see Figure III . 12) and some quantity less 
than OJ from 1l (see Figure II I. 13) . Thus ON* is equa l t o this quantity 
from R plus ON from L, in Figure III . 14 . 
At any price above Pw + Tl it pays L to export her domestic production 
to H, and to import from the rest of t he wor ld to satisfy her own consumer s . 
L will continue to export to H until she is exporting all he r domestic 
out put to Hat that pr ice (Pw + TL) . From Figure III . 12 we see that at 
Pl = Pu = Pw + Tl, L ' s domestic output is ON , so that O~ = S*R* i n Figur e 
III . 14 . After L has exported S*R* to H and imported for her own consumers 
the sa~e quantity from the rest of the world , i f demand i n the f r ee trade 
area is still unsatisfied the price , Pu , will rise above Pw + Tl . Then 
the supply curves of the two countries, H and L , are added horizontally 
once aga·n until Pu= Pw +Th . This str etch of the joint supply curve is 
r epr esented as R~T* in Figure III . 14 . 
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At Pu = Pw + Th, L procuces and exports to H a quantity greater than 
ON (see Figure III . 12) and imports that same quantity from the rest of the 
world . At Pu = Pw ~ Th, H produces OJ for domestic consumption (see 
Figure III . 13) and imports zero from outside the free trade area . Thus 
in Figure III.14, OJ* is equal to some quantity of production in L that 
is greater than ON plus the quantity of production, OJ , in H; at any 
price in the free trade area above Pw + Th, H imports some quantity equal 
to th~ demand minus OJ*, from the rest of the world . 
We have assumed that both countries are deficit producers and so im-
ports from the rest of the world must be positive after a free trade area 
is formed . This m~ans that we are only interested in that portion of the 
joint supply curve which corresponds to a quantity consumed in the free 
trade area greater than ON* in Figure III . 14. Shibata uses this part of 
the curve to illustrate his analysis of trade creation and trade diversion 
in a free trade area . We reproduce this part of the curve (on a smaller 
scale) in Figure III . 15 . There are thr ee cases illustrated by 01, D2 , n3 , 
where D is the demand curve of H. Let PSu denote the joint supply curve 
of the free trade area countries after the area is established . Because 
L and H are deficit producers, and because the supply curve of the rest 
of the world to the union is perfectly elastic, Pu , the free trade area 
price, will be greater than or equal to Pl after the area is established , 
and less than or equal to Ph . 
Shibata analyzes trade creation and trade diversion by examining the 
position of H's demand curve on the joint supply curve . H' s demand curve 
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is used for the sake of simplic i ty because it clarifies the trade d i -
version effect of the f r ee t r ade a r ea . If o1 is the demand curve of R 
cutting the joint supply curve PSu beyond T*, say at X, then Pu = Ph 
afte r the f ree t r ade a r ea is formed . PhU is the quantity produced by H 
and T*and T*X is ~he quantity imported from third countries by H. UE 
represents L ' s output . Thus L ' s imports from t h ird countries to sat isfy 
the gap in he r domestic supply due to her exports to R amount to PhX 
(H ' s consumpt i on) minus the sum of PhU (R's output) , T*X (H ' s imports f r om 
third countries) and UE (her own output) . This i s equal to S*R* . The 
usual definit i on of t r ade diversion must be modified to make t his analys i s 
more meaningful, however . Trade dive rsion has been defined as the quant i-
ty of trade r esulting from the replacement of third country produce r s by 
i nter mediate cost pa rtne r country produce r s af ter a trading association 
has been formed . I n the case we a r e analyzing (because n1 represents H' s 
demand curve) at a price Ph in R, H would have impor ted UX f rom least cost 
third countries if a free trade a r ea had not been formed . Now only T*X 
has been imported by H from leas t cos t third countries so a quantity of 
t r ade diversion equal ~o UT* has taken place , according to R' s consumers . 
Howeve r, at Ph L exports ET* to H (trade diversion) but must i mport S*R* 
to satisfy t he gap in he r domest i c supply as a r esu lt of the exports to 
H. Thus , f rom the point of view of producer s in third cou nt r ies S*R* 
is s till exported to the f r ee trade a rea at a price Ph , albeit through 
different ports . For them t rade diversion amounts t o UT* - S*R*. Shibata 
calls UT* g ros s trade diversion and UT* - S*R* net trade diversion . 
I f D2 is H' s demand curve and it cuts the joint supply curve PSu 
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between R* and T*, say at Y, then Pl(.. Pu <.Ph, after the free trade area 
is established . At a price of Pu if the free trade area was not formed 
the.:L H would produce PuV and import VY f rom least cosr; ~hird countries . 
Atter th~ a rea is formed all of VY comes from the intermediate cost 
partner and s o is the amount of gross trade diversion . However , L must 
import sxR* frora third countries to sa.tisfy the gap in domestic supply due 
to her exports to H . . Therefore net trade diversion is VY - S*R* . 
If D3 is H's aemand curve and it cuts the joint supply curve PSu 
between S* and R*, say at Z, then Pu = Pl after the free trade area is 
established . H produces PlD and L produces DS* . L exports S*Z to H and 
imporr;s S*Z to s~tisfy the gap in her domestic s upply due to the exports 
to H. Gross trade diver~ion is DZ and net trade diversion is DZ - S*Z . 
Suppose the world supply curve is not perfectly elastic , but slopes 
upwarc to the right . Then as trade diversion takes place the world price 
will fa 11 . This is a more r easonable outcome in the case where the par-
ticipating countries of the free trade area account for a significant por-
t ion of world trade . Because the world supply price falls net trade di-
version will tend to be less than under a perfectly elastic supply curve 
because less hi6 h cost free trade area production will be expanded to re-
place third countries' exports . This is the same as the result we obtained 
when we compared a customs union facing a world supply curve that was 
perfectly elastic with one that was facing a world supply curve that was 
not perfectly elastic . 
The larger is the output of the corm:odity in country L (prior to the 
formation of the free trade area) rela tive to the output of the commodity 
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in H, thG more of h 's high cost production that will be replaced by L 
after the free trade area is established, and thus is the greater is the 
trade crea~ion cffec~ . Shibata notes that if L is a specialized economy 
its output is likely to be larger (relative to d's) than if Lis diversi -
fied . Thus he suggests that the more specialized is an economy , the mor e 
likely it will gain from trade creation due to a free trade a r ea . How-
ever, a specialized economy will not be able to "balance" her gains and 
losses from a common external tariff (that is an arithmetic mean rather 
than an average weighted by the relative importance of corr.nodities) as 
well as a diversified economy . Thus he suggests that a specialized 
economy will ~end to favor a free trade area and a diversif ied economy 
will tend to favor a customs union . We shall see in the next chapter 
that French production was much more diversified than the British in 1958 . 
These suggestions are analogous to the suggestions made about trade 
diversion effects of customs unions established by complementary as op-
posed to parallel economies . Lipsey ( 6 6) showed that the more comple-
mentary are the ranges of products produced by countries contemplating 
forming a customs union the more likely is trade diversion to occur as a 
result . The more diversified are the ranges of production of countries 
contemplating forming a trading association, the less complementary are 
their ranges of production likely to be, and so the more likely is trade 
diversion to result . Since the intermediate cost partici pating country 
gains from trade diver sion due to a trading association, then it favors 
such trade diversion . Thus if a diversified economy and a specialized 
economy are contemplating forming a trading association, and if the diversi-
58 
fied economy sc~s the possibility of replacing third countries exports to 
the specializ~d economy, the diversified economy is likely to favor a cus -
toms union, unless the specialized country agrees to maintain her tariff 
against the rest of the world . 
This leads us to consider one implicit assumption made by Shibata 
which , if relaxed, would do much to destroy the validity of his conclu -
sions . He assumes that both countries will maintain their tariffs against 
the rest of the world at the same levels as they were pr ior to the formation 
of the free trade area . He assumes that after the free trade area is formed 
and His satisfying he r domestic demand by imports, that she will not re -
duce her tariff against the rest of the world to zero in order to get her 
imports at the least cost source , but will import from L whose costs are 
higher than the rest of the world . However, in r eality trade diversion 
will never take place because in the cases where it might arise the higher 
cost meober of the trading association (or that member who has no signif i -
cant output of the coomodity prior to the formation of the association) 
will always reduce its tariffs to zero against the rest of the worl d as 
well as against its i ntermediate cost pa=tners , if the association allows 
her to have an independent tariff policy against third countries . Tnus 
in a free trade area (where tariff policies against third countries are 
independent) the intermediate cost producers have no assurance that they 
can secure the markets of higher cost members vis a vis the rest of the 
world . This is a strong argument for a customs union from the point of 
view o~ an intermediate cost producer and for a free trade area from the 
point of view of a high cost producer (see Table III . 2) . In the cases 
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Table III.2 . Influence of a country's cost level on her attitude to a 
fixed or variable external tariff 
Cost level High Intermediate Low 
external tariff 
policy 
Fixed external tariff Indifferent Favor Favor 
Variable external 
tariff Ind if Ee rent Oppose Oppose 
where the high cost producer finds it beneficial to reduce her tariffs to 
zero against the rest of the world (at the expense of her intermediate 
cost partners) she might be able to negotiate r eciprocal trade concessions 
(benefitting herself) with thi r d countries . In 1958, the U. K. was uniquely 
placed to be able to negotiate such trade agreements with the Commonwealth 
and this was one of the reasons that the French objected to making the U. K. 
the "cross-roads of the t wo free trade areas" . 
C. Theoretical Arguments for a Customs Union Rather 
Tnan a Free Trade Area 
Our survey of the theory of trading associations has yielded three 
possible argumen~s why the French would not join a trading association 
that did not have a common external tariff , the '' intermediate cost argu -
ment", the "trade diversion argument" , and the "terms of trade argument" . 
1 . The. "intermediate cost argument" 
If two countries contemplate forming a trading associ ation, the i nter -
mediate cost argument supporting a common external t ar i ff a rises for that 
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countr-y which has the majority of its com..":lodities produced at a level 
of costs intermediate between the high level in the other participating 
country and the low level in some expor ting third country . When a t rading 
assoc iation is es~ablishcd and commodities are free to move from one pa r -
ticipating country to the other wi~hout tariffs , some (or all , if the sup-
ply is completely elastic) of the production in the high cost participant 
will be replaced by imports . Without the security of a common external 
tariff, the intermediate cost country has no gua r ant ee that it will ob-
tain the rna rke~ in the high cost country . The high cost coun~ry may 
eliminate i~s t ariffs agains t least cost third countries and thus provide 
the commod ities to it's consumers from the cheapest source . When a t rad i ng 
associQtion is established between two countries, bo:h cou ntries will be 
low, intermediate and high cost producers in different commod ity groups . 
With f ixed tariffs against the rest of the world both countries stand to 
benefit from either being the i nter 1ediate cost country or to lose froo 
hav i ng thei r partners as intermediate cost countries . Thus a country 
mus~ weigh the gains to its consumers f rom being able to extend free trade 
to low cost third countries, against the loss to its producers f r om allow-
ing the partner country to extend the free trade area also . 
2 . The "trade diversion argument" 
If two countries contemplat e forming a trading assoc i at ion , the trade 
diver sion argument for a common external tariff also arises for t hose com-
modities where one of the par~icipants i s an intermed i a te cost producer . 
In this case, however , the high cost (partner) c ount r y has l ittle or no 
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domestic production of the commodity prior to the formation of a trading 
association, but consu~~s a consid~rable amount . So, presumably, the high 
cost cou:1try imports her supplies of the commodity from the cheapest 
source, w lvN cost third cou:1try . After fonning a trading association 
goods move freely between the participants without tariffs . The low cost 
third country is J~scrim~n~ted against by external tariffs and must now 
co~pete with the intermcdinte cost producer inside the association fo r 
the warKets of th~ high cost participatinb country at a disadvantage . If 
the inter~cdiate cost producer captures some of the market then trade di -
vers ion taKes place . The r~al cost to the high cost producer rises and 
the government revenue falls . How~ver , without the secur ity of a common 
extG~nal tariff, thG intermediate cost producer cannot be sure that the 
high cost partner country will not reduce its tariffs to zero against the 
low cost third country , in order to supply her consumers at the cheapest 
cost . If the commodity is important to consumers in the high cost countr y 
and to ?roducers in the intermediate cost country a considerable conflict 
will arise over how much of the market should be supplied by the inter-
mediate cost country even when a customs union is established . However by 
f ixir.g a common ext~rnal tariff the intermediate cost country is sure that 
whatever gains it makes will not be lost by the high cost country reducing 
h~r .... a riffs against the rest of th ... world, without ner assent . Once again, 
it is necessary to point out that each country stands to gain from trade 
d~vcrsion in her portners markets and to lose from trade diversion in her 
own markets, when she joins a trading association with a common external 
tarif f . Thus a country oust weigh the gains to its producers from trade 
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divers ion in :i.er partners markets against tne loss to her consumer s f rom 
trade diversion in her own markets . 
3 . T~e "terr:is of tr~.:.e ar,aume;-it" 
The terms of trade of a country are defined as the ratio of its ex-
port pric~s to its import prices . If the participating countries of a 
trad i ng association together account for a l~rge portion of world trade , 
then a common external tariff is lik~ly to improve their terms of trade 
with the rest of the world. If intra- association trading rises , e ithe r 
due to trade creation or trade diversion, then the associations exports 
will fall and imports will fall from the rest of the world . If the asso-
ciation is an im?ortant supylier of world ~xports, then the reduction in 
its suyply to the world will cause a significant fall in the total supply 
of ex?orts to the world . This fall in supply will cause a rise in the 
world price , or to pu t it differently , a rise in the world prices of those 
com:nodi~ies which the tradi;-ig association eA~orts . Similarly, the increase 
in intra- trad i ng assoc i ation trade will cause the imports of the associa -
tion from the rest of the world to fall . If the association accounts for 
an important portion of the demand for wor d imports, then the reduction 
in its demand will cause a ~ignificant fall in the demand for world im-
ports . This fall in demand will cause a fall in the world price, or to 
put it differently , a fall in the world prices of those commodities which 
the trading association imports . A ~all in the ?rices of it ' s imports and 
a rise in the prices of its exports means that the terms of trade of the 
tradiP-g c.ssociation with the rest of the world have improved . Thus , the rise 
in intra - assoc iation trade gener ates favorable terms of trade . The effect 
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will not be. so larJe in a free trade area as unaer a co:n..~on external 
tariff ~f high cost me~ber countries re~uce their tariE=s against the rest 
of the. world to zero in the cases where their par'-ner countries are inte r -
med iatc co~t produc~rs . Fu=tn~rmorc in a large union a common external 
tariff will increase the bargaining power of the participating countr ies 
at international trade negotiations and so will increase the likelihood 
of gains in their cerms of trade . 
Thus when countries consider formir~g a trading association and have 
to Jc.ci~e whet~er they need a common external tariff or not they must 
weight t~e net ef:ects of each of these arguments, the intermediate cost , 
trad~ diversion and terms of trace arguments, against each other . The 
algeb=aic sum or the net gains from the trade diversion and intermediate 
cost cirguments must be added to or oalanced against the positive gain in 
the t~rms o: trade that is likely to result from the common external tariff . 
In 1958 G.?.neral de Gaulle decided that France needed the security of a 
common external tariff . Thus we can infer that he identified France as 
a) generally an intermediate cost producer 
b) s~ldom a high cost producer of significant expor ts 
c) likely to benefit substantially in h~r terms of trade from join-
ing a crading association with a corrunon external tariff . 
The losses to France from perrnittinJ Er~d entry of W~stern European goods 
would have been the costs of large structural changes ~hat would have to be 
mad~ by th~ hig~ly protected French economy . These costs de Gaulle was 
prepared to accept, apparently, in exchange for assured access to her part -
ners m~rkets for France's intermediace cost producers and the gain in her 
terms of trade from a Western European customs union . 
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IV . TilE JUSTIFICATION OF THE FRENCH DECISION 
TO REJ::::CT A FREE TlLDE AREA 
The French government rejected the proposal for a free t r ade area in 
Western Europe because they did not wish to join a trading association 
that did not have "a common external tariff and harmonization in the 
economic and social spheres". In this section of the thesis we are con-
cernea with the r easons why the French wanted a common external tariff . 
We have surveyed the theory of trading associations and found three pos -
sible arguments in support of the French decision: the ''intermediate 
cost" argument, the "trade diversion" argument , and the "te r ms of trade" 
argument . 
However, these a r guments must not be interpreted in the traditional 
manner : 
... the [pol icy] relevance of traditional theory depends on a 
particular assumption •. . that the government seeks to maximize 
rec:.l income but is ill - informed how to do so .. . . Under different 
assumptions [ tradit::.onal international economic theory J would 
have to be interpreted differently . [Johnson , (55, p . 256)] 
The evaluation of arguments for a p~rticular decis i on of economic policy 
must take account of goals other than the maximization of r eal income . In 
this study we attr i bute three goals to government policy : development 
(growth) , security and equity, that is , a just distr ibution of income and 
opportunity. Thus we accept arguments in favor of an economic policy de -
cision if they concern themselves not only with developing the national 
income, but on securing it and distributing it in an equi table manner . 
This approach conforms to that taken by the OEEC countries during the free 
trade ~rea negotia~ions . In addition to the development of the national 
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income th~y rc.'luir-.:d that ti · rL:\! tr.:..de area hav\! three other characteristics, 
"reciprocity, non- discrL.,in..ition , and equilibrium" ( 7 5, fL) The require-
nent of c~u~librium is just anoth~r Wciy of expressing the goal of sta -
bility or security of the national income . Th~rc is an upper bound to the 
amount of adjustm~nts a country will accept as part in response to a 
policy cecisio~ no mutter how fast the national income grows or how op -
timally it is dist ributed as a result of the dc.cision . In its efforts to 
increase the gra~th of the national income and to distribute it equitably 
the government must not allow the fluctuations about the equilibrium path 
to become too large . The requirement of non-discrimination reflects the 
desire of eac~ country to share equally in the benefits of a free trade 
area . This is one aspect of the broad goal of government policy in inter -
natio~al negotiations , the goal of reciprocity , which leads countries to 
re=use to l~Ner their tariffs unilaterally, even where such a decision 
would be to their benefit . The desire for reciprocity shows that nations 
are concerned, in trade negotiations, not only with increasing their in-
come but in ensuring that the increased income is distributed "equitably" 
between the participating countries . Thus, in international economic 
policy, the desire Eor non-discrimination and r~ciprocity reduces to the 
usual Ge6ire for equity . 
In 1956 , all the OEEC countries agreed to negotiate for a free trade 
""rea because they recogniz~d that free trade stimulated the growth of their 
economics . Difficulties arose , however, becaus~ the negotiating governments 
often dir=ered in their asscss~~nt of the effect~ of a free trade area o~ 
thei= goals of security and equity . 
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The rrl!nch regarded the negotiat.ions for freeing trade as the "ex-
chang~ of prl!f~r~ntial tre.at.ment" . In exchange for granting the entry of 
Br itish goods int.o France they demanded access t.o sales of equal signifi-
cance in th~ British market . Furthermore, 
A French manufacturer would be counting not on l y on free ent r y 
into the market of a par tner country but also on a preferred 
position in that market in relation to third countries . [ Frank , 
( 42 ) p . 2 21) ] 
If France had the lowest production costs in the world in t hese manufac tures 
then the oanufacturer would not have demanded preferential access to the 
British market . Thus we see that this desire must have reflected the 
views of those French producers whose costs we r e intermediate between the 
British high costs and a third country's lowest costs of production . From 
our study of the theory we saw that intermediate cost producers advanced 
two arguments for a customs union (corrunon external tariff) , the inter-
mediate cost argument and the trade diversion argument . 
In addit ion, the. French wanted a common external tariff because they 
felt. that the economic union of Europe would help it to be.come the world ' s 
Third Power . From our study of the theory of trading associations we saw 
that this argument could be identified with the terms of trade a r gument in 
its trade considerations . The French concern with mak i ng Europe a Third 
Power was partly due to their reali2ation that their power had d i minished 
during and a=ter the Second World War . The British, on the other hand , had 
emerged &s victors from the War and their foreign policy was built on 
"special relationships" with the U. S. and the Commonwealth: they thought 
of the:r.selves a s the Tttird Power . Thus, they were not so concerned with 
the inc~eased bargaining power and the terms of trade arguments fo= a 
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cu::;toms union . 
.lh..!r.:?.for.:?., w.:?. can scl! th ... t the three theor<:.tical arguments for pre-
ferring ~ customs union over d :rec tr~a..! area can be applied to the ne-
goti~tions for a free trade arl!a in Western Europe in 1958 . The purpose 
of this chapter is to examine the eLpirical data on Wes t ern Europe in 1958 
to see what practical significance the arguments had . un=ortunatcly all 
the data ncedca to permit a thorou5h quantitative examination of the a r gu -
cents is :1.0t av ... i lab le . however, w.:: will exai:".ine each argument in the 
ligt.t o: any r..::.levant aata we have found and make sugges-r.ions for f urther 
research . 
A. The Intermediate Co::;t Argument for a Common Exter na l 
Ta r iff in Weste rn Europe in 1958 
The i:1.ter~ed~ate cost argument applies to those co!Ullodities where the 
level of French cos-r.s of ?reduction are inter~ediate between the high 
level in the U. K. and the low level in soa.e :1.on-Western European export-
inJ coL~try . In these circuas-r.ances, i : f r ee trade is established be-
tw~en the U. K. and France, it will pay the British to reduce thei r tariffs 
against the non-Western European country also , in order to supply her 
consumers at least cost . If a common external tariff i s established , 
then the U. K. cannot reduce her tariff against the non-Western Eu r opean 
cou1.try, without the acquiescence of Frdnce . Thus the French can be sure 
of a:1.y marke~s they secLre a~~er free tra~~ . This argument ~as s-r.rength-
enec b; the fact that t he U. K. had a "s pecial relationship" whh the 
Coo.7.onweal~h . Thus if it was profitable for the U. K. to reduc e her ta r iffs 
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to ~~ro ag;:iinst a Commonw .... alth country becaus\.! of the intermediate cost 
posiLion of Pr~nc~, it might have been poss~ble for her to have negotiated 
rcciproc::tl tariff c.::>ncess ions in return fro.rt the Commonweal th . 
'i'he intermediate cost ar0c~ent b .... <lrs ctn interc~ting relationship to 
the goals of government policy which we have attributed to General de Gaulle , 
grow-r:h, s .... curi-r:y and equity . During the negotiations for a f r ee trade area 
all the negotiat:ors were c.gre.ac that free trade would enhance thei r econo-
mies' growth . However, the implications of the argume t for their goals 
of S¢cu=ity and ..... uity was~ very controversial issue . The French main-
tained that without the security of a common external tariff , they could 
not b~ sure of securing ~he gains from free access to the British ma r ket . 
In a free trade area, their security would be endangered because of the 
likelihood of large fluctuations in th~ir eX?Orts to the U. K. , as the 
Brii::Lsh a:anipulated their tariffs against non-Western European countries 
to secure the rr~ximum benefi~ from free trade . 
T'r.e large= the range of production over which France was an inter-
~ediate cost procucer, relative to the British range, the more likely that 
the ga~ns from establishing free trade in Western Europe would not be d i s -
tribu~~d in a. man~cr deemed equi-r:able by the French . This is because free 
trade would cause French high cost producers to go out of business , and 
i~ter~~diat~ cost produc~rs would rec~iv~ no gains . Thus the only French 
produc.;rs who would ber,ef it would be those wit.h the lwest level of costs 
in the world, and then th.:: Britis,1 consumer would benefit . Of course only 
1G2st cost British producers would ben .... fit too . But if French intermediate 
cost ?roduc-r:ion was more widespread than the British , the opportunity cost 
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for Fr.:tnce o:. joinir.g a tru.Jin~ c:.ssocic:.tion withouL a co;noon externa l 
t.'.!riff would b\; hiJhcr th.:::n for the U. K. Thus a .i:rce trade area would not 
cii~tr~b~tc ~he g.'.!ins from tree trace in w~stern Europe in the most favor -
able Tu<lrrner to France unless it was accompanied by a common externc:l tarif f . 
Thus it becomes necessary to determine t he ratio of French inte r -
m~diate cost production to Jritish intermediate cost product ion . To do 
this we need data on c ost levels in West~rn Europe in 1958 . Such data 
is not availabl~ and would be ext r emely difficult to obtain . It would 
first be necess~ry to fine the cost of inpu t s for each commod ity for each 
fi r m in e.ach country . The inputs would not be homogeneous so s ome weighted 
avera0 e would have to be employed . Also , 
cost datu. c<ln be built up only .:or whole plc.r.ts , cor:;panies or 
groups of corr~odities, rather than fo r precisely specified 
individual commodities . International cost compar isons fo r 
individual proaucts would be distorted by the diversity of 
~cthods of allocation of costs in different fi r ms and 
cou ntries . (62, p . 21) . 
The data that would be necessary would be costs per commod ity per firm per 
country . FirsL it would be necessary to get a weighted average of t he cost 
of ~ach commodity over all firws . The~ it would be necessary to r ank 
the costs. per cot:imodity for each country and to find the r elative frequency 
of each level of costs per country . To es timate whether one country is 
hi6 r . ..;r cost then another tncse two fr~quency distributions might be c om-
pared . However , even if the data were available , the aggregat ion problems 
encountered in estimating these f =equcncy distributions would be enor mous . 
A more indirect ~ethod of evaluating international c ompetit iveness 
woul d be to compare of fer prices . This, of course , has several drawbacks . 
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Information ~bout pr ices , although easier to obtain in pri nciple, i s i n 
fact not c~sily ~ccessible . Furthermore , offer prices r eflect other i n-
ternational di:f~rences bes~d~s u~::erences in costs o= production , e . g . 
trans?o=t costs, dif=erent cconolliic polici~s such as taxes , subsid i es , 
d rop i ng and so on . Thir dly, 
?rice di:f~rences . .. reflect the fact that the price is part of 
a p~~~~o~ wnich inclu~e~ sp~ec o= delivery, credit terns , ease 
of oraer, or .uaiity 0: uLter sale service, in which the non-
pric~ elements offset, tor some, but not necessarily for a l l 
buyers, the appa r ent price difference . (o2 , p . 17) 
For these reasons , offer pr ice differences were abandoned as a measu r e 
oE r elative costs in di fferent countr i es . 
Another indi=ect way to es~imate cifferences in internatio~~l com-
petit::.veness would be to use differences in tcJriff levels . However, no 
conpletely reliable nethod of calculat i ng a countr y ' s t a riff l evel has 
been established . The most common method of estimati ng a count r y ' s tariff 
level ~s i:O use the unweighted arithmetic average of impor t duties . Thus 
: c d" i s the cuty on pr odt:.ct i , and if "chere are n pr oducts , t he est i ma te 
n 
would be of tne fo r m l/n t... d. . However, many countries have "historic 
i =l ). 
tariffs " which are hangovers from a period when they wer e ne t i mpo r ters 
of co::unodities and were not abolishGd after they became net expor ter s . I t 
SG~=s r idiculous to i nclude such tariffs in an estimate of the t a r iff leve 
An unweighted average implicitly assumes the same import val ues fo r each 
product . In ~ddition , 
\·:':1.il~ on'-' country s-..parat>.!S ~ certa:i.n proJuct cat.:!gory into 
~~~nty tari[f positions , another country would impose only one 
~Jty r~t~ on the entire product group . H~nc~ this particular 
goods cat~gory would be computed twen~y tim~s in computing the 
um .. •ei0 hi:.!C. ari.. .. ~e-;:ic mean of all tariff positio:is in the first 
coun~ry, while i t would be counted only once in the sec ond case , 
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;:h~rcby sev~r~ly ir .. p~ ... inr:. corr.parability between the two 
t:.iriff h..vds. (110, p . 24) 
0ain~d ..icce.?t-.i:1cc i..twong c.conomist.., . Th'"' weit:-,'t,ts assigned vary, but many 
economists w~ig,: t~riffs with the valLe of im~orts . If mi are the im-
por::.s oi: co..i..modii:y i, this ;.rocedur~ gives an .-;st:imclte of the form 
n 
l/~~ dimi . T~us if a commodity ceases to be import~d bui: a tariff still 
i =l 
exists 1.he index falls . A variation of this index hus been used : t he 
n 
amount o~ tariff r~venue (~ dimi) has b~~n uivided by tne value of total 
i= l 
:1 
impo:-ts o:: all co;r,;nodit.ie.s (.?.. mi) rather than by the number of commodi -
i=l n n 
ties . This e.stioate. has the form ~ dimi/~ mi . But weighting by import 
-=l 1=1 
values has its dis~dvantages . A tariff m~y effectively keep out imports 
from a country . If so, then the higher is t:h~ tar~ff t:he lower is the. 
value of imports of the commodity . In the extreme case where all tariffs 
were prohibitive the value of the index would be c;uite low . This might 
lead on~ i:O infer that costs of production in the count r y were quite com-
petii:ivc by world standards which would be the opposite of the true situa -
tion . In a range, however , if tariffs are generally high and both domestic 
production and imports take place , if a tariff were reduc~d the. index: would 
fall becaus~ only a percentage of th~ numerator woula rise (the ad valore.m 
tariff times the v~luc of imports) while. 100~ of th~ ris~ in imports 
would count in the denominator (the total import value ot all COLumodities) . 
Thus the rise in the dcnooinator would be la r ger than tha rise in the 
nu~erator, so the incex would fall . Loveday suggests weighting the tariffs 
by t~e value of consuoption but this 
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c"':mot do more than give " v..:.ry rough in ... ication or the probable 
influ ... nc ... of .. ariffs on tradl.! for tariifs may reduce. demand by 
r.:iisin._., prices, so ... it may tend r:o givi.! a lower index than 
would result w~ru consum~tion aft~r t:h~ abolition or the re -
duction or the. tari.:f ~SC<!rt.ainable . (67 ' P-13) 
Thus \o.'e c.:in s'-'- thnt no gcner .... l ly acceptcibl..:: u1ethod of mec..suring tariff 
levels i s available, and so tariff levels cannot be used to evaluate in-
ternatio~al cost differences . 
It is not possible to demonstrate ri~orously the importance of inter-
rr.cdiate cost production in France, and thus tne relevance of the inter-
ml.!diar:e cost ~rgument in the negotiations for a f r ee trade area in Western 
Europe in 195:0 . We do know that the argLment was used and believed im-
portanr: by ?rench negotiators . T:.\:! official minUi:es of the negotiations 
record the French delegation as saying : 
':'"ne whole problem of deflections of trade due to disparit i es be-
tween ext .... r.-.ul tariffs of m.,i.10.::rs (of c. J:r<:!e ;:rade area) ... cannot 
be solved :.atisfacr:ori.ly unless (all rn.:. ... J'""rs) a
0
re:.e to a stancstill 
o:: external tari;:fs at the level they have f r eely fixed at the 
tir:..c of s ib::ling the Convention (estc..blishing t:.e. free trade area) . 
( 73 ' p . lb-.) 
This is a plea for sone written agreement to ?revent high cost producers 
from reducing their tariffs against non- European countries to zero to 
bri~g imports from (lGast cost) third country s0urces , rather than :ram 
int~r;:iediate cost French sources . One industry stands out as a case where 
mv~t ?roduccrs in Western Europe dre ei;:her high cost producers or inter-
m~di&te cost pro~uc~rs . This is the textile industry . As a result it was 
recorded in the negotiations th<lt 
Ali de.lc6 ""'t.:.ons agree that g,rec1t probler.1S will arisa for i:'1ember 
countr.:.es if any one of th .... m r~laxes its existing restrictiuns 
on imports fro~ outsid~ the area so ns to undermine the protec -
tion w:tich other me,nb~rs of the area accord to their own indus -
tries against SLchgoo ... s . (73, p . 125) 
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The textile industry in Western Europe r equires heavy protection aga inst 
low cost Asiatic producers . 
Th~ importation of Asiatic textiles into the advanced indus -
trialized countries would be very much larg~r than it is at 
pres~nt w~re it not restricted by the countries of Western 
~urope to about 33 of their consumption. [Blackburn (8, p . 7)] 
The growth of the lower cost Asiatic producers is due to the fact that 
.. . the processes of the industry are too simple, and therefore 
too easily capable of being reproduced without decisive loss of 
quality in parts of the world with l~~er labor costs, while at 
the same time there is no solid assurance that more complex or 
larger scale processes (e . g . , automated spinning) would yield 
advantages justifying their cost . [Carter (13, p . 12)] 
Shortly after the breakdown of the negotiations for a free trade area the 
problems created by Asiatic competition in textiles for the Western coun-
tries became so acute that 
.. . early in 1961 , the President of the United States asked the 
Ge~eral Agreements on Tariffs and Trade to call a conference of 
textile importing and exporting nations to work out some co-
O?erative policies relating to world trade in textiles . The basic 
idea was that the burden of Asiatic imports should be more equally 
shared, and that the exporting countries should be prevailed upon 
to exercise some restraint . Accordingly , a Conference was held at 
Geneva in July 1961, . . . . The principle of a more orderly approach 
to trade in cotton textiles between the advanced nations and Asia 
has been accepted and acted upon . (Blackburn (8 , p . 7) J 
The "burden of Asiatic imports" indicates that the advanced countries 
were higher cost than the Asians, and that textile production in Asia was 
expandable while production in Western Europe and the U. s . was not easily 
contractable . Trade in textile fibers increased r apidly between the Western 
countries up to 1961 . Exports from the industrialized countries increased 
f rom 325 million square yards i n 1938 to 1,335 million in 1961 . This 
occurred because the countries became individually more specia lized in 
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different lines of texti le production . Thus, by specializat i on , their 
costs became intermediate bctwe~n the high levels of other industriali~ed 
cou~tri~s and the low Asiatic levels . If fr~e trade was introduced in 
Western Europe , it was likely that intra- European trade and spec ialization 
would continue to g row, i f the present " orderly approa ch to trade be -
tween the advanced nations and Asia" was retained . But if the taxtile 
industry of any Western European country was hurt or eliminated by the 
increased intra-European competition , then al l the other countries would 
need the security of a common external tariff in a trading association . 
This is so because it would pay the country whose pr oduction had been 
el i minated to open all her textile markets to the Asians because she would 
no longer hav~ an incentive to raise the cost to her consume r s to protect 
her textile produce r s . The unstable equilibrium of tariffs be tween s pecial -
ized industrialized countries would collapse . So the French would no 
longer be sure of the gains their text i le industry might gain from free 
trade in Western Europe without the security of a common external tariff . 
This argument for a common external tariff is probably true for much of 
French produc tion becaus e , his torically, her domestic production has been 
heavily protected . 
B. The Trade Diversion Argument for a Common External 
Ta ri£ f in Wes t ern Europe 
The trade dive r s ion argument was important for France in the f r ee 
trade area negotiations in Western Eur ope in 195~ . It a ro se for those 
co::unoditics whe r e the level of French costs of production was intermediate 
bGtween the high level in the rest of Wes t e rn Europe and the low level 
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in so ....... non-European co1.mtry . In thi:; ca5c, we assume procuction in the high 
cost member country is not a s ignificant part of its total consumption . 
Tr-ade is divertl-d when imports from the least cost third country source is 
substituted by imports from an intermGdiate cost partne r country . When 
a Western European trading association i s established trade is diverted 
in the British ma rket if she is forced to buy from intermediate cost pro-
ducers in France rather than least cost third countries (e . g . the Common-
wealth) . If France captures some of the British market because she does 
r.ot hav~ to compete through a tariff wall trade diversion has occurred to 
the bc~Gfit of French producers at the cost of British consumers . In such 
cases it would pay the British to reduce her tariffs against the rest of 
the world in order to supply her cons umers at least cost . If the trading 
association has a common external tariff, France can be s ure that such a 
taritf reduction will not t ake place without consideration of her inter -
ests . Thus the French can be sure of any markets they secure after free 
trade . Also, in a free trade area it might have been possible for the 
British to have secured reciprocal trade concessions in return for a 
unilateral tariff cut against the rest of the world at the expense of 
French intermediate cost production . 
As in the i ntermediate cost argument , the French maintained that 
without the security of a common external tariff they could not be sure 
of securing the gains from free access to the British market . In a free-
trade area their security would be endangered by British manipulation of 
their tariffs agains t the rest of the world to prevent trade diversion and 
to gain other tariff concessions . 
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If intcrm~diate cost production was more widespread in France than 
th~ U.K., and if the U. K. was enoubh deficit where Franc~ was an inter-
mediate cost pro~ucer then France would gain more from trade diversion in 
the British mar~ct than would British intermediate cost producers from 
trade diversion in the French market . This seems likely since France is 
near self - sufficient and heavily pr otected while Britain is a big trader . 
Thus the potential loss for France from joining a trad ing association 
without a common external tariff would be greater than for the U. K. To 
evaluate the net effect of trade diversion France must estimate the ga in 
to her producers from diversion in the British market and balance it 
against the loss to its consumers from trade diversion in her own markets . 
If the net effect is a gain then a free trade area which would open up 
French markets to the British but not guarantee French gains f rom trade 
diversion in the British market would not distribute the gains from f r ee 
trade in Western Europe in (what the French would regard as) an equitable 
manner, unless it was accompanied by a common external tariff . 
Thus it is important to detennine the ratio of trade diversion in 
the British market that benefits France to trade diversion in the French 
market that hurts France . Trade diversion will be small if partner sup-
ply of intennediate cost goods cannot expand very easily (is inelastic) 
and if third country supply of such goods cannot contract very easily (they 
will reduce their prices· to compete with the intermediate cost producer) . 
In the case of trade diversion in the British market if we think of aari-
o 
cultural sector as a place wher~ such diversion might be significant , 
Fr ench production probably cannot expand very easily and Commom~ealth 
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production cannot contract very easily . Thus the Fr~nch argued that 
trade diver;:; ion would not harm the British consumer very much and some 
consun~r subsidies could always have been used, while the diversion would 
~ase ~h~ burden of French surplus agricultural prcduction significantly . 
Trade dive r sion was not so likely in the French market because of her high 
d~gre~ of self - suff iciency and so the loss to France's consufilers f r om 
trade ~iversion can be expected to be minimal . Thus the amount of the loss 
or gain from trade diversion to France depends on the elasticities of sup-
ply of her intermediate cost goods domestically and abroad . Unfortunately, 
becaus~ of a lack of data it is not possible to estimate these elasticities 
and so we cannot measure the significance of the trade diversion argument 
for the French decision to demand a common external tariff in a Western 
European trading association. 
Althou0 h we cannot demonst ra te quantitatively the importance of the 
trade diver sion a r gument in the negotiations for a free trade area in 
Western Europe in 1958, we do know that the argument was of importance to 
the French , because of her likelihood to benefit in one important industry 
from trade diversion i n the British market . This industry was ag ricul ture . 
Since man ' s capacity for food is limited by the size of his stomach, 
as income rises, expenditure on agricultural commodities expands relatively 
less th~n expenditure on other goods and services . The agricultural in-
dustry has been characterized by rapid technological innovation which 
has substantially increased real output and released resources from that 
sector . Thus , the importance of agriculture as a~ industry has tended to 
decline as an economy develops . In the U. S. , ag ricultu r e accounted for 
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~3 of net domestic product in 1958 compared to 163 of gross domestic 
product (GOP) of Western Europ~ . (See Table IV-1.) The WEFTA figure re-
flects the lag in economic development between w~stern Europe and the 
U. S. , particularly of countries such as Greece,Turkey and Portugal . Thus 
the figure for WEFTA was much larger than that of France (10%) and the 
U. K. (43) . Bec~use the agricultural industry accounted for so little 
of gross do~cstic product in the U. K. and because cheap food imports were 
vital for her balance of payments equilibrium, the British tried to ex-
clude agriculture from the WEFTA agreements and to maintain her cheap 
(Corumor.weal th) sources of supply . France, howevc.r, had a much more im-
portant agricultural industry (10% of GDP) and high tariffs by the U. K. 
(and Geruany) made the expense of mc:intaining h~r agricultural surplus very 
high . To reduce this surplus was socially and politically unpalatable to 
the French gov~rnment, so the O?ening up of the markets of other European 
countries to French agricultural exports was a major objective of French 
international economic policy . Thus we see why agriculture was a major 
source of controversy in the negotiati ons for WEFTA . 
In 1960 , united Kingdom imports and French exports of agricultural 
co~.;nodities amounted to $3,701 million and $832 million respectively . A 
large ctuantity of the British imports came from Commonwealth countries, 
and the French very probably hoped to replace some of them, under the 
shelter of a Common external tariff . In l9b0, the important British im-
ports were meat and meat preparations , dairy products, cereals and cereal 
preparations,, fruit and vegetables, tea and coffee, and sugar and honey 
(see Table IV . 2) . The important French exports were meat and meat 
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T~bl~ IV . l . Pcrc~nt~ga ori~in of gross domastic procuct in 195~ for 
s\!l~ctcd countriesa 
Sector Country 
France U. K. WSFTA u.s . 
Agriculture 10 4 18 I ..,. 
'..'lining 2 3 2 1 
i:':a::n.if.!lctur ing 37 .SS 35 28 
Const:::-uction 7 6 6 5 
Utili._i.;s 2 3 2 2 
Transportation, storage 
and c orru:1e rce 5 8 6 7 
Whol..;sc.. e and re tu.il trad~ 11 12 11 19 
Ban.kine, insurance and 
r ... al estate 3 2 2 8 
Ownership of dwellings 3 4 2 3 
Public admi nistration 9 7 7 14 
Servic~ 11 16 9 11 
a source : (92b) 
bt\..;t national product 
b 
Tabla IV. 2 . Percentage distribution of French axports and U. K. i mports 
in 1960a 
Country COi .. mod i tv g;roup 
Live i:'1eat Dairy Cereals Fruit: and Sugar , Tea, Bever -
ani - products vegetabl..;s honey coffee ages 
ma ls 
Franca L. . 5 10. 6 10 . 2 23 . 0 12 . 8 11. 5 1.4 24 . 4 
u . ~. 3 . 2 26 . 2 13 . 0 16 . 6 18 . 3 6 . 1 13 . 3 3 . 1 
a 
Source : (ob) 
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pr-!p;:ir..itions , dairy products, cereals and cereal prepar ations , fruit and 
v~g~tables, sugar and honey, tea and coffee . Of these France has 
the problem of surplus disposal of ccr~als and sugar . Thus in these com-
moditi~s the French may have , in particular , hoped to displace Commonwealth 
rivals . 
In the negotiations from 1961 to 1963 dealing with the U. K.' s ap-
plicaLion for membership of the European Economic Community, the problems 
of Cou~onwealth exports of agricultural exports to the U. K. , we r e studied 
in sorr.L great~r deta il, than in the free trade area negotiations . The 
British ma intained that putting up a common external tariff against 
Commonwealth producers might "force (them) to change thei r whole pattern 
of trade and cons\:!quently pe r haps their political orientation" (see 21 , 
p . 491) . Therefore the Brit i sh wanted " special pr ovisions whereby the 
Commonwealth countries might count on outlets for their products comparable 
to those they already enjoyed . " ( 21 , p . 527) The EEC negotiators, how-
ever, pointed out that "the enlarged Community , when it included the U. K., 
would constitute the largest importing block in the world . It's wheat 
imports would at:'lount to approximately half of the total world commercial 
imports; for da iry products, the figure would be two thirds; fo r meat , 
three quarters; for sugar , a third" ( 21 , p . 527) . 
Because of this, the EEC negotiators said that Commonwealth proble.ras 
w~re not to be given a permanent solution by means o: specific measures 
in favor of thos~ countries al one . A pe rmanant solution would have to be 
sought within a world wide context . Thus the EEC would propose to call a 
conference of agricultural importers and exporters to work out internation-
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al agreements that would safeguard the interests of all producers and im-
porter~ . 
Thus in the case of wheat and cereals the EEC negotiators made it 
clear that the British would have to accept the provisions of the common 
agricultural policy intact . But the common agricultural policy is drawn 
up to safeguard the exporting interests of France in distinct discrimina-
tion against third countries , i . e . , the Commonwealth. The French would 
hav~ favored ~n even larger customs union which included the U. K. which 
would have en~bled the~ to unload their agricu ltural surplus using trade 
diversion on the British market under the shelter of a common external 
tariff . France could not have replaced the Commonwealth as the major 
supplier of agricultural products to the U. K. but a customs union would 
have ensur ed that Britain ' s import policy would have been determined taking 
due account of France ' s need to unload her surplus . If France joined a 
trading association without a common external tariff (a free trade area) 
she could not have been assured of this . 
C. The Terms of Trade Argument for a Common External 
Tariff in Western Europe 
Vanek shows that the effects of a Western European customs union on 
the French terms of trade can be analyzed in terms of the union ' s inco~e 
elasticities . If Western Europe ' s demand for its own exports to the rest 
o: the world is responsive to the rise in consumers income generated by 
the abolition of intra - European tariffs then , although t he supply of ex-
portable goods rises, exports to the rest of the world may fall . Thus 
Europeans will drive up the prices of their own exports . If Western 
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Euro~~·s d~~and for her imports from the rest oz the world is income 
inelastic , then as consumer ' s income rises as a result of the tariff 
reductions , the amount of imports from the rest of the world will tend to 
fall . This may be aggravated by substitution of domestic products for im-
ports from the rest of the world . T~us Europe would tend to dr ive down 
the prices of her i mports . This fall in the prices of he r imports and the 
rise in the pric~s of her exports would bring about a favorable effect on 
h~r terms of trade with the rest of the world . The case is, however , un-
certain . If Europe ' s supply of exportable goods grows faster t han Eur ope ' s 
demand for her own exports the absolute amount exported to the r est of the 
world will rise , in spite of the tendency towards internalizat i on of 
trade . If Europe's growth in income spells a faste r growth in demand for 
non-European goods than for European goods then the rise in intr a - European 
trade will be overshadowed by the rise in trade between Europe and the 
rest of the world . Further more the effect on the terms of trade cannot 
be determined unti l the relative grQV.lth in the demand and supply of the 
r est of the world is known . Thus , even if intra - European trade increased 
significantly this might not bring about a favorable effect on Europe ' s 
terms of trade , if trade between the count ries of the rest of the worl d 
also increased significantly . Thus , Vanek's analysis is not mu ch use for 
empirical application because it is essentially static and the history of 
trading associations in Western Europe shows that dynamic factors play a 
rr.ajor role in determining t he effects on the terms of trade . 
But we can still make some evaluation of the effects on France ' s 
terns of trade of joining a Western European trading association . If 
S3 
intra - Lrnding association trade. rises, either due to trade creation or 
trade iversion , then the association ' s exports will fall and imports will 
fal 1 from the rest of the world . The more important a world trader Western 
Eur-ope is in the commodities affected in this way, the more likely that 
Eu=ope ' s(and France ' s) terms of trade with non- members will improve after 
the trading association is established . 7he rise in intra - European trade 
which generated the favorable terms of trade effect will be larger under 
a common external tariff because high cost r.iewbers will not be able to 
reduce their tariffs against least cost non-members to prevent intermed i -
ate cost partners from increasing their exports to them . Thus it is im-
portant to measure the share of world trade that would be accounted for 
by a Western European trading association . But first it will be useful 
to examine some of the characteristics of the Western European economy, 
and ~n ~a=ticular, the differences between the WEFTA economy and two of 
its main members, Britain and France , and her chief r ival the U. S. 
Th.., population of France was 45 mill .:..on in 1959 compared to a popu -
lation of 52 million in the United Kingdom (U . K. ) . The population of the 
United States (U . S . ) at 177 million was almost twice as large as the two 
comoinea but only a little more than half the size of the populat i on of 
the proposed Western European Free Trade Area (WEFTA) , which would have 
been 325 million . However, the combined gross national product (GNP) of 
the proposed members of WEFTA ($268. 8 billion) was only 593 of the G~P 
of the U. S. ($45L. . 9 billion) . (See Table IV . 3) . Thus G.1P, on a pc.r 
capita basis , was over three times as large in the U. S. ($2600) than it 
would hav\! been in WEFTA ($t>OO) . The WEFTA figure , howev~r , was also 
84 
Table IV . 3 . Breakdown oE national expenditure in 1958 for France , the 
U. K. , WEFTA and the U. S . a (perce~tages) 
It: em Country 
France U. K. WEFTA U. S . 
Private consumption 67 . 2 66 . 3 t>4 . 4 63 . 9 
Public consumption 14 . 3 16 . 1 14 . 0 18 . 6 
Capit:al formation lo . 4 15 . 0 19 . 1 16 . 9 
Chan,:,e in stocks 2 . 2 0 . 4 1. 0 0 . 0 
Exports 12 . 8 23 . 9 22 . 4 5 . 0 
Imports 13 . 2 21. 9 21. 0 4 . 5 
Gross domest:ic product 100 . 4 98 . 4 100. 2 99 . 5 
Net: factor income 
from abroad - 0 . 4 1. 6 - 0 . 2 0 . 5 
Gross national product 100 . 0 100. 0 100. 0 100 . 0 
aSource : ( 92 b) 
smaller than t:he French ($1100) or the British ($1200) . 
Foreign trade is much more important to the Western European count ries 
than to the U. S . In 1958 , imports amounted to 213 of G~P in the combined 
WEFTA countries and exports amounted t o 223. In the U. K. the percentages 
were slightly higher, with imports amounting to 223 of GNP and exports to 
233. France, however, was much less dependent on fore i gn trade than was 
WEFTA since both her i mports and her exports accounted for only 133 of 
GNP, i n 1958 . In spite of severe balance of payments crises in 1957 and 
1958, 133 is representative of the share of i mports and exports in French 
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G~P for the dcc&dc 1955- 65 . Thus the French economy was not as op~n to 
foreign competition in 1958 as were the economies of most of the WEFTA 
countriGS, particularly the U. K. This may have been due to a high tariff 
policy . The implication is that whatever harmful effects that might 
be caused by free trade in Western Europe, France stood to suffer more 
because freeing trace represented such a large step for France . 
In 1959, the combined imports of the WEFTA countries from non - member 
coum:ri.as wer.?. worth $22 billion, or $ 7 billion more than U. S . total im-
ports . (See Table IV.4 . ) The most important WEFTA i mports were food and 
liv~ animals (28%) , crude materials (263) , mineral fuels (18%) and manu -
factures (11%) . The most important U. S. imports were manufactures (243) , 
=ood and live animals (2 3) , crude mat.?.rials (203) , machinery and equip -
ment (11%) , and mineral fuels (103) . This difference can be explained 
by the difference in age between the nations of Europe and the U. S . The 
Europeans , in their long history , have come close to exhausting their 
natural resources and so they tend to specialize in the processing of raw 
nat:erials i r:iported from third countries . In additio1 , cou:1tries like the 
U. K. with high densities of population and a free trade tradition, import 
large amounts of agricultural commodities, from least cost (i . e . non-
European) sources. The people of the U. S. are a young nation, well endowed 
wit:h natural resources, and with a history of supplying the Europeans with 
many of their agricultural products and raw materials in the last century . 
~owadays t:he production of pr imary commodities in the U. S. is likely to 
have a comparative disadvantage. and this is reflected by their diminish-
ing importance in U. S. foreign trade . However, the theoretical ant icipated 
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T.lbl.! IV . 4 . Distribution of international trade between SITC sections 
195 9 (percentages) 
s~ct .:. o:-i Country 
Franc<! U.K. WEFTA u. s . 
Imp. Exp . Imp . Exp . Imp . Exp . Imp . Exp . 
Food, live animals 18 8 35 3 28 6 21 14 
:aev""rages, tobuCCO 6 3 .., ..:. 3 2 2 3 _,, 
Crude i;,aterials 23 7 22 4 26 4 20 10 
t-1in~r"'"l i:uels 20 4 11 ... 18 2 10 5 
Oils and fats 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 2 
Cheti.icals 4 8 3 9 3 10 3 9 
t-:.-.nuf<:..ctu r es (by 
n:aterial) 13 33 13 27 11 30 24 14 
Mach.;.nery and 
transport equip . 13 24 6 43 5 36 11 34 
~:i.sc.:.l :aneous 
~am.:.::actures 2 8 2 6 2 8 6 8 
Other manufactures 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 1 
Tot<:..l valueb 11.14 9 . 09 5 . 07 5 . 56 21. 71.,. 20 . 20 14 . 59 17 . 16 
asource : (ob) 
b ·11· Bi ions of dollars 
switch- over from primary production to the production of processed products 
in the U. S. entails large socia 1 and political change, so the U. S. still 
produc~s significant amounts of primary agricultural coomodities . 
The major U. S . exports include food and live an imals (143) and cruda 
materials (103) as well as mach inery and equipment (343) and manufactures 
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(1 !.,.~~) . On tl\1... oti1~r hnnd th!.! only WEPTA i..!xports to non-WEPTA countries 
that arl.! great~r than 10% of total exports are m~chinery and e~uipme.nt 
(363) manufactur""s (30'/J and chemicals (10~ .. ) . 
If we classify commodities in the (Standcrd Inter national Trade 
Classification of the U . ~ . ) SITC sections of food and live animals, bever-
ages and tobacco, crude materials, mineral fuels, and oils and fats as 
"largely unprocessed" commodities, and if we ciassify commodities in the 
SITC s~ctions of c~cmicals, manufactures, machinery and equipment, mis -
cel lancous manufactures and other manufactures as "largely processed" 
commodities . Then, in 1 959 , 53% of U. S . ira,.1orts were "largely unprocessed" 
and 663 of U. S . exports were "larr:,el y processed" . On the other hand 773 
of W2FTA imports were "largely unprocessed" anc b53 of WC:FTA exports were 
"largely processed" . 
T'.le U. K. is an extreme exam1)le of a country which imports " largely 
unprocess1...d
11 
goods and exports "largely processed" goods . In 1959, the 
ma~or Bri~ish i mports were food and live animals (353), crude materials 
(223) , manufactures (133) and mineral fuels (113) . The major British ex-
ports were machinery and equipment (43%), manufactures (273), and chemicals 
(9%) . In sum, 723 of Br~tish imports were "largely un?rocessed" and 573 
of h'2:r -::xports were "largely processed" goods . France i s not as ext reme a 
specialist in processed goods exporting as the U. K. and this probably r e -
flects the greater importance of agricultur~ in that country . 
The important French imports in 1959 were crude materials (233), 
mineral fuels (203) , food and live animals (183), manufactures (133) , 
and machinery and equipment (133) . The im;>ortant French exports were 
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m.:i• llL-<ctures (33%) and C'.achincry and equipm~n:: (24%) . However, France 
had ~n agricultural surplus and stood to benefit from a rise in agri -
cultural exports to the U. K. and G~rmany if she could gain access to those 
m-.irK:~ts . This would be more likely if a customs union rather than a free 
trade area was formed in Western Europe . 
The g r eat b~nefit of the participating countries from the formation of 
a customs union in Western Europe , however , would be the impact of suc h a 
large tradir.g unit on their terms of trade with the rest of the world . 
Western Europe im?orts more " largely unprocessed" goods and exports more 
" largely processed" goods than does any other trading unit. In 1958 WEFTA 
accounted for 62% of world imports of food , beverages and tobacco, 513 of 
world im?or~s of cruce materials , 673 of mineral fuels and 693 of oils and 
fats (see Table IV . 5) . WEFTA also accounted for 503 of world exports of 
ch~micals, 50-f., of machinery and equipnent, and 51% of other manufactured 
goods (s .... e Table IV . 6) . Overall WEFTA accounted for 43% of world imports 
anJ J9% of world expor ts, whereas the largest world trader at the t ime , 
the ~ . s . , accounted for only 20% of world imports and 233 of world ex-
?orts . Thus the bargaining power of a Western European customs un i on at 
international negotiations would have been extremely strong . 
The likely effect of the formation of a customs union in We.ster n 
Europ\.. on its terms of trade with the rest of the world would have bee.n 
very favorable because of its strong position in world markets . If the 
exports of the union were diverted, to any significant extent , from third 
country markets to partner countries, because of either trade creation or 
~rad~ diversion , world supply would fall and world prices would r ise . Thus 
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world imoorts 
a for selected T<.:..bl(; IV. S . Imports as a perccntagl! ot 
are<J.s in 1959 according to SITC scctionsb 
Sectio:1 Ar1.;;a 
France EEC U. K. EfTA WEFT A u.s. 
Fooc, bevera.ges, tobacco 7 . 7 27 . S 27 . 7 33 . 9 61. 8 22 . 9 
Crud-.. wateri.'.lls 8 . 0 32 . 2 17 . 2 20 . 4 50 . 9 20 . 2 
~1inerc.l fuels 13 . 0 46 . 6 16 . 9 28 . 3 67 . 3 20 . 2 
Oils and fats 9 . 3 1.,.3 . 9 17 . 4 32 . 3 69 . 0 11. 6 
Chemicals 5 . 8 20 . 1 9 . & 27 . 6 33 . 9 11. 3 
~1.:..chinary and equipment 5 . 2 13 . 5 5 . b 19 . 3 18 . 5 36 . 2 
Other r.::anufacture.s 4 . 1 20 . 6 9 . 9 5 . 1 lb . 2 8 . 6 
Tota l 6 . 9 25 . 9 15 . 2 20. 5 42 . 9 19. 9 
'"'World ioports aro?. calculate.a as the total figure given by the United 
Nations Statistical Office minus any trade. internal to the a r e.a which is 
included 
bsource: (88) 
Table IV . 6 . Exports as a percentage of world cxportsa fo r selected a r eas 
in 1959 according to SITC sectionsb 
Sect.ion .~=ea 
France EEC U. K. EFT.A WE:?TA U. S . 
Food, beve:-C:1ges, tobacco b . 0 20 . 0 !+ . s 12 . 3 21. 5 25 . 8 
Crude nc.te.rials 4 . 6 11. 3 3 . 5 12 . 6 10 . 3 18 . 9 
Mine.rc:.l fuels 8 . 0 45 . o 9. S 7 . 2 24 . 6 25 . 5 
Oils end fats 2 . 9 13 . 6 2 . 9 11. 9 16 . 1 45 . 7 
ChC.w1.i.cal s 1.1 35 . 7 1 L. . 3 21. 2 ... 9 . 5 26 . ~ 
~:achinery and e.quipme.nt o . 7 30 . 7 19 .s 24 . 3 49 . 8 29 . l 
Other r:ianuf c.ctur~s 10 . 2 37 . 3 13 . 4 21.5 51.1 16 . 7 
~oo;al 7. 5 29 . 4 12 . 3 18 . 9 38 . S 23 . 2 
ciWorld exports arc calculated as total figure given b~ United Kations 
Statistical Of:: ice. minus any tr.::.de intl!rnal 1:0 the. area which is included 
bsource. : (88) 
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if .1 custo::1s univn in W'""st.!rn Europ .... l~d to incr~ .... ~ed intra - European trade , 
th~n the pric~'-' o_ exports from Western Europe would r ise and wor ld pr ices 
woi...la prob.::..bly ri::;c . Sir .. il .... rly i f Lu ropean imports f r o::r. thir d countries 
wcr~ r~p~ac .... d by intra- European t r ade to any significant ex~ent, then wor ld 
dc.mand would fall and world pr ices wou l d fall. This would be particula r l y 
tn:e of ur.?roces::.ed goods wnose SC?;>ly tends to be inelastic . Thus the 
pr ice of Eu r opean imports Crom third countr ies would fall . A fall i n the 
pr ice of its imports and a rise i n th~ pr ice of its expor ts would cause a 
:avor~ble effect on the terns of tr~ue if a custo=s union was formec . 
Th~ formation of a free tradc area would not lead to the benefit s of a 
large tradi nJ unit (bargaining power and a very favor able ter ms of trade) 
because .... ach country would b~ free to pursue its own independent c omme r c i al 
policy against third countries . 
France , alone , a c countcc fo r only 7~ of world i~ports in 1959 and 83 
of worid exports, while the U. K. accounted for 153 of wo rld imports and 123 
of world exports . However , as a r esult of General de Gaulle ' s rejection 
of a free trad .... area, Franc~ and the U. K. wer e not lef t alone . Fr ance is 
part of the ELC which accounted for 263 of wor ld imports and 293 of world 
export~ . This tra ing unit , while not as important as a Western European 
custo~s union is , nevertheless, th~ most important trading unit in wor ld 
L:rad~ . The U. K. joined the C:uropean Free Tra.:ie Association (EFTA) which 
is dlso un important t r ader (213 of world imports , 193 of world exports) 
but its wenbers do not act as a unit and so do not get the benefits of 
b~rgaining ?CMer and a favorable terms of trade . 
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D. Th~ Principle of Cqu~l Acc~ss to R~w ~aterials 
If t~o coLntri~;; form a free t=~de urc~, trade deflection a r ises if 
the p=otec~ivc t~ri:f wall of o~e country aga~nst third countries c~n be 
circ~mv~nted by th~ impor~ation of third country goods through the other 
~c~bc= country's ports . This arises, ~n particular, when semi- finished 
manufactures are iill?Orted into one of the m~mber countries, processed and 
th~n =~-exported to the other member country . The question arises as to 
ha;" cit.:ch :;:>roccssing of a,. Lnfinishcd good sho..ild be done before the fin i shed 
good ~uu~ifies for free trude ar~a privilcb~s . 
This probleo was particularly s~rious for the French and Italians 
du ring the 1958 n""gotiations for a Western European Free Trade Ar ea . It 
was r eported in the official minutes that 
.. . tne French c.nd It.:il i.: ... d1:.legations point out that a consequence 
of their governments' pol~cy of p=otec~ion of basic materials is 
o .. ten to rais1;:: the internal prices of such mi.lt.?.rials . ( 73 , p . 116) . 
Thus French and Italian manufacturers have higher raw material costs than 
most ~a~~facturers in Western Euro?C · Thus, any other oember country of 
the proposed WEFTA would be a b le to undersell French and Ital i an manufac-
turers b~cause of their cheap raw matarial costs . 
T~.us the French and Italians conclude that some form of pr inciple of 
'"'qU<:.l acc.?.ss to re:.w materials would hzve to be agreed upon in a trading 
&ssoci~tion . Go0ds s~ould not be allowed to cir culate freely in th~ f r ee 
trace area unless each cou~try ' s m~nufa cturers had equal access ~o the raw 
materials required for their production. 
Th~ British proposed a "percentage criterion" for determining whethe r 
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a c01;; .. 1odity wot:ld qu.:;lify for tree trade area privileges or not . Ac -
cordinb to this criterion, a comraodity would be treated as a domestic free 
trad~ area product if at least 50% o: it's value was added within the area . 
Hrn~ever, over a wi~e range of products the French and Italians felt that 
this would damage their domestic industry too much . Initially they pro -
posed a "?recess criterion" . Under this criterion, a commodity would have 
to pass through a minimu:n set of processes within the area in order to 
qualify for free trade area treatment . However, this was not a satis -
factory criterion either be cause the non-homogeneity of production processes 
betwe.?.n different countries made it extremely difficult to agree on a 
comrJon standard . 
Thus, the French and Italians came out in favor of a common external 
tarif= to ensure the principle of equal access to raw materials during the 
free trade negotiations in 1958 . We have seen also that the French identi-
fied themselves as intermediate cost producers and they wanted the security 
of a common externa l tariff to protect and maximize their gains in the 
markets of their partner countries . In addition, because of the importance 
of Western Europe in world trade, a common commercial policy against third 
countries would be likely to bring large gains in the terms of trade for 
the area , and this strongly supported the French goal of mak ing Western 
Europe the world's Third Great Power . 
V. Yi.i!: DECISION TO REJECT THE :-:OVC TO TIE THE CAP TO 
EUROPl::.A:'\ POLITICAL U:.XIO.' 
:-:-ie C<!cisions of int.crnation ... l econo .. 1.;.c pol :..cy are co:lc~rned with two 
problems : the r~~ulation of a ngtion ' s international t r ade and t he finance 
ot ir.t~=n~tional co~mocity and f~ctor movements . Because of the advan-
tages from specialization and a large market, it is agreed that some trade 
i~ better than no trade . However, nztions regulate trdd~ because sooe 
dom~st~c production may b~ desir~bl~ for reasons of national secur ity and 
~quity . In addition, a swift tr~nsition ~o fre~ trade rndy cause serious 
dislocc:.tions in the national economy r esulting in sever e social c osts . 
For these reasons , nations control and r~&ulat~ international trade . 
Two methods are us~d to limit desirable int~rnational t r ade : tar i ff 
policy and international agreements . When Franc~ joined the EEC it agreed 
to have a unified tariff policy to limit the trade of third countries . 
The cecision to ::-eject the free trade area in 1958 was taken because of 
differences between the British and the Fr~nch on the appropriate way to 
limit trdde from non- members . So far , this study h~s examined the Anglo-
French oitferenc--s on tariff policy . The int.::rnational agreement method 
of l:o~tinJ the trade of third countr ~es was also contested by the French 
~~d British dcring the fr~c trade ar~a n~goti~tions . At the close of the 
ncgotiat~ons the 2rench announced that th~y want~d trade between member 
states to be controlled by a series of gentlemen ' s agreements which 
woLld r'-'sul t in "harmonizc:.tion of nc:otional pol ici-.!s i n the economic and 
social spheres . " Y:rns we see that the cecision to limit trade by inter -
national coo?eration and ~o enforc~ this cooperation by some form of 
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int~rnationnl institution is a major part of international economic policy . 
The French demand for harmonization of national economic policies 
was not viewed very seriously by everyone . A leading economist wrote tb.at 
3ucL a demand .. . can generally be shown to rest on failacious 
arguments ~termning f rom ignorance of the principle of comparative 
costs, or from an implicit assumption that the domestic wages 
and pr ice levels and the exchange r ate are both absolutely 
rigid . [Johnson (57, p . 62) J 
This criticism of t~e demand for harrnonizatio~ confuses it with t he 
"pauper- labor" argument for a tariff . If a foreign country is at a lower 
stage in the process of economic development then its wage level will be 
lower . Thus in a free trade situation the less developed country will be 
able to undersell the developed country both at home and abr oad . This, how-
ever, ignores the principle of comparative costs which states that foreign 
producers will not put domest i c producers out of bus i ness even i f they 
have l~ver absolute cost levels because international trade takes place 
accor ding to di fferences in relative costs . A lower cost foreign produc er 
will not put a domestic producer out of business unless he has a comparative 
advantage as well as an absolute one . 
However, the comparative cost principle assumes perfect competition , 
price flexibility, complete domestic factor mobility , complete internation-
al factor i mmobility , no transport costs and so on which do not g ive an 
accurate representation of the r eal world . Thus policy recommendations 
based on the pri~ciple of comparat ive costs have little appeal to the 
international economic policymaker . Furthermore, naive policy recom-
mendations to liberalize trade assume that " the gove rnment seeks to maxi -
raize ::-eal income but i s i ll - informed how to do so . " Howeve r t he pol icy 
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~sker kn~~s well tha1: industry may be protcc~cd by m~ans other than 
tariLs . If h~ w:::nts int..!rnation..il reciprocity as "1C.ll as growth ..ind se-
curi'.:y th..!n he will never ac.,r~c. with th-; .... ullvwing . 
Prot1...cLio.1 cnjoy~d by nation..il indu .. Lril..!s r:iay b..; sccurud by 
mc~ns other thb~ tar~f und 4u0La r~~trictions imposed by govcrn-
m0.nts ... . Th..:. o!:ficial pro._ect.ion o..: S,,iss industries, for ex-
ulnj)lc., is compc:..r ... tively sligh;:, but th.;:. actLal protection is 
consi~~r~ble . It is prim~rily achieved through an elaborate 
n1...t\-'O::'!< of priva1:e trac..1... i.l$SOciar:ion., . This is not, of course, 
.:in .. rt:>um1.;;.nt u_$J.inst the. r~oval of ta..:-i.:.:s anc quotas, but 
::g;.iir:.st c.x;_;> ... cting too much to !:allow from it . LWorswick (112 , p . 189)] 
T~us b..!c-~sc President d-; Gaulle wented international raciprocity he de-
~anil.!~ t~at n~tional polic~es b0. harmonizl.!d . He will not open up French 
mar~e~s to ioreign competition unless h~ is assured of access for his 
prod~cers to an equal port~on of other country ' s markets . 
The French arguments for harmonization ne~d not rely solely on their 
desirc for international reciprocity . Th~ theory of the second bes1: 
st~r:es 1:nat if some of the conditions of optimality are not fulfilled 
ttcn the s~co~d best procedure is not necess~rily to fulfill ~hose that 
~rG c~µable of bein~ implemented . A movement closer to free trade is not 
nec~s~arily the second best solution if com?lete free trade (the optimal 
SO LU tion) ca~not be achieved. Thus i~ may ba nec~ssary to violate some 
otner free trace condi1:ions to achieve the optimum . This extra violation 
(in .sd ... it.:.o .. to government intl.!rf~r ... nce. in the economy) wou ld be the 
har ... o,1ization of national policies . 
The Frc:-1ch were supported by the "Europeans" in 1:hei.r demand for 
har~oni~~tion . M. van der Groeben , a member of the EEC Commission , said 
Firms must be ablu to face th~ growing challen~<.:. from their 
competitors at homu and abroad . They accept such competition 
as t~e. source of prosperity and as the guarantee of their 
own cco:-iomic f :-ecdo,n . But they de.man.d that such competition 
should be ~air , that is should not be. distorted by artificia l 
o:- state aids; in short they de.mao.d that equality of oppor-
tunity be created and guarantecd . .. the Commission believes 
th.:t busin.?.ssrne.n arc r i ght in calling for suc h things . (106 , p . 5) 
Bu~ ~he Europeans supported the French desire for harmonization for 
another reason also . They believed that the more ha r monizat ion of na tional 
pol icie.s that was i mplemented the. closer Eu r ope would come to political 
union and the gr.?.a ter would be the ne.ea for such a union . 
'.Lt.us we see that there we.re two forces working for the harrJonization 
of natio;:-ia l policies in Western Europe in the period 1956- 66, the " Europeans" 
and the Gaullists . It i s reas onable to say that the development of ~he EEC 
up to 1965 has been the resul~ of the alliance. of these t wo forces as t hey 
pursued their common interest of harmonization . The harmon i zation of 
na~ional policies and even the unification of national agricultural policies 
was pursued by ~he Fr ench for e c onomic r easons and by the " Europeans" 
primarily for political r easons . In those areas where these inter ests did 
no~ overlap, such as defence and foreign policy, little or no progress was 
rr.ade . This was because the Gaullists and the "Europeans" were in sharp 
di sagreement as to what k ind of harmonization of non- economic national 
policies should take place . Thus we see that this a r ea of disagreement 
existed throughout the period and it is not surprising to learn that the. 
allia~ce eventually broke down because of it . 
A. The I ssue 
Tne clash between the Gaullists and the Europeans came on June 30 , 
1965 . The area of conflict was agriculture and the major protagonis ts 
97 
w~re G~n~ral de Gaulle and the CEC Commission . The harmonization of 
agricultLral polici~s to the ?uint oE est<..bl~shing a Common Agricultural 
Policy w ... s vitiorously ?Ur::.u~d by th .... ?rench <...1-. t.~1~ Coi::mission . Ti-IE! Com-
ma::-. Agricultur.:il Po:.icy (CAP) was ... !most com;_)l~t~ and O:l March 30 the 
Commiss ion h~d proposed a scheme for financing it for the r est of the 
-.:runs::.tio:--.... :. p .... riod (up to 1970) . :'!-.e pro,los .. ls involved some moves 
towarcs political Lnity that ~~r .... re?ugnant to the Frenc~. The Commission 
kn~w Lt·,ar. th..,s"° would anger the Fn ... nch but rr.aint..i i ned that this was a 
natural place for proposals for polit ical unity to origi nate bec<:use the 
<:grict.:ltt:.ral sector was the most advanced towards economic union . The 
ctr.er ~ ive nl:!-.o~rs o: t:~~ EI.:C hud, core over, ... xpressed their desire to 
co:lsicer proposals for gre<..t~r political hannonization . How sincer e this 
desire was is another matter . The Dutch greatly fea red being dominated by 
a P ... ris - Berlin axis . They h~d ori~inally hoped that the entry of Britain 
~oulc prevent this , but Britain's entry was v~to~d by de Gaulle . Then 
they acvocat~d greater political unity to pr~vant the Franco-German 
domination . The other four countries were not cnthus::.astic about paying 
for the CAP and may have ho~ed that the Commi~sion's proposals would either 
re .... ucc de Ga~lle ' ~ power withi~ th~ EEC or ~1se c~stroy the CAP . 
As w.:; sh<.lll see later, th~rc w~re strong motives why the " Europeans " 
m::.ght tie ~ovcm~nt towards political unity to th~ CAP . The CAP was the 
~ajor construction of French interr.ational ~conomic pol icy from 1900- 65 
a~d ~he Commission probably hop~d to force the~ to make political cor.-
c~ss ions in ord~r to fin~nce it . The Fr~nch, however, bitterly resented 
this ar.c they ~·ithdrew f r ora the ncbotiat ions . They pursued an "empty 
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chair" policy , that is, did not hinder its existing progr ams but r efused 
to negotiate the development of new ones . They issued the followi ng 
statement in support of their action : 
The Cabinet noted that an undertaking given three and a half years 
ago to complete the financial regulation by June 30 , 1965 , had not 
been f ulfilled .. . serious since it was on the basis of the f inancial 
regulation that the French government had agreed in January 1962, 
to embark on the Second Stage of the Rome Treaty . .. the decisions of 
December 15, 1964, had been taken on the basis of definite and re -
peated assurances that the financial regulation would be completed 
by June 30 , 1965, as agreed . . . . Some partners of France within the 
Common Market .. . by laying down new political and e c onomic condi-
tions during the final negotiations had broken the previous agree-
ment on financial responsibility . (2 0 , Pp . 3-4) 
B. The Alternatives 
Maurice Bye (11) has classified political unions in three classes 
which , while not exhaustive , seem particularly adapted to our purposes . 
The following def initions are based on his formulations . 
An Imperialist Political Union is a political union imposed by one country 
by military, political or economic pressures on a group of other countries . 
The motive for the union is the self interest of the imposing state . The 
great emp ires of the past were imperialist political unions but so also was 
Bismarck ' s Germany, an example so dear to " Europeans" in other contexts . 1 
A Federalist Political Union is a political union entered into by a g r oup 
of countries where the motive is the interest of the federated people as 
a group, and not that of the countries that make up the union . The welfare 
of the union as a whole transcends that of a single member state . 
1rt grew out of an economic union of the Zollverein (1830) . Thus it 
is often said that Europe will one day be politically united , j us t as 
Bismarck ' s Ge r many was united, because economic union encourages political 
union . The fact that Germany was united by force is not often realized, 
however . 
99 
A Corf~~l!ralist Political U.:ion i s ~ ~olicical union entered into by a 
group of countr il!S wt1ere the mot.ive i s the self interest of .::...c1ch o= the 
co.!n.".:ri..:s and whl!rl:! this r~nc:.1 •. s t he goal . 7he only com.-non policies un-
cert.:i.,.en are t r.os1.; rr-eely c..ccepted by ..i ll the rr..._;r .• b'-r states; conflicts 
betwc..'-=-n the union and the tH.!..nber statl!s are r.?. solved in favor of the 
st.ate.. . 7his ~-·a s t.hi.! ori
0
in.:.l form of un.::.on aao pt..:.c by the United S.:ates 
of Am..;rica but. a federalist polit.ical union has s teadily evolved from it . 
It i s fair .. o say th.:.t i:.ha "Euro!_)e.:.ns" favor the e s tabl ishrnent of a 
Fedcral_st. ?04.::.cic~l Union in Western 8urope . However the Gaullists 
favor t~e establishment of a Confederalis t Political Union . It was be -
caus.::... these ic'-as were s o r~dically diff'-=-rent and because they were so 
iffiport~nt a ~art of their proponent ' s p~ ilosophy that the crisis of 1965 
took pl ~ce i n the EEC . In order to understand the crisis we must have 
so~e knowl edge of the politic~l ~ewers of the prot~Jonis t s . 
C. The ?ower Positions of the Antagonis ts 
Thrl!e cajor institutions were established und..;r the Treaty of Rome . 
(See Figure V. l . ) Our discussion of the~e and of their personnel is valid 
up to JL:ly 1, 19o7 , when the three Communities were me r ged (EEC, ECSC , 
Eu r atorM) under r.(!w leadership . 
1 . The Co •.. miss ion of the EEC : this was th ..... xecu.:ive branch of 
the ~EC . I~s f unction was to administ~r and ex~cut~ the decisions made 
by t t'- leg isl~tive and jL:dicial b=anch~s . I~ wus compos ... d of a Presid~nt, 
Walt~r Hallstein, three Vice-Pr~sidentb , Sicco ~~nsholdt , Robert ~arjolin , ~ 
L. L . Sandri , and six mer.ibers all of whom were appointed for four year 
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Six na t. io:1..; l 
p<lrlic:.:nents 
1--~~----oJ Six nctional 0overnrnents 
"I 
Europeun parliament I Council 
' I 
, . 
Court: of Ju;:;tice 
I 
' 
EEC Com:ni.:;sion 
. / 
:-~anag ..... merrt Cor..mit: t..,Gs in 
Agrict.:t1.;re 
' 
of ministers 
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l r 
Figure V. l . Institutions of the Euro)e~n Economic Comrnu:1ity prior 
to July 1 , l9o7 (based on a fig1,;re in 54 , p . 29) 
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tl.!rm;:> by t:h1.:. m1.:.mber g,ov'-'rn ... -:.nt::; . E ... ch mcrnb~r of t.h..! Commission was in 
.:.,ricultun .. , ~".;.:-jolin fo:- .:::co.,omic affairs, S<.1ndri for social atfairs , 
and Je.cln R~y for external affairs . The Corr.mission was responsible col -
l~ctively for its act i ons and had to answer to the Eur opean Par liament . 
The p01vcr of th-:. Co:nmission lay ir. t:r.e fact th;;.t it had the sole r ight to 
i~itiate pro~osu!s fo:- 1(!0 ~sl~tion, and had sp-:.cif ic authority to direct 
a me:::=>.:!r to c:.oc ... ioct tn.at CO;"ltlici:.'-'c with t:he Treaty of Rorae . 
2 . The Europ~an Purliam~nt was com?osed of 142 delegates f r om the 
P.arl:"..a:i.er.ts o: th.:. Six . G-...rm ... ny, France, and Italy each had 36 rnemb~r s , 
B..!lgiun and t:-.e Netherlands e .... ch : .... d 1-., and ... uxe.,.bour0 had six . The 
parlia=.ent h..id t~1e power to aismi.ss ;nec::be:-s cf th'-' Coi:;anission but not t o 
appoint them . It had the right to be consultl.!d by the Commission and coul d 
pro_;>ose arr.endL;Cnts to leg is la ti on , but: t:hese. could be rejected by the 
Cou .• cil of ~1inis t:ers . In pr2.ctice the European Parliat:.ent is pu r ely ad -
visory and hus been cynically called a dl.!bating soci~ty . 
3 . Tb~ rcul power o:: the Ii.SC was the Council of Ministers . This 
was ::he legi~lative branch . It e1~ct~d a President (in pra ct i ce the office 
was ro~ated) wno sur.u:;oned th~ meeLings . Vo~in6 was unan i mous but this re -
c;\!!.r.a::ie:c:: th~orl::.tic-...lly endec! on January 1 , 1966 . Unar.i:::iot:s voting was 
replGced by ~uali.Eied ~ajority , which is a ~~jority of 12 of 18 . The 
4 • • . .. ~ ~LstrLOUtLon oc vot1.,;;s gav~ Gurma . y, France, and Italy~ each , Belgium and 
the. :.?t'herlancs 2 ~ach .::;·i.... LUX1.,;;uJbvur
0 
1 . Th~ particular i:r.en who att~nd 
th~ Council o: ~in:s ... ~rs vary bLt in the cases of inter~st to us (::he 
n.;_,,oti.~tio:i.s for a Co:nmon AgricultLr.:ll Pol~cy, CAP) the :;'oreign i'-linisters 
and the Ag r iculture c~inis ters wcr._; usually present . I t was thr ough the 
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Ccuncil o:: Ministers ::hat Gcn~ral de Gaulle excrcized his power. Thus 
constitutionally, General de G<lullc. had all the authority he needed 
within the EEC i.:o fight the Comm i ssion . However the Commission was 
ident:'..E ied with the "Europeans" because of i.:he personalities of its mem-
bers and b~cause of its function of pr oposing legislation for European 
union in the Treaty of Rome . Thus the Commiss ion had great pol i tical 
prestige and a substantial following throughout the EEC countries . In 
addition the conflict arose over the CAP, an area especially important to 
France and with little support from the Germans . Thus the Commission may 
have hoped to blackmail de Gaulle . 
D. The Alte~native Plans for European Political Union 
of the Gaullisi.:s and the "Europeans" 
The differences between the "Europeans " and the Gaullists on the 
future apportionm~nt of power in a European Political Union can be ex-
?ressed as the difference between a federalist political union and a 
confedera lisi.: political union . The objectives of the two plans a r e i.:he 
same : the harmonization of national policies in a European Political 
Union . The method employea by both plans is to develop common policies 
for western Europe, particularly in foreign affairs and defenc~ . The 
co~i.:roversy arose over whether ::hese common policies should be binding 
becduse of the authority of a supra- national institution or because of an 
inte!'national agreement t:hat gave each nation a veto on "important ques -
tions" . 
For the Gaullists, the nation st:ate is the only political reality . 
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Thus a Europ~an Political Union can only have. delegated powers from 
Europ~an nation states, it~ members . The Gaullists advocate a compre-
hensive Council o:: :-1inis ters i n which each country would have a veto on 
"ir:ipon:ant questions". Other questions and important questions on which 
there i3 general agreement WOL.d be deve:ope.d into common policies and 
executed by a comprehensive European Commission . This Commission would be 
ar. a - political Internationai Civil Service . The Euro?can Parliament would 
continue to be purely advisory, as under the present system . On "important 
questions" on which there wa::> not unanimity because of uncertainty over 
the ideas of the peoples, r.ational referenda would be conducted to enable 
a dec~sion to be reached. ~he Gaullists advocate. the inclusion of the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. in the union . Thus their plan is 
called a "Europe. of the Fatherlands from the. Atlantic to the Urals . " I f 
Britain accep-ced absorption in Europe and the severance of her " special 
relationships" with the Commonwealth and the U. S. she would also be ad-
mitted . 
Tr.e. "Europeans" advocate a federalist political union in Europe with 
a Council of Ministers and a European Parliame.~t jointly maki~g decisions 
which are binding on the member states by majority rule . The Parliament 
would be elected by the people in a uniform apportionment based on ?Opu -
la-:::ior. . There would be a bi- cameral legislature 1 ike the U. S. Cong ress . 
The European Parliament would corr~s?ond to the U. S. House of Represen-ca -
tives, and the Council of Minis-cers would corres pond to the U. S . Senate . 
The European Commiss ion would be the executive. branch of government and 
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huuld r..hus fill thl!. role o[ the i.;.s . Administration . It would bl.! much 
t:iore tirnn .:i Civil S ..... rvicC!, al though it would be appointed by the Council 
~~d r~s?onsiblc to the Par:iament; it would not be dir ectly elected by 
the p~ople . 
In a federutGd union a policy dGcision would be approved if a major-
ity o.:: :r.e::iber st.o. t~s appi.~oved it Cir. the Council of Minisl:ers) and if a 
m~jori~y of the p ..... ople approved ~t (in the European Parliament) . In a 
confederalist union a policy decision is approved if all the member states 
approve it (in the Council of Ministers) . 
There ~re m~ny criteria for jud~ing proposals for ?Olitical unity but 
we wil: select three which were ~sea in the conflict between the Gaullists 
and "Europeans" . The first is "efficiency", or the ability of the system 
to g~t things done . Its re1ative ir.efficiency is a major drawback of a 
confederated political union . If una:limity is required on all important 
questions many decisions will never be t aken . The federar..ed system, on 
the other hand, ensures a decision when one is called for . 
The Gaullists, for their part, cr~ticize the federated union because 
it does not take accoun1: of th~ only political realities, the nation states . 
Th~y believe that a common policy on Ger~an reunification, which is ac -
ceptable 1:0 al 1 , c.:..nnot be achieved under present conditions . "European 
l::lity cannot be created solely through institutions" as Debre says in (41) . 
T~~s r..he Gaullist urge the Europeans to seek ar~as of agreenenr.., such as 
iore~6~ aid perhaps, and to work out a comraon policy on them. Yne Europeans 
deny the charge of "unreal ism" and point our.. that many of the problems 
105 
that prevent the nat ion states of Europe f rom uniting are due to the 
selfish pur suit of her interests by France . The impl ication i s that if 
the French changed thei r attitude (we r e mor e r easonable) the na tion stat es 
of Europe wou ld be prepared to unite . The decline of nationalis m in 
Europe should be welcomed by the French , who were the v i c t ims of v i ol e nt 
nationalism i n two world wa r s . 
The French , however, do not see nat iona lism s i mply as a destructive 
force . The contributions of the civilizat ion evolved under the nation 
states we r e g r ea t and significant , particularly in the cu l tural field . 
The i mportance of p reserving and extend ing French cultur e is a major goal 
of French policy both at home and ab road . France has a Ministry for Cul -
ture and uses her f or eign a id programs as a means of extending he r cultu r al 
influence . The fea r of los ing her national ide ntity in a big ce ntralized 
super state causes anx i ety in France . 
Finally the only type of federalist political union possibl e in 
Europe, de Gaulle believes, i s an i mperialist union , wher e one count r y 
imposes unity on the others by fo rce . General de Gaulle has said that a 
fede rated union cannot be founded in Europe today without there being a 
fede r ator with suffic ient powe r, authority and skil l . 
Many commentator s see the Gaullist Plan as a s tage through which 
Europe would have to go before a fede rated union would be forired . But 
the Europea ns are afraid that the Gaullists Pl an would take the moveme nt 
for political union in Eu r ope down a blind al l ey f r om which it might neve r 
emer ge be cause a fede ration they say can only be achieved if you "strike 
when the iron is hot ~ " The Eu r opeans believe that a Feder ated Union wil l 
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be u.c:1 .:....:v'-'c. t'.1~·ough " st.cc...:-. s ive dis--.qu.:.1ibriu", Lhat is ._ach move toward 
unity will :na!-.1.! anocher t:L.Cl.!ssary , and w.i.11 rl!sult in "an ascend i ng spi..:- it 
Th .... crisis we ..l!:"I.! studyi::-.g, hm.''-'ve. r , might be int"'r-
pr...:tcd ~s dcmonstrat.:.ng the We..lkn~ss of th i s vrO}OS i tion . Tne dis~quil i-
brium c~us'-d by moves towards unity may result in a reg r ession t o a place 
furt~ .... ~ b~ck rath~r t~an to a progr .... ssion further towards a Feder~ ted 
U-.i.on . 
E . Agricultur ... in th~ Treaty of Rone 
Th" Tr~aty of Rome b ~xplicit in its intc:1tion that a Common Agri -
cultur-ul Policy should be establish ... d for the countries o::. the. EEC . Artic le 
3 of the Rome Tr.:;aty says th .... t " .• . the activit i .... s of the Community shall 
includu . .. the in.:..uguratic.n of a common agr i cultural policy ..•• " A f u ll 
e.conon . .:.c uni..'.m in t .te abricul tural s ... ctor i s c:..nvisaged by the c omplete 
1..::1if _ccotion of .. ationc..l economic policies in the sector . Thi s means tha t 
all f<::.r ... ers would be sub~ect to the govern: ..... -it ?rogr~ms and r~Juia-
The co; ,sun;ers of a 11 memb.:;r coLntr ie~ would be co::ipe ted for on an equal 
basis OJ all procucers ..:. :1 tt1 ... ESC . rt.is, it coul.::! be. expecte.::! , would lead 
to t~ .... least cost locat i on of a6r .:.cu~tur~l procuction . Tnus , the CA? 
~as not to b~ the su~ of th~ s~x na~ional policies b e t to be sepdrata dnd 
7h~ intention of tha treaty is explicit but it w~s also reco~niz.:;d 
ti".c.t to e::.tablish suc:i .::i CAP would be a delic"tc... political and co:qli-
cat._d ~cono~ic p r oc ... ss . Th.:;refore th~ treaty m~rcly m~de some ganeral 
suggest.:.ons , and =~com~~nded that an internati.on~l confer .:;nca be summoned 
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co g:. -:::1..:!r i.-t: o:-ma t i0:1 on axis ting pol ici~s, and comp.:. le the.. re.cor.tmencat i.ons 
of L .-::""r'-st._t. pe::rti'-s, as a bnckground to -::r.e develo;.>ment of t'h.~ CAP . 
The Tr~~ty la.:.c. down th~t the. Ch2 should hav~ as its objectives : 
to i.nc:-'-~se agricultur .... i ~ro<l~c~.:.vi.-::y by dev'-lop.:.ng tccn-
:1.:.cal pro0r~ss and by ensu::-i:-...:; t:1e r<•tional developm.;nt of 
~0 r.:.cLltu::-~: ?Coduct~on a~c -::~e optimizat.:.on of the f~ctors of 
procuction, es~ecially labor 
b . ~o ~nsure ther~by a i~ir ~tandard of living for the agri-
ct. ... tx::-.... 1 _.)O._)t..l~tion, pa:-ticuL.rly by the incr~asin.g of the 
.:.ndividukl '-~rnin~s of .Person~ engag'-d in dgriculture 
c . to stabilize mark'-ts 
c. . to ~u .... rant'-e r""gul~r st.~?:ies 
\::. . to ..:11sur..: r ... ason ... ole prices in sup;_)l ics to consur.1ers .. . . 
t:o co:i .. r-.:.b .. tL., .:.n confo::::~.1.:.ty wit:1 th\.. co ...... on i:1tC.rest , to the 
h .. r: .. onious develo?ment of woric trac.~ , th.; progressive aboli -
tion o~ restrictions on internGtio:1al exchanges, and the 
lu.Jering of customs b.::i.rrfors •... (27) 
Subject to these objectives " the. Common Market shall exte.nd to agr i cultur e 
<inc to trade in agricultural products . " The only articie that int i mates 
wh.:.t ~.:.n-:i of a CAP was envisa.;:,ed was article. ~O, and thi s was very flexible 
and vague : 
1 . r~~r.1be:· StCJ.t~s shall bradually .::~v ... lop the. CAr during the 
tr.insitional p1...riod ci.1d shall ..:.stablish it not later than the 
e.nd o= that p~rioa 
2 . With a view to achieving th<.! obj..:!ctives •• • a common organiza-
tion of agricu_tural ~arkdtS sh&ll be e=f.::ctcd . Ttis organization 
s:'"'.c..ll tc:.ke. one. of the fo-.1.owing form~, accorcing to the products 
con.::ern'-d : 
a . cowmon rt.les concerning co~?etition 
::> . co . .1pJ.lsory 1..oo:::-ci.n'1 tior. OL the various natio:ial marki.:;t 
organizations 
c . n _uropean ~urk~t Organiz3tion . 
:'he Treaty was sch~duled to become. op-;rative in 1958 . The twe::..ve 
ye.z.:::-s between 1955 anc 1970 wer..:. to be a "transitional" p.::rioci to the 
eco~o=ic union . Dur.:.ng th.; transit.:.onal p..:.rioJ the common external tariff 
was to be established and the ha r monization of nation~l polici es was to 
lOo 
bl.! wo:::-k~d out . t:or theSG purpos..!s the transitional period was divided 
i::oto fou:- " st<....:,l!s" . At th..; end of th~ first stage (D(!c . 1961) a unani -
mous vote wa.5 r.:!~uirGd of l:hl.! Council of :-1in.:.st<-rs affirming that the ob-
j..?.c ._ives of 1.he stage had bcl.':.n achieve" . Th.1.;:. .:;econd stage was not to be -
come O?erative until this had been done or a number of additional years 
hdd l~psed . The SGcond and third (last) stages, on the ol:her hand, cou l d 
only be ext.ended by unanimous vote . At tn.e be0 inning of th~ third stage, 
(Janua:::-y i, 1900) except in a f.;;w cases, vo ... ing in the Council of :1inis -
ters was to be by m.::jority vote and unanimity was no 10:1ger required . 
Ap~rt fr0n tnes~ differences the major charactl-ristics of the stages we r e 
the degree o~ intra -Co~munity tri..C~ l iberali~at ion and progress towards 
the estajlishment of a comoon extern.al tariff that were to be achieved 
during the stage. Since the targets laid down in the Treaty were sur -
p~ssed in all stages ~o enuoeration of them will be made here . 
Thus, in sucmary, the Treaty called for an international conference 
of agriculturalists to compile a list of possible choices of agricultural 
policies and directed the Commission to LSe this na~erial and the advisory 
co~mittees to draft proposals for the CAP . The union in agriculture by 
t~e CA? was exp~cted "CO become prog:::-ess ive::.y designed and implemented 
curing ~he transitional period . 
F. The historical Setting : The Develo?~ent of the 
CAP up to 1965 
In 1958 , the Int~rnational Conference of Ag=iculturalists , called 
for in the Treaty, was held at Stresa , Italy . Information was compiled 
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rh~r~ o.nJ .s.f;:er wt.!C~l consul <:.:ttion r.nc first propose:.. ls o!: the Commis~ion on 
the CAP wcr..! officially submitt'-d to the Cour.ci.l in early 1960 . These pr o-
pos~ :s e~oodicd the princi~1~s o~ the futur~ CA?: 
'l.'~1.:. Co;n.""TILn.:.-::y wou:d -cc:..kc. over from tr.e r:i"'Lb.!r states respons ibility 
f0 r ciuara~tcei~g a rea~on~b:e lcv~l of income for efficient farmers ; 
th~ measLre.s by which m~mber states J?rote.ct their agriculture would 
be ~radu~lly replaced by a Co~munity system of protection: ther e 
wi::.! i:>e fr0.e. tr::.ce between tl:'.e m<!mbcr countri~s in all agricul t:urc.J.. 
?rodLcts; cne~p food ~or consuoers will be an overriding aim; t: r ade 
lir.ks wi tr. thi:-ci cot.ntries would be mair.tained . ( 80, p . 08) 
On JLly l~ , 1960, the Council of ~inisters accepted the r esponsibi lity 
for the Con::nunity i~pliec in the propos'-d guidelines for a CAP , and t: he 
Co:r..~ission set about drafting detailed pro?osals for the CAP . By the end 
of 19ol , several proposals had been submitted to the Counci l of ~inisters 
a~c w~re. under consideration . Progress in achieving the i r acceptance was 
slow, how.,:.ver . On Jam.1ary 1 , 1962, t.hG second stage of the trans i t i onal 
periou (new ta:-if!: cuts) was to be voted into being unani mously . Fr ance 
was aisturbed ~y the lack of prog r ess that had been mace on the CAP du ring 
the first stage ~nd m&de it clear that it would use its veto to bl oc k : 
.. . passag~ to t:hc second stage o: the r.ransi:ional period 
- the ex~ra 10% tarif: c~t p:-o?os~d on industrial goojs 
- tr.e ]rogr.ass of discussions w::.th the U. K .... L: the Germans we r e 
not will i ng t:o go along with the ba::oic ces i gn fo r the Common 
European ?arm Polic y . ( 109 , p . 23) 
The first of many "maratho'.1" end of yezr discussions was held at the end 
o: 1961 to achieve agreement: on the CAP so that. France would not delay 
t:he progress of the rest of the Tr eaty . On January 14, 1962 , agreement 
we-.s reached in the Cou:-tcil . Six regulat i ons were a:;>proved establishi ng 
c oc.u:o~ ~arkets for var i ous products and groups of produc t s . 
Th~ pr oducts that bccam~ subjec t to the CAP i ncluded ce reals , p i gmeat , 
..!:;:;s, poultry ~aat, fruit , a[, ... v1;..g0t"'ble.>, .:.no vi::e products and amounted 
to 53% of totr.l agricultural output at the tim.:. and 23% of total agri-
cultu:::-~l imports of the Conununi::y . A tioetable for ir:1p!ementing a common 
r..~rket =or e"'ch o: the commocities was agrc..!d upon and the pol icy instru-
ca~ts for con~rolling their pr ices were chos~n . The actual pri ce levels 
~o be ai~ed a~ were not fixed, hc~~ver . The Europecin Agricultural Guarantee 
a~d Guidance Fund was esta0lished (heraaf~er de~oted FEOGA, wh ich are its 
initials in French) . The purpose of FEOGA was to finance the CAP and the 
for~u:a for member states contributions to provice its revenue was fixed 
until July 1, 19o5 . 
Another " mc:.. r athon" end of year dis cussion was held in 1 963 and on the 
23rd o: Dece~ber th~ Council of Mini~ters a?proved reg~lations establish-
ing a tin:e.:able for the implementation of a common market in rice, beef 
and veal, milk: a.r,d milk p::-oC.uc t s . The ?olicy instrumen~s for controlling 
their p:::-ices were selected and guidel i nes for the management of the marke ts 
for vege~able fats c..na oils were agr~ed upon . ~his brought anothe r 323 o= 
agric~ltural output a~d 143 of agricultural imports unaer the CAP . Thus, 
85% of ~otal agricultural production and 373 of total agricultural im?orts 
w~re now under the CAP . Common pric~ levels h~d not yet been fixed , how-
ever , b~~ the li;:nits had been fixed within which national prices could vary . 
These usuully cor::-~spondec to the French or Dutch low and the German high . 
The int~ntion was ~hat these limits should be progressively na rrowed un-
t i l c. corr,mon pr ice level was reachec . Little p:::-ogress was wade , however , 
i:1 acco::.:?lishing r;his . As a result, Sicco l'Ic..nsholdt , Vice President of the 
cEC Coorr.~ssion in charge of aJricultu:::-e remarked i n 1963 : 
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D~spite all the Council ' s work, and despite all good intentions , 
the fact remains that industrial tariffs amongst the Member 
States have shrunk to a r es idual 40%, but that in agricul ture 
there has been practically no r eduction of the inte rnal protec -
tion maintained by Membe r States; this protection i s virtually 
the same today as it was in 1958 . All that the Community has done 
is to r eplace a number of national protective measures by a 
common system. (71) 
Because of this , Mansholdt suggested that the t ransition to a common 
price level be made in one jump and that those hurt by this procedure be 
compensated by FEOGA . This was known as the Mansholdt Plan and it be-
came the basis for the rest of the CAP . 
After another "marathon" in the end of 1964 , on December 15th, a 
common ce real price level was agreed upon . The common ce r eal prices i m-
plied a common price system for those commodities derived from ce rea ls , 
such as poultry , eggs and pigmeat . Agreement was reached on when the 
different price levels were to come into operation and on the gradual take-
over of the financing of the CAP by FEOGA . The system of compensation for 
farmers hurt by the common price level was decided . An important point 
to note is that the c ompensation was set by the EEC and was g iven to fa rm-
ers on the merits of their cases r egardless of their nationality . 
At this time , however , no decision was made on how FEOGA was to be 
financed after July 1, 1965 , when the 1962 ag r eement lapsed . On March 
31 , 1965 , the Commission submitted a proposal to the Council of Ministers 
to solve this problem . The system adopted in 1962 had the Council of 
Minister s authorize the levying of revenue on the Membe r States as they 
approved their budget . The r evenue was collected f rom the national gove r n-
ments as a proportion of the variable levies collec ted by each state and 
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fror.: ci:·.::.c'.: corn::::-ib1.. ... ions by .; ... ch st<:.t~ . Thus th.:; r.<lt.:..on~l govG r:1ments 
h .... d col.•?lc.:e control over the r~venu..; of ~·'J.:OGA : they h.::d a veto on the 
a~ou:1~ ot ravc~ue tn ... t ~as to bl..! col-~ct~d, tt~ ~ro:_)ortion to be paid by 
c..-cr. cui..r:try, ~ :-.d 1..hey cou:.c ... ~ways r..!ft.:s..! .:o p ... y if dissat: .:..sfied °:Jy the 
O?.::.r~tions of FEOGA . Tnc zovernments al~o nad complete control over the 
ex?e~J:.~1..re ut F20GA but tnis .~ver o~c~o~ a controv~rsial iss1..e . 
In ~;.1rch 1965 t.h.e 1.;orr.:::.issio:1 s..?br~it ::l..!d new p ropose:. ls to c:he Co1..ncil 
=or f :.nancing tb.a operc.tior.s of :?EO(,A ( re_>on: in 17) . Thc:se proposals we r e 
til..!d to .:i. proposal to ext..;nd 1..h.:?. budgetary po•..Jers of the Europ"'an Par -
li.::ne:-..t becc:.us~ o: tne :_)Ort o:': ern:.ry problcra. T'•is i nvolved the apparent: 
i:1j1..st.:..ce of leavin~ customs r..!venu~ in tne hands o~ nember nations be -
c~1..se, ... s trai..e w~s fre~d within the Cc:nmunity, the port of entry of im-
pc,rts would not necessarily be. i:1 th~ cou:1try of consum;:>tion of t~e in-
?Orts . A s~~ ... e whic~ contain~c ~ conve:1icnt: port of entry woulc benefit 
fro~ the ec?loy~ent a~d service ch~r0~s for use of the port, and they would 
also get th~ customs rev1;.n~e which was a t~x on the consumers of the con-
su::.i~g country . B~ca.us~ of t:hi~., th" Ccmwission propo::>ed tr.at all cust:oms 
r~ve ..... ..! go to the. Cent:r<::l Ir..stitut:.ons o: the Coc.rr.unit:y . It: was with this 
ri..vet:ue that the Commission propos~d to finance the expenditure of FEOGA . 
~~:.s ~=O?OSdl nad one s:.0 nificclnt i~pl:.ca~ion . Cp to 1970, the proposal 
wo1..L.'.3 --.. sure ti' ..:.t the Central I:ist..:.:1..tions of tne Commun:.ty would be 
likely to have a surplus after meeting the costs of th~ir expenditure, be-
cause the CAP woul1.; r.o·.: bl.! fully operat.:.v.:! . The Cou.U1ission realized th.::! 
n"'"d fo::- so::-.1;. :_)a!'l:..;;mem: .. c..ry con .. rol over this sur?it.:s . !'h.ey ?reposed that: 
the ?CW1;..rs o .. ti'.e European Parl ia::ient should be extended to share this 
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control with the Council of Ministers . This aspect of the Commi ssion 
was anathema to the Gaullists . They we r e opposed to " s u pra - national" 
control and remembered tha t the British Parliament had g r adual ly gained 
c ontrol of Britain be cause of its control of the purse . Thus they 
strongly opposed giving budgetary powers to the European Parliament . 
The al ternative solution was to give the Council of Ministers full par-
liamenta ry control over the budgetary surplus . Howeve r , within six months , 
(January 1 , 1966) the Counc il would be mak ing decisions by qualified 
majority vote and France woul d have lost her veto powe r s . Thus t he Council 
would become another " s upr a -national " i.nstitution with the power and finance 
to overrule t he nation state of France . Opposing increased budgetary 
powe r s fo r the European Parliament and g iving t hese powers to a Council 
of Minis t e rs with majority vot e would be closing the front door on supr a -
na t ional fede ra l i sm and letting it in the back door . The French position 
on the Commission's proposal was stated by the leader of the Gaullist 
Party in the European Parliament : 
The r eve nue to meet our new r equir ements must be found • . . • 
but it seems unwise to collect more taxes than a r e 
necess ary , to take account of the common customs tariff 
befor e it is es t ablished , . .• or to make it necessary to r e -
vise the Treaty of Rome before we are ce rtain the national 
gove rnme nts and parliaments wil l ag r ee . ~8, p . 7) 
The French objected to the surplus of revenue . They we r e prepared to ad-
mit the port of entry pr oblem as stated by the Commission but saw no 
reason " to revise the Treaty of Rome" in order to solve it . This type of 
inequity can be solved by f ina nc i al compensation . However , the "omn ibus" 
proposal of the Commission received s upport from the other f ive member 
states of the EEC . Pr essure was brought t o bear on France to accept the 
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pol i tical proposals or accept the risk that no ag reement would be r eached 
on financing the CAP. The French stood firm and withdr ew f rom the ne-
gotiations on April 30 , 19o5 . They pursued an " empty - chair" policy : they 
did not obstruct exi st i ng progr ams of the EEC but played only a pass ive 
role in them . They refused to negot iate any new programs and without 
French support the development of the Community came to a halt . 
On July 22nd (1965), the Commission submitted revised proposals that 
would sat i sfy the French demands . But now the French r efused to r e turn 
until all t heir political grievances had been cleared away . They objec t ed 
to majo r ity v ot i ng which was to come into effect a t the beginning of the 
third stage of the transitional period , January 1 , 1966 . They also de-
manded that certain matters of protocol be r evised to emphas i ze tha t the 
Commission was not supra-national . Their position on these matters was 
accept ed by the other Five at the beg inning of 1966 , but the question of 
major ity rule was shelved . 
Then in February , 1966 , after six months of " empty- chair" tactics, t he 
negotiati ons for the CAP we r e r esumed . The date for the adoption of the 
compl e te CAP was moved forward one yea r to July 1 , 1968 and t he French 
ag r eed to finance a higher portion of FEOGA' s expend i ture than Ge r many . 
Finally the French agreed to make concessions on their a ttitude to the 
Kennedy Round of tariff reduc tions at GATT . Thus France's objective of 
pr eventing an expans i on of the powers of the European Parliament was 
a chieved only at the cost of the concessions mentioned above . 
In March , 1966 , common price l evels we r e proposed for milk and milk 
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product s , beef and veal , rice , sugar , oilseeds and olive oil . All these 
pr oposals we re acc epted in July, 1966 escept for milk . Final regulations 
still have to be adopted fo r milk , non- edible horticultural products and 
hops . However, except for s ome minor deta i ls the common market fo r 
agriculture and the CAP will both be fully operative when the industrial 
customs union comes i nto effect on July 1, 1968. 
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VI . THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POL ICY 
A. The Outline of the CAP 
An economic union is a common ma rket with some degree of harmon i za -
tion of national policies . The CAP of the EEC is a completely unified 
policy for the management of the agricultur al sector of the combined 
member count r ies . A common ma rket was defined to be a trading association 
in which all barriers to the movement of goods and factor s of production 
be twee n countr ies a r e abolished and a common system of protection is applied 
aga inst third countries . Thus , the f unct ion of a common policy fo r agri-
culture in a trading a ssociation is to equalize the effects of state inter-
vent i on i n the sector between t he member count ries , by ensuring f r ee ac-
cess by all producers to all markets within the association , by establish-
ing free factor movements within it , by operating a common system of pro-
tection against third countries and a common price and income policy for 
all individuals within the union . 
A necessary c ondition fo r a common market is the existence of a 
"common price level " wi thin the market . Prices need not be exactly the 
same in all pa r ts of t he market , but goods of the same quality must c om-
mand the same pr ice in different geog raphical areas of the ma rket except 
fo r transport costs. For manufactured products this c ommon price leve l 
will be established in the EEC step by step as duties a nd other impediments 
to trade between Member States diminish as the free movement of goods 
develops . 
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In t he agricultura l sector, howeve r, common prices cannot be i ntro-
duced so easily . This i s because demand fo r agr icu l tura l products is 
relatively i nelastic and so supply , both domes t i c a nd i mported , exercizes 
gr eat influence in determining prices . I f the su pply of ce rtain agricul -
tural products is not curtailed there would be a drastic r eduction in 
prices and major soc i al changes would be necessary . Such soc ial changes 
would be painf u l and so the policy maker s in indus trial ized areas such as 
the EEC manage supplies to cont r ol prices and so control the rate of 
social c hanges needed . 
In the EEC common market in agriculture, the Commission has the task 
of ensuring f ree movements of goods and of implementing a common policy 
for controlling prices . The CAP dir ected that all intra-Community t r ade 
barriers on agricultural products be r emoved . The system of prices fixed 
must be internally consistent and conform to the objectives of the CAP . 
The prices are consistent if they preserve the r e lationships between the 
prices of related ag ricultural products, such as that [See (22)] between 
feed grains and meat . The objectives of the CAP are the usual goal s of 
economic policy, gr owth , security a nd equity . The r elationships between 
these goals and the objectives of the CAP as laid down in the Treaty of 
Rome a r e depicted i n Figure VI . l . 
The prices of agricultura l products in the EEC are fixe d within cer-
tain ranges by the CAP . They are kept within these r anges by support 
buying and import controls . The fi rst set of policy instruments used to 
fix prices within the required r ange is the "targe t-l evy-inte rve ntion" 
- - o - - - . - - - - • 
domestic demand is now OQ" and thus there is excess demand amounting to 
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Increased productivity in the agricultural sector 
A fair standard of l iv ing for farme rs 
Reasonable prices to cons ume r s 
Market stabil ity for producers 
Gua r anteed food supply for consumers 
The harmonious development of world trade ~~~~~~~~-
growth 
equity 
security 
all three 
goals 
Figure Vl.l . Relationsh ip be tween goals of interna tional e conomic policy 
and the goa l s of CAP 
system. 
Target pr ices a r e the prices f or the products that the EEC Commission 
would like to see rule on the market . They a r e fixed for the a r ea of 
g r eatest def icit in the EEC countr ies and target prices for the othe r 
areas a r e derived to r eflect locational, quality and seasonal differen-
tials . To e nsur e that the a cceptable range around each target price i s 
maintained inte rvention prices and variable levies a r e employed . The 
intervention price is somewhat between 90- 953 of the target pr ice and if 
the market pr ice falls below it the n the Commission ente r s the mar ket to 
keep the price from falling f urthe r . The intervention prices are fixed 
for the area of greatest deficit and inte rve ntion prices fo r the other 
areas are derived consistent with the derived t arget prices . Va riab le 
levies are used to ensure that prices do not rise above a certain maximum 
in the range around the targe t prices. The derived ta r get price at the 
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port of entry to the EEC is known as the threshold price , and the lowest 
offer price of third countries for exports to the EEC at that port is 
known as the free at f r ontier price . The difference between the free at 
frontier price and the threshold price (plus a small sum for protection) 
is levied on imports . This is the variabl e levy, variable because it does 
not matte r what changes occur in the f ree a t frontier price , the levy will 
always be the diffe r ence between it and the threshold price . However , if 
the market price rises above the target price then imports will always 
tend to enter to meet the excess demand over domestic supply . This is 
because the variable levy is fixed in terms of the target price and pro-
tects domestic pr oduction only while market prices a re equal to or below 
the target price . The target-levy - inte rvention system of controlling 
prices can be illustrated geometrically . 
Under these assumptions the target- levy- intervention system ensur es 
that the market price P can only take on values between the intervention 
price Pi and the threshold price Pth . (See Figure VI . 2) . Suppose we 
start out from a price Pth with supply equal to demand (OQ) and i mports 
equal to zero. If the relative price of a close substitute product falls 
then the domestic demand curve will shift to the left , say D' , as in 
Figure VI . 2a . Domestic demand and supply wil l continue to be equal (OQ' ) , 
and imports will continue to be zero . The market price will have fallen 
but th i s is in the permissible range in Figure VI . 2a . If population or 
income rises the domes tic demand curve is likely to shift to the right . 
Suppose this shift can be r epresented by D" as in Figure VI . 2b . At Pth 
domestic demand is now OQ" and thus there is excess demand amounting to 
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Figure VI . 2 . Determination of the price of a commodity under the 
target - levy- inte rvention system of control 
::~r----____ ?.~ /0 
P' 7 
Pi i. 
I 
l 
I 
s 
0 -------Q' Q Quantity 
Figure VI. 2a . 
Price 
I 
Pth -
Pi 
0 
The effect of a fall in the price of a close substi-
tute product on a price managed by the target- levy -
intervention system , if the initial price is the 
threshold ~rice I 
. ) r 
\ 
Q - Q" - - Quantity -
Figure VI . 2b . The effect of a rise in income on a price managed 
by t he target- levy- intervention sys tem , if the 
initial price is the threshold price 
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QQ" . If imports are not allowed to rise then the market price will rise 
abov~ Pth . However , in this case the profit from exporting to the Com-
munity , the market price minus the free at frontier price is greater than 
th~ variable levy (the threshold price) and so i mports will enter . QQ" 
will be imported and the price will remain Pth . 
If domestic cos t s rise and domestic supply shifts to the left this 
might be represented by S'" in Figure VI.2c . At Pth domestic supply will 
now be OQ" • whil e domes tic demand wil 1 be OQ . Thus there will be excess 
of do1nocstic demand over domestic supply of Q" ' Q at Pth . If imports are 
not increased then the market price will rise above Pth . However, if this 
happens it becomes pr ofitable for third countries to export QQ"' to the 
Community because the levy is fixed in terms of the target price , not the 
market price . Thus the levy, which is equal to the difference between the 
free at frontier price and the target price , is less than the difference 
between the free at frontie r price and the market price the pr ofit from 
exporting to the Community . Imports will exactly cover the excess demand 
(QQ'") because of the assumption that their supply is perfectly elastic . 
The r i se in imports (QQ" ' ) will keep the market price in the Community 
below Pth . The price will not fall further due to excess imports because 
below Pth the difference between the free at frontier price and the thresh-
old price (the levy) is greater than the difference between the free at 
frontier price and the market price (the prof it from exporting to the 
Community) . Thus we see how the control of imports is used to keep the 
market price in the Community below the threshold price . 
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Figure VI . 2c . The effect of a rise in domestic costs on a price 
managed by the t a r ge t - levy - intervention system if 
the initial price is the threshold price 
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Figure VI . 2d . The effect of a fall in domestic costs on a price 
managed by the target-levy-intervention s ystem if 
the initial price is the threshold price 
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threshold price 
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If domestic costs fall and domestic supply shifts to the right a new 
supply curve will be established for domestic production and this may be 
r~prcscnted by S*, as in Figure VI . 2d . Domestic demand and supply will 
continue to be equal (OQ*) and imports will continue to be zero . The 
market price will have fallen to P~, but this is in the permissible range . 
The preceding analysis assumes that the Community starts out from 
the threshold price Pth and is designed to show how the variable prevents 
the market price from rising above Pth . • ow let us assume tha t the Com-
munity starts out from the intervent ion price Pi and let us show how the 
wa rket price is prevented by support buying from falling below Pi . If 
demand is equal to supply at Pi , the situation may be represented by 
Figure VI . 3 . Here imports are zero and the amount being purchased by the 
Commission is also zero. If the relative price of a close substitute 
product falls then the domestic demand curve will shift to the left, say 
DD ', as in Figure VI . 3a . If the Commission does not intervene, at the 
price Pi domestic demand will fall to OB and there will be excess supply 
amount i ng to BA . This will drive the market price below Pi . In order to 
prevent this the Commission will have to enter the market and buy the 
quantity BA of the commodity . 
If population or income rises the domestic demand curve will shift to 
the right. Suppose this shift can be represented by DD" as in Figure 
VI . 3b . Supply and demand will continue to be equal (OA") and the market 
price will rise to P'' . This is in the permissible range in Figure VI . 3b , 
so no intervention by the Commission will be needed . 
If domestic costs rise and domestic supply shifts to the left this 
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Figure VI . 3a . The effect of a fall in the price of a close substitute 
product on a price managed by the ta r ge t - levy- inte r -
vention system, if the initial price is the interven-
tion price 
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Figure VI . 3c . The effect of a rise in domestic c os t s on a price managed 
by the target - levy- intervention system, if the initial 
price i s the intervention price 
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might b~ r~prcscntcd by SS'" in Figure VI. 3c . Supply and demand will con-
tinu'"' to be equal (OA"' ) and the market price will rise to P"' . Tr.is is 
in the permiss i ble range in Figure VI . 3c , so no inte rvention wil l have to 
be made by the Commission . 
If domestic costs fall and domestic supply shifts to the right a new 
supply curve will be established for ~ulliestic proauc~ion ~nd this may be 
represented by SS* , as in Figure VI . 3d . If the Commission does not inter-
vene , at the price Pi domestic s upply wi l l be OB* and there will be excess 
supply amounting to AB* . This will drive the ma rket price below Pi . In 
order to prevent this the Commiss i on wil l have to ente r the market and 
purchase AB* , of the commod i ty . 
In summa r y , therefore, the tar get - levy - intervention system keeps 
mark~t prices within t wo limits ; the uppe r limit is the threshold pr i c e 
and the lower limi t is the intervention price . I f excess demand or r ising 
costs tend to push the marke t price above the threshold price imports are 
au~oillatically allowed to enter the Community to fill the gap in demand . If 
demand shifts to the l eft or s upply shif t s to right and this causes pres -
sure to lower the market price below the intervention price , the Commission 
enters the market and suppor ts the pr ice . 
A second set of policy instruments is also employed to ensure that 
mark~t pr ices of agricultural products fall within an acceptable range . 
This set is known as the " market-levy-sluice - gate" system. The principal 
cifference between this system and the ta r get - levy - intervention system is 
that no desired or target prices are fixed for the commodities subject to 
this system and no s upport buying is undertaken by the Comm i ss i o n . How-
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Figure VI . 4 . Relationship between the va riable levy and the boundary 
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at frontie r price 
levy increases . When this differ ence r eaches a high level , say whe re Pf= 
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ever, this does not mean that ma r ket prices are completely subject to t he 
whims oE supply a nd d~mand . The contr ol of domestic supply is s ti ll 
undertaken by the CAP but in a mor e s ubtle manne r . Th i s set of policy 
ins truments is appl ied to most of the pr oducts whose supply prices depend 
o~ the prices of ce reals . Thus when the Commiss ion fixes the prices of 
cereals (by the target- l evy- interve ntion system) it determines t he s upply 
pric~ s of t hese commodities to a large extent . 
Protection from imports i s still provided for these commodities by 
the CAP . The market price of the commodities (plus a small amount for 
protection) can be called the boundary price of the Community . The dif -
ference between the boundary price and the free at f rontier price is levied 
on i mports . However, some additional features to the variable l evy employed 
for these products should be noted. The supply of the commodi ties subject 
to this system is extr emely variable (the so-called hog cycle is an ex-
ample) and so the CAP has some built - in devices to prevent domestic in-
flation due to exce ss demand for t hese commodities and a farm crisis due 
to dumping by foreigners . It the domestic or boundary price ris es above 
a ce rtain level (there is a danger of inflation) then the variable levy 
becomes constant . I f the rise in the difference between the domestic 
boundary or market pr ice and the free at f rontier price is due to foreign 
dumping then imports attract a supplementary levy . This i s regarded as 
t r ue if the free at f rontier price falls be low a ce r tain price known as 
the sluice-gate price . Finally, if the Community becomes a net e xporter 
because the free at frontier price rises sharply in relation to the boundar y 
price ( probably due to excess supply in the Community) then Community ex-
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ports are subsidized by the negative of the variable levy , that is , the 
difference between the domestic market or boundary price and the f ree 
at frontier price . 
The theoretical r elationships between the variable levy and the 
boundary price and the free at frontier price can be illustrated geometri -
cally. Let Pb denote the bounda ry price and let Pf again denote t he free 
at frontie r price . Let us f irs t ass ume that Pt i s c onstant. The r ela -
tionship between Pb and the variable l evy i s then represented in Figure 
VI . 4. If the boundary price and the free at frontie r price are equal 
(Pb = Pf ) t hen the variable levy is zero . As the boundary price rises 
above Pf the va riable l evy increases until the boundary price reaches an 
uppe r h i gh price , Ph . At this price the Commiss ion be comes concerned 
that excess demand for the commodity will threaten t he Community with in-
flation and so the varia ble levy bec omes constant . If the boundary pr ice 
of the Community is above the free at frontier price , Pf, but the community 
is i n surplus then a negative va riable l evy is paid to pr oducers to bring 
their pr ice down to the level of Pf . 
Now let us assume that Pf can vary but that Pb is constant . The r e -
lationship between the free at f r ontie r price and the variab le l evy can 
be represented as in Fi gu r e VI.S . Where the free at frontier price is 
equal to the bou ndary price (Pf = Pb) the variable levy i s zero . As Pf 
falls below Pb the differe nce betwee n them increases and so the variab le 
levy increases . When this diffe r ence r eaches a high l evel , say where Pf = 
Pc , the variable levy becomes constant to dis courage inefficie nt Communi t y 
1:-,o 
pt"oducers . However , if other countries then begin to dump on the Com-
munity market they will push PE down further still and when it Eal ls be -
low a low pric~ called the sluice gate price a suppl ementary levy is 
placed on i mports . Once again if the Community is in surplus a negative 
levy equal to t he difference between the bounda ry price and the free at 
f r ontie r price i s paid to Community exporters . 
The CAP also employs othe r ins trume nt variables fo r contt"olling prices 
and suppl i es , but they are vat"iations of the two systems outlined above . 
"Guide prices" are set by the Community fo r some products . They a r e ve r y 
similar to target prices except they are not derived from the a r ea of 
g reatest def icit and pr oducts gove t"ned by them a r e not protected by vari -
able levies but rather by common externa l tariffs . " Norm prices" are a l so 
used . These are also s i milar to t arget prices except that instead of 
charging the r es t of the world a levy to bring the free at f rontie r price 
up to the threshold ta r get price , def iciency payments are paid t o domestic 
producer s to bring thei r price r e ceived up to the nor m price . " Basic 
prices" a r e employed by the CAP and are exactly the same as target prices 
exce~t that t hey are not used to calculate va riable levies but rathe r the 
~a rket price i s . The actual price within the Community i s f i xed withi n 
92 to 973 of the basic p r ice . 
B. The Details of t he CAP 
Cer eal prices occupy a key position among agricultu r al prices . They 
determine the common pr ice level of t hose livestock products which de riv~ 
chiGfly from ce rea ls such as poultry and pi gmeat . Cereals and t hese l i ve-
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stock products make up more than 30- 403 of the revenue from the sales of 
farm products . In most parts of the Community more than 50% of the arable 
land is sown to cereals . Thus the level of cereal prices was the most 
important decision of the CAP pr i ce support system . A "target - l evy-
i nte r vent i on" system was establ ished fo r cer eals . 
Table VI . l g i ves t he t a r get and interventi on prices fixed for c e r eals 
in December 1964 . The a r ea of g r e a tes t def icit i s Duis burg , i n t he Ruhr . 
This common price sys t em came i nto ope r a t ion on J uly 1 , 1967 . I n t he case 
of durum wheat the t a r get price i s f i xed below the mi ni mum p r ice gua r anteed 
to producers . The d ifference i s made up by a subsidy . Since the onl y 
significant producer s of dur um wheat a r e in Southern I taly this subs i dy 
is in t he nat ure of a social meas ure r athe r t han an economic one . 
Table VI . l . Target and intervention prices for cereals fixed i n Dec ember 
1964 (dollars per metric ton)a 
Commodity Tar get price I ntervention price 
Wheat other than du rum 106 . 25 98 . 75 
Barley 91. 25 85 . 00 
Maiz~ 90 . 63 77 . 00 
Rye 93 . 75 87 . 50 
Durham wheatb 125 . 00 117 . 58 
a 
Sou r c e : (23) 
bGua r anteed mini mum pr ice to pr oducer s , $145 . 00/met r ic t on 
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Table VI . 2 . gives the derived intervention prices Eor feed grains ex-
cept tor maize and durum wheat . The table also shows the 38 marketing 
centers of the Com.~unity. There are only four marketing center s for durum 
wheat and their derived intervention prices are given in Table VI . 3 . 
The intervention price for maize is constant throughout the Community, un-
less Community production were to expand to a certain percentage of con-
sumption which is not thought likely . 
One further point should be made about cereals . In the Southern par t 
of the ESC are the major producers of cereals and their interest was to 
keep prices just below those of their Northern neighbors . However, the 
major producers of processed cereals were in the Nor~h of the EEC and their 
interest , given free trade, was to lower cereal prices substantially . 
They were "bought off" with substantial export subsid i es . 
Eggs and poultry meat are subject to the market - levy- sluice gate 
system. Pigmeat has in addition a basic price , and the market price is 
ke?t within 923 to 973 of it . These commodities often need expor~ subsidies 
to dump their surplus abroad . This is likely to become a very expensive 
proposition so there is considerable speculation that the system may be 
changed for these products, or feed grain prices may be lowered in the 
Community . The Common Market for these products came into operation on 
July 1, 1967 . 
Beef is subject to a guide price and intervention price, and is pro-
tected by a common external tariff . The intervention system will be a 
levy system and will al so operate to protect the domestic producer , but 
the exact fo r m of the system has yet to be settled . The system is scheduled 
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Table VI . 2 . Dcriv~d intervention prices for the marketing c~nters of 
the EEC , fixed in December 1964a (dollars per metric ton) 
Market center 
Kiel 
Hamburg 
Bremen 
Hanover 
Kassel 
Aulendorf 
Bamberg 
Schwabach 
R..::gen:sburg 
Pass au 
Stuttgart 
Mannhiem 
Rotr.erdarn 
Antwerp 
Liege 
~1ersch 
Coopiegne 
Chartres 
Rouen 
LaPall ice 
Poi tiers 
Tours 
Chateauroux 
~Jarseilles 
Toulouse 
Orleans 
Reggio Calabr ia 
Palermo 
Cagl iari 
Bologna 
Ancona 
G1,;noa 
Rome 
Grosse to 
Florence 
Naples 
Foggia 
Bari 
a Source : (19) 
~on-durum wheat 
97 . 06 
98 . 31 
98 . 31 
90. 95 
96 . 24 
94 . 61 
98 . 11 
95 . 27 
95 . 2 7 
98 . 30 
98 . 75 
98 . 13 
97 . 56 
97 . 26 
93 . 71 
95 . 23 
92 . 11 
95 . 27 
95 . 27 
91 . 96 
91 . 86 
92 . 11 
98 . 75 
94 . 82 
98 . 75 
98 . 75 
98 . 75 
95 . 07 
96 . 37 
96 . 15 
98 . 85 
97 . 44 
96 . 52 
98 . 75 
98 . 75 
98 . 75 
Commodity 
Rye Barley 
05 . 81 84 . 54 
87 . 06 84 . 54 
87 . 06 84 . 54 
85 . 70 83 . 20 
84 . 99 82 . 47 
83 . 36 
!:so . 86 84 . 36 
81 . 38 
84 . 02 82 . !.3 
84 . 02 82 . 43 
87 . 50 85 . 00 
87 . 50 oS . 00 
86 . 88 84 . 38 
86 . 88 83 . 81 
83 . 51 
82 . 46 b4 . 65 
8J . . 48 
78 . 36 
82 . 43 
82 . 43 
78 . 60 
78 . 28 
76 . 85 
85 . 00 
79 . 25 
7 9. 61 
83 . 25 
83 . 25 
83 . 25 
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Table VI . 3. Derived intcrvcn~ion price~ for the four marketing centers 
fo r durum wheat Ln the EEC (dollars/metric ton) 
Marketing center Price 
Marseilles 117 . so 
Toulouse 114. 76 
Palermo 110 . 24 
Genoa 117.50 
aSource : (19) 
to be completely designed and impleme nted by July 1 , 1968 . 
The market for milk and milk products is subje ct to a "levy - target-
intervention" system . A common price system was fixed for milk and mil k 
products in July 1966 , but many of the details of applying the CAP to 
these products have still to be worked out . The target and intervention 
prices are fixed f or milk ex dairy and the prices of other milk produ cts 
are derived from these . 
The market for sugar is based on a "target - levy - intervention" s ystem. 
A common target price has been fixed for ex factory sugar and so has a 
common intervention price . These prices , however, have been fixed for the 
area of greatest surplus (~orth and Northwest France) . Prices in other 
areas will thus be higher by amounts reflecting regional differenc es . A 
levy and export subsidy system has also been agreed upon . However, there 
is also a production quota . The protection of the levy and intervention 
price or the benef it of the export subs idy only applies if the sugar 
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factory remains within a certain quota . Output above that quota is gradu-
ally phased out of pr otection . Italy has been given a longer trans~tion 
period but the common market for sugar is expected to come into effect on 
July 1, 1968 . 
The market system of fruit and vegetables has been succinctly de -
scribed by T. K. Warley : 
Prices of fruits and vegetables are protected by seasonal ad 
valorem tariffs , minimum standards of quality for imports, in-
ternal support buying , and in certain circumstances the payment 
of export subsidies . Support buying is conducted by pro-
ducers ' marketing organi:4a tions, the formation of which will 
be encouraged by direct grants shared by th~ Commission and 
the national authorities . This support buying is perraissible 
wh.?.n prices fall below 75-853 of a "basic price" fixed for each 
product (less for some products . . . ) bas ic prices being the 
arithmetic average of market prices in the previous three years 
in the main producing regions . The support buying will be 
shared by the producers themselves . If prices fall very low the 
Commission wi 11 share the cost . ( 111 ) 
Vegetable oils and fats are subject to norm prices and producers a r e 
paid subsidies (deficiency payments) . 
This summary is represented in Table VI . 4 , but it does not exhaust 
all the means used by the CAP to cont r ol prices and supplies . However , 
it is sufficient to indicate the kinds of price support policies and tariff 
policies employed by the EEC Commission to achieve the objectives of the 
CAP . These policies , themselves, do not exhaust the CAP . Other parts of 
the CAP i nvolve common rules of competition , standardization of products , 
quality control measu r es , harmonization of laws , common social transport , 
education and research policies . Free movement of factors of production 
throughout the whole agricultural sector of the EEC must be ensured by 
the CAP . Common development policies fo r underdeveloped regions both 
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Ta bl~ VI. 4 . Pric~ systems oE the CAP a in l 9o5 
rl.C~ 
Commodity T.:irget Basic Norm Guide Inter- .Slui.ce Levy Tariff Quota 
vention gate 
C..?.r.:!.:ils x x x 
Durum wh.l!at x x x x 
Milk and 
milk products x x 
Pigmeat x x x x 
Poul try meat x x x 
Beef and veal x x 
Eggs x x 
Fruit: and veg . x x x x 
Olive oil x x x 
Wine x x 
:'able wines x x x 
Sugar x x 
8 Source : (9 , 23 , 25 , 111 ) 
wi~hin and without the EEC must be adopted . But above al l the CAP in-
volves the collection of r evenue and its expenditure to f ulfill its func -
tions . 
C. Financing the CAP 
In January 19o2 , the European Guarantee and Guidance Fund (whose 
initials , FEOGA , give it its popular name) was established and it began 
to function in Februa r y 1964. Membe r States submit to the Commission 
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quart~rly retut"ns of r<!levant expot"ts , imports and interventions on the 
home ma rk~t , and apply once a year for refunds of their expenditure on 
price suppo rt measures . Projects for agricultural development also arc 
eligible for assistance from the Fund . The expend iture of FEOGA is thus 
divided into two sections, a "Guarantee Section" which handles price sup-
port financing and a "Guidance Section" whic, handles agricultural de -
v~lopment g r ants . The division of expenditure between the two sections 
is given in Table VI . 5 up to 19o4- o5 . Provisional figures are included 
for 1965- 66 . In 1966- 67, expenditure on the Guarantee Section is ex-
pected to rise to about ~30 million dollars; it is expected to r each $920 
million in 1967 - 68 , and thereafter to level off at about $1200 million . 
The expenditure of the Guidance section of the Fund was limited to a ceil-
~ng of one third of the amount spent by the Guarantee Section , but since the 
beginning of 1967 it has been limited to $280 million annually . 
The purpose of the Guarantee Section of the Fund is finance the com-
mon price levels by intervening in the domestic market of the Community 
and by paying export refunds to the farmers . The 3 distribution of ex-
penditure between these is given in Table VI.6 . The percentage going to 
intervention is expected to rise because th~ above figures do not include 
the support that will be necessary fo t" crops since the c ommon cereals 
prices came into effect . The major support items (903) are expected to be 
cer~als, pigmeat , eggs and poultry meat . 
The purpose of the Guidance Section of FEOGA i s agricul tural develop-
ment . It tries to bring about structural i mprovements in agriculture , in 
particular , consolidation of farm units , changeover of production to more 
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Tabl~ VI. 5 . Division of expenditure of FEOGA between guarantee and 
guidance sections from 19o5 to 196ba (millions of dollars) 
Section Y~ar 
l 962 - b3 1903- 04 1904- 65 1965- 66 
Guarantee 29 . 0 so.a 165 . 0 245 . 0 
Guicance 9. 0 18 . 0 55 . 32 81. 0 
aSource: (24, 26 ) 
Tabl~ VI . 6 . Division of expenditure of the guarantee section of FEOGA 
between export refunds and price supports f r om 1962 to 
1965a (per cent) 
Item Year 
1962-63 1963 - 64 1964- 65 
Export refunds 77 . 5 86 . 3 80 . 5 
Price supports 22 . 5 13 . 7 19 . 5 
asource : (24, 26) 
profitable lines, capital investment and greater technical efficiency . 
Approved natiorsl pr ojects are submitted to the Fund for grants and they 
are divided iPto two groups , those that improve. " production structure" 
and those that improve " marketing structure". An example of a project 
' 
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th::it would improve " production structure" is soil i mp rovement - it 
increases technical cffici~ncy . Silo construction is an example of 
a projcct that will improve "marketing structure" . The maximum sup-
port that the Fund can give to a project is 453 of total cost . Table 
VI . 7 sh~s the breakdown of expenditure by the Guidance Section by 
country . It is remarked that these figures match almost exactly the 
contributions made by the member countries to the Guidance Section dur-
i ng the period but it must b~ stressed that this is just coincidence . 
Table VI . 7 . Expend iture of FEOGA allotted to farmers in each member 
countrya (millions of dollars) 
Country Year 
1962- 63 1963- 64 
BLzub 0 . 70 o. 76 
France 1. 95 3 . 69 
Germany 2 . 56 4 . 97 
Italy 3 . 07 5 . 87 
~ether lands 0. 77 1. 58 
a 
Sou rce : (24, 26) 
bBelgium-Luxembourg Economic Union 
l:..o 
Th~ last major item of expenditure of the Fund that we will discuss 
is the compensation to the farmers for the movement in one jump to t he 
common price level rather than a phased move . Table VI . 8 gives the country 
breakdown of the compensation to be paid until 1970 . 
Because so much of the Fund's activity has to r ece ive the approval of 
the Council of Ministers , and because of the stra in on the time of the 
Council, Management Committeeshave been appointed by the Member States 
to act for the Council of Ministers , in routine day to day decision 
making . If there i s a dispute between the Management Committee and the 
Comoission, the Council makes the final decision . The Management Committees 
have been established for every branch of the agricul tural sector . 
To date, however , little controv~rsy has been experienced over the 
expenditure of FEOGA . The problems were encountered when it came time to 
r aise the revenue to pay for the authorized expenditure . After 1970 , it 
is i ntended that all variable levy revenue will go to FEOGA to help defray 
the cost of financing the CA? . In the transitional period three systems 
have been employed to raise the revenue. All the systems apportion the 
revenue between two sources , direct contributions from the member states 
on the basis of their importance in the Community and contribution by the 
states on the basis of the volume of their agricultural trade . Between 
19o2 and 1965 the revenue was gathered from these two sources in the per -
centages shown in Table VI. 9 . The "net imports" itl.!m was distributed be-
tween the states as a proportion of their net i mpo r ts . The "contributions" 
ii:~m was shared by the states on the basis of the proportions laid down in 
article 200(1) of the Treaty of Rome , and given in col . 1 , Table VI . 10 . 
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Tabl~ VI . 8 . Compensation ptiyments to farm~rs because of the decision 
to introduce common cereals prices in one step (millions 
of doll a rs )n 
Country 
Germany 
Italy 
Luxenbourg 
Total 
a source : 
19o7 - oS 
140 . 00 
65 . 00 
1. 25 
206 . 25 
(24 , 26) 
l 9bo- 69 
93 . 50 
1.,.4 . 00 
0 .75 
138 . 25 
Year 
1969- 70 Total 
46 . 75 280 . 25 
22 . 00 131. 00 
0 . 50 2 . 50 
69 . 25 413 . 75 
Table VI. 9 . Method of financing the CAP agreed upon in December 1964 
(per cent)a 
Item Year 
1962 - 63 1963- 64 1964- 65 
Contributions 100 90 80 
~et :.mports 10 20 
aSource : (24, 26) 
Table VI . 10 . Allocation of revenue obligations for FEOGA between EEC 
member countries as laid dow:i in the Treaty of Rom\! 
(per cent)a 
Country : Belgium France Germany It~ly Luxembourg Netherlands 
Share: o . l 32 . 0 31. 2 20 . 3 0 . 2 8 . 2 
a Source : (24, 26) 
142 
In .96~, and 1965, however , Italy bot into serious b~lance of pay-
ment~ <lifficulti~s and she b~~an to complain that the proportion to be 
paid by her w.:.is too high . n~r partners were sympathetic to her and they 
a~rced to place a ceilina of 183 on her contributions in 1965- 66, and of 
0 0 
223 on her contributions in 1966- 67 . The Germans also were unhappy that 
they were going to have to pay so much relative to the French. A ceiling 
was put on her contributions of 32% . After the 1965 crisis the French 
agreed to make higher percentage contributions than the Germans . The 
final s~ttlement is g iven in Table VI . 11 under colunns 2 and 3 . During 
these two years the Fund was to be completely financed by direct contribu-
tions . 
From July 1, 1967, to December 31 , 1969, the Guarantee Section will 
be financed by each country contributing 903 of its variable levy revenue 
and the remainder will be raised as direct contributions . The proportion-
ate distribution of direct contributions is given in Table VI . 12 . Since 
the variable levies apply to all imports and not just to net imports , this 
has been called the "g r oss systeci" of financing . This system is supposed 
to alleviate the advantage the countries with the most efficient ports 
o= entry have over the ir neighbors . During this period the Guidance 
Section will be financed solely on the basis of direct contributions as 
given in the table . It i s estimated that abou t $1500 million will be 
needed to finance FEOGA . This completes our discussion of FEOGA and in the 
next section we will discuss some of the implications of the CAP. Our 
discussion wil 1 not be e>..haust ive, however , because its object will be. to 
increas~ our understanding of the CAP ru the.r than to evaluate it • 
.... 
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Tabl~ VI . 11 . Allocation of revenue obligation for F20GA between EEC 
member countries from 1962 to 1967a (per cent) 
Country Year 
196~ - 65 1965- 66 1906- 67 
7 . 9 7 . 95 7 . 95 
France 2 . 8 32 . 58 2 9. 26 
G~rmany 2 . 8 31.67 30 . 83 
Italy 2 . 8 18 . 00 22 . 00 
Luxe:::bourg 0 . 2 0 . 22 0 . 22 
Neth.!rlands 7 . 9 9. 58 9 . 74 
a 
Source : (24 , 2 6) 
Table VI . 12 . Allocation of rev~nue obligations for FEOGA between 
countries from 1967 ~o 1970a (per cent) 
Country 
Belgium France Germany I taly Luxembourg Netherlands 
Share 8 . 1 32 . 0 31.2 20 . 3 0 . 2 8 . 2 
a source : (18) 
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D. Some Implications of the CAP 
The chief features of the CAP, as already agreed upon, are the con-
trol of domestic supplies and imports through the manipulation of prices , 
and a unique m~thod of financing . The European Community is , at present , 
a net importer of agricultural commodities . For this reason we can say 
that ~he CAP has attempted to achieve an optimum level of domestic out-
put a~d to ensure that any excess demand over that output is met by im-
ports . Domestic production is controlled by using production quotas or 
price controls . However, very few quotas exist, examples being sugar, 
eggs a d wine products . The main method of supply control is fixing 
prices . Three characteristics of the price system established by the CAP 
are of importance . First , prices have been set above the world prices in 
most cases . Second prices have been set above the level pr eviously i n 
existence in the major producers of the Community prior to the CAP . Third, 
~he Council has frequently set prices above the level recommended by the 
Commission . This has caused the CAP to be protectionist and Warley at -
tempts to explain this fo r the following reason: 
. .. the ~ighest common factor of agreement has frequently 
been reached only by making the policy more pro-
tectionist . (111) 
These high prices mean that the cost of financing the Guarantee Sec -
tion of FEOGA will be at least $1 . 2 billion in 1970. In addition, do~estic 
output in the Community will expand and a greater degree of self - sufficiency 
will be experienced . This is likely to further increase the costs of sup-
port and to cause international criticism on a large scale . Finally , be-
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cause of higher costs to consumers in som~ countries FEOGA wil l f i nd it -
self paying more consumer subsidies . Thus in the Netherlands the com-
mon ?rice l avels for butter and cheese will r aise consumers prices sig -
niCicd~~ly and consumer subsidies are being paid to alleviate this . 
Graater consumer subsid i es c ould also significantly raise the cost of 
the CAP . 
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VII . THE IMPORTANCE OF DECISIONS ABOUT THE CAP 
A. Agriculture in the European Economy 
Tha tradin~ association known as the EEC or European Community con-
sists of Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries . It has an 
area of 449,000 square miles or approximately one ninth of the area of 
the U. S. In 1965, the population of the association was 184 million, with 
Germany, France, and Italy contributing over 160 million . In comparison 
the population of the U. S. was 10 million greater and only Germany sur-
passed the population of Britain (see Table VII . l) . 
The EEC has a labor force slightly smaller than that of the U. S. but 
the latter figure is growing more rapidly . Figures for the labor force 
are among the most unreliable statistics because a wide variety of def ini -
tions are employed . The total labor force of the EEC in 1965 was almost 
75 ~illion co~pared with 78 million in the U. S. (See Table VII . 2 . ) The 
agricultural labor force of the EEC is probably about 13 million or 163 
of the total labor force . (Estimates were not available for the 
Netherlands . ) This compares with a figure of 53 of the total labor force 
engaged in agriculture in the U.K . and 8% in the U. S. 
The share of agriculture in the labor force is declining in all the 
EEC countries . (See Table VII . 3 . ) The largest agricultural labor force 
in the EEC is in Italy, both absolutely and as a relative share of the 
total . The decline of the Italian agricultural labor force is aggravated 
by a declining total labor force . This unique and difficult phenomenon 
brought Italy individual attention in the formation of the CAP . 
• 
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Table Vll . 1. Total population of the EEC countries, the U. K. and the 
u. s . , from 1962 to 1965a (in lOOO's) 
Year 
Country 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Germany 5 9 , 241 60 , 057 60,787 61 , 494 
France 47,573 48,134 L..8,699 49) 150 
Italy 50, 338 50 , 857 51 , 382 51,767 
:Netherlands 11, 890 12 ' 042 12, 212 12,377 
Belgium 9, 251 9 ,328 9, 428 9, 499 
Luxembourg 323 32 5 330 333 
EEC 178 , 616 180 , 743 182 ,77 6 184 , 620 
U. K. 53,548 53' 7 97 54,213 54 ,5 95 
u.s . 186,656 189 ,417 192 ,12 0 194 ,57 2 
a Source : (35) 
Table VII. 2 . Total labor force of the EEC countries, the U. K. and the 
u. s . ) from 1963 to 1965a (in 1000 ' s) 
Country Year 
1963 1964 1965 
Germany 26 ,640 26 , 692 26 , 844 
France 19 , 298 19,586 19,688 
Italy 19 ' 979 1 9,938 19,732 
N~therlands 4,650 47,000 4 , 750 
Belgium 3,590 3 , 627 3,642 
Luxembou r g 130 138 139 
EEC 7 4' 2 93 74 , 696 74 ' 7 95 
U.K. 24 , 276 24,276 24, 820 
u. s. 75 ' 714 7 6' 97 2 78,357 
aSource : (37) 
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Table VII . 3 . A6ricultural labor force. in che EEC countries f r om 1963 
to l 965a (in 1000' s and per cent) 
Y~ar 
Coen try 1963 1964 1965 
Totcil P<!r c~~t Total Per cent Total Par cent 
Germ"ny 3 , 230 12 3,084 12 2 , 960 11 
France 3 , 772 20 3 , 652 19 3 , 538 18 
I cc.ly 5 , 2 95 27 L,.) 967 26 4 , 956 2o 
~ethe:-lands na b na na na na na 
Bel 0 ... t.l:l 230 7 210 6 204 b 
Luxambourg 20 15 19 14 19 14 
aSource : (37) 
bNot available 
The decrease. of the total labor force in the EEC countries has been 
only partially absorbed by indu~trialization in the rural a r eas . Thus the 
cities have grown and some rural communities have tended to stagnate and 
c~ll for S?ecial regional d~velopm~nt policies . The population distribu-
tion changes have caused severe social problems in the cities, economic 
p:-oble~s in the countryside and significant changes in the distribution of 
policical power. This was one of the reasons why the establishment of the 
CA? was a delicate political process , and why it was so i mportant to France . 
Over om:. third of the Gross ?\ational Product (v.-P) of the EEC 
origi~ates in Germany (see Table VII . 4) . Italy with a popul ation 5/6 as 
g:-eat , contributes a GNP about half the size of Germany's . In 1965, the 
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Table VII . 4. Gross national product of th'- EEC countries, the U. K. and 
th~ U. S. trom l9b2 to 1965a (in billions of dollars at cur-
r1....nt prices) 
Count .. -y Year 
l 9o2 19o3 190 .... 1%5 
G1....nnany b.:> . O 94 . 4 103 . 5 112 . 2 
Franc.::i 71.3 79 . 2 87 . 1 92 . 3 
I taly t...2 . 2 48 . 5 52 . 9 56 . 9 
'.'letherlands 13 . 5 14 . 7 17 . 2 19 . l 
Bdgium 13 . u 13 . 9 15 . 2 16 . 7 
Luxembourg 0 . 52 0. 55 0 . 63 0 . 67 
EEC 230 . 8 253 . 3 27 9. 2 299 . 9 
u. t( . l:SO . 9 b5 . 6 92 . 3 99 . 0 
U. S. 569 . l 599 . 7 641. 9 692 . 3 
aSource : (36) 
G~P of th~ European Community was somewhat less than one half tha t of the 
U. S. although the labor forces and total populations of the two a reas ~ere 
roughly similar . Germany has a larg~r G~P than the U. K. although GNP 
per capita was about equal in Germany , France , and the U. K. 
G~P has grown much more subst~ntially in Europe since 1958 than GNP 
in th~ U. S. and Brita i n . (See Table VII . 5.) The increase was 453 in 
the t:EC, 29% in the U. K. and 373 in the U. S. However , the annual g rowth 
rate w~s higher in the U. S. since 1962 . Within the EEC the Italian g rowth 
rate was highest since 1962 but it: was closely followed by France and 
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Table. vrr . 5 . Index numbers of GNP in the EEC countries, the U. K. and 
r.he U. S . irom 1902 to 1965<:. (19So=100) 
Country Year 
l 9o2 1963 1964 1965 
Ge rr.1a n y 128 132 141 148 
Fr ... ncc. 124 130 137 144 
Italy 131 l.'.">8 142 1!+8 
~.;th ..... rlands 123 128 140 147 
Belgium 115 120 124 130 
EEC 124 132 13b 144 
U. K. 114 119 12 6 12 9 
u . s . 118 123 129 137 
a Source : (36) 
Germany who have r oughly the same rate . Tne high growth rate in the E2C 
is probably partly due to the specialization following trade liberaliza-
tion in t he area . (The high U. S. rate may be partly explained by the War 
in Vietnam and the tax cut of 19o4 . ) GDP as a m~asure of national wealth 
is the same as GNP except that it docs not include earnings of factors of 
production abroad . 
T~e contribution of agriculture to GDP declined one percenta6e point 
between 1962 and 1965 (see Table VII . 6) . France and Italy both experienced 
the largest decline of one and one half percentage points . Except for 
Italy (123) the contribution of agriculture to GDP in all countries of the 
EEC was in the range 4 . 5 -7 . 03 . 
T.:ible VII.o . 
Country 
G~rr:-~any 
France 
Italy 
~~ther-lands 
Bel
0
ium 
Luxe.nbou r g 
EZC 
asource : 
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Contribution of agricultur~ to grosa domestic pr oduct in 
the L£C countri~s fro~ 1962 to 1965~ (mar~~t prices and 
per c~nt) 
Y~ar 
19o2 i963 1964 1965 
5 . 1 5 . 1 5 . 0 4 . 5 
9 . 0 8 . 5 7 . 6 7 . 6 
13 . 5 12 . ..,. 12 . 0 12 . 0 
7 . 7 7 . 5 7 . 3 7 . 2 
6 . 0 6 . 0 5 . 8 5 . 5 
7 . 5 7 . i (7 . 0) (6 . 8) 
7 . 9 7 . 6 7 . 3 7 . 1 
(36) 
Since 1958, however , the volume of GDP, originating in agri culture , 
has risen by 143 for the EEC as a whol~ . Betw""en 1962 and 1965 the in-
crease was 33 (see Table VII . 7) . Since 1962 the voluce of GDP arising 
in a6riculture has declined in Belgium by about 43, but this was com-
pensaLed by a 93 rise in the .etherlanas and a 63 rise in Germany and 
Italy . 
Thus although agriculture hus declined in relativ~ importance, some 
growt:h hc:.s occurred in that: sector . This grow';:h , howev~r , has been over-
shadow~c by t:he growth of other sectors (se~ Table VII . 8) . 
Statis t:ics involving production , however , are not a good basis for 
estima';:ing the ir .. portance of agriculture in the EEC . One must look else-
wh~re for agriculture ' s significance because, as we saw in the last chapter, 
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Table VII . 7 . Volur:.e indic.;s of g r oss domestic product an.si.ng in 
agriculture for the EEC countries from 1962 to 1965a 
(1955= 100) 
Count::.-y Year 
l 9c2 1963 196!+ 1965 
Germany 105 113 119 112 
France 123 119 120 127 
:.taly 104 lG-+ 108 112 
~ctherlands 109 101 118 119 
Belgiuo 108 105 108 103 
EEC 110 108 112 114 
a source : (36) 
Table VII . 8 . Index of production of manu.:actured products for the EEC 
countries f ro;n 1962 to 1965a (1958=100) 
Coum:ry Year 
l 9o2 19b3 1964 1965 
Gerraa:-.y 137 141 150 167 
Fra:.ce 125 131 142 143 
ltdly 163 178 179 187 
3'-'lgil.::-. 130 139 157 163 
:...uxembourg 114 114 126 127 
:\ctherlands 139 146 160 170 
SEC 137 11..4 156 162 
asource : (32 , 33 , 34 , 35) 
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control of supply is a major part of the CAP . We saw that allowing a 
free market mechanism with no government intervention wou l d create large 
social and political problems because of the high proportion of the 
population engaged in agriculture in Europe. The reduction of this pro-
. 
portion and the pol itica l repurcussions of this reduction i s one of the 
reasons for the importance of agriculture . The other reason for the im-
portance of ag riculture in Europe is the dependence of the European 
Economy on foreign agricultural trade . 
B. The European Community as a World Trader 
The European Community is the world ' s largest importer of agricul -
tural commodities . In 1965, the Community imported over $12 billion of 
agricultural produce and all countries had a deficit in the ir agricultural 
trade except the Netherlands . 
It is important to r emember that trade figures for the EEC inc l ude 
intra - union trade while comparable figures for the U.S . and other nation 
states do not include their internal trade . For example , all imports into 
Luxembourg are counted twice . In 1965 EEC exports and imports from member 
countries amounted to about $20 billion, or 423 of the total . Intra-
Community agricultural trade was about $3 billion (see Table VII . 9) though 
only 253 of imports were from member countries . Exports to member coun-
tries , however , amounted to 553 of total reports . The most heavily popu -
lated country , Germany , exported $358 million of agricultural products 
outside the Community, while California, the most populated state of the 
U. S. , exported $437 million outside the U. S. 
Table VII.9. EEC sha r e in the trade of member countriesa ( millions of dollars and per cent ) 
i n 1965 
Item 
Va lue : 
All commodities 
Agricultura l com-
modi ties 
Pe r cent : 
All c ommodities 
Agricultura l com-
mod itics 
BLEU 
I mp . Exp . 
3473 3947 
438 415 
55 62 
37 69 
aCa lcul a t ed from data in (89 , 
France 
I mp . Exp . 
4015 4114 
44 2 893 
39 41 
17 4 6 
90, 91 , 92a) 
Cou ntry 
Germany 
I mp . Exp . 
6660 6306 
1583 21 6 
38 35 
32 38 
Italy 
I mp . Exp . 
2291 2891 
423 531 
31 L~O 
19 54 
Nether l a nd s 
I mp Exp . 
3985 3561 
266 1092 
53 56 
20 60 
EEC 
I mp . Exp . 
20424 20819 
3152 3147 
42 43 
25 55 
...... 
V1 
~ 
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Since 192 8 world trade has expanded greatly . In current dollars it 
r ose from $2 7 billion in 1928 to $127 billion in 1960 . If price changes 
are r~moved, the volume change is from 100 to 190 f rom 1928-1960. (See 
Table VII . 10) . During the period world agricultural exports rose at 2 . 43 
per annum as opposed to 6% in non- agricultural exports . Field (4 0) 
explains this by a r elatively low income elasticity of food , increased 
self - suffic i ency of the major importers and the emphas i s on i ndust rial iza-
tion in e conomic development . We might add , however , that i ndust rial 
prices have r isen very qu ickly as is evide nced by the much smaller in-
c r ease in volume of exports (see Table VII . 10) . However we will foll ow 
Field ' s approach and use only value figu r es for an agricultural trade 
because they merely exaggerate the true figure . 
Foreign trade for the EEC as a whol e amounted to about 223 of GNP 
in 1965 . In Brita in the percentage amounted to between 14 - 163 and in the 
U. S. 3- 43. (See Table VII . 11 . ) We can conclude , therefore , that the 
European Community is relatively hi ghly dependent on foreign trade . 
Within the EEC, the low tariff cou ntrie s ,(Be ne l ux) are most dependent on 
foreign trade , with trade amounting to about 353 of GNP. France is the 
leas t dependent on foreign trade . This may be because her economy is not 
highly specialized wh i ch may be partly due to her forme r high tarif f 
pol icy . 
Agricultural exports are a significant part of the total exports in 
&11 the EEC countries except Germany whe re they acc ount for only 33 (see 
Table VII . 12) . Agricultural exports are most important for the Netherlands 
(293) and France (193) . Agricultural import are of greater importa nce 
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a 
Table VII . 10 . Growth in world exports 1928- 1960 (millions of dollars , 
1928=100, and per cent) 
World exports of agri -
cultural commodities 
1928 
Year 
1948 1956 l 9t>O 
Per cent annual 
growth 1928- 1960 
(value) 10 , 665 14,o82 23 ,5 39 23 , 018 2 . 44 
World exports of non -
agricultural commodities 
(value) 16,124 28,274 83 , 561 104,482 6 . 03 
Total world exports 
(value) 
Volume 
(index) 
aSource : (40) 
26,789 42,956 107 , 100 127,500 5 . 00 
100 89 151 190 2 . 03 
Table VII . 11 . Imports and exports as a percentage of gross national 
producta in the EEC countries , the U. K. and ~he U. S . f rom 
1963 to 1965b (per cent) 
Country 
1963 
BLEU 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
EEC 
U. K. 
u.s . 
I mports 
35 . 3 
11. 0 
13 . 8 
16 . 7 
41.4 
24 . 0 
16 . 0 
2.9 
aAt current pr ices 
Exports 
33 . 5 
10 . 2 
15 . 5 
11 . 2 
34 . 4 
21.0 
14. 1 
3 . 9 
bsource : (29 30 31) 
) ' 
Year 
1964 1965 
Imports Exports Imports Exports 
37 . 1 35 . 0 33 . 5 38 . 1 
11. 5 10 . 3 11.l 10 . 8 
14 . 1 15 . 7 15 . 6 15 . 9 
14 . 6 12 . 0 12 . 9 12 . 7 
42 . 0 34 . 6 3o . 2 31. 0 
24 . 0 22 . 0 22 . 0 22 . 0 
16 . 7 1 3 . 4 16 . 3 13 . 8 
2 .9 4.1 3 . 1 3 . 9 
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Table VII.12 . Agricultural imports as a percent<lge of total imports and 
ag r icu ltu r al exports as a percentage of total exports for 
the EEC countries f r om 1963 to 19o5a (per cent) 
Count r y Year 
1963 1964 1965 
Imports Expor t s I mpor t s Expor ts I mports Exports 
BLEU 19 8 19 8 19 10 
France 28 19 27 20 26 19 
Ge r many 29 3 29 3 28 3 
Italy 28 15 31 '14 29 14 
Ne the r lands 19 29 19 28 18 29 
a Source : (89, 90 , 91 , 92a) 
to all countries of the Commun ity , except for the Netherland s which has 
a favorable balance in agricultural trade . The countries most dependent 
on ag ricultural i mports are France , Germany and Italy with 26 - 293 of 
total i mports in ag ricultural commodities . Thus , another r eason fo r the 
importance of the CAP can be seen f rom t he i mporta nce of the agricultural 
trade to the EEC . 
The a bsolute value of ag ricultur al trade in the EEC is one way of 
estimating the stakes at the conf rontation which led to the crisis in 
1965 . The Eur opean Community had an over all trade def icit of somewhat 
ove r $1 billion i n 1965 . (See Table VII . 13 . ) However , the def icits of 
the member countries in agricultural c ommodities i s much larger . The 
def icit in ag ricultural trade of the EEC was $6 billion i n 1965 . Thus 
Ta ble VII . 13 . Va 1 ue. o [ to t a 1 imports and exports and the value of ag r icu l tural imports a nd expor t s 
f or the EEC countries from 1963 to 1965a (millions of dollars ) 
Ye.a r 
CounLr-y ] 963 1964 19 5 
Total Ag ricul tur-al Tota l Agricultural Total Agricu lLu r-al 
I mports Exports I mports Exports Imports Exports I mp orts Exports I mports Exports I mpor Ls Expor ts 
BLEU 5 , 112 4 , 839 943 496 5 ' 922 5 , 589 1 , 130 498 6, 374 6 , 382 1,1 98 603 
France 8 , 724 8 , 080 2 , 480 1 , 53 2 10 , 067 8, 990 2 , 756 1 , 768 10, 336 10 , 048 2 , 663 1 , 940 
Ge rmany 13,019 14, 615 3 , 817 383 14 , 613 16 , 214 4 , 227 447 17 , 472 17 , 892 4 , 906 574 
,...... 
Italy 7, 539 5 , 047 2 ) 097 799 7, 231 5 , 95 6 2 , 088 840 7 , 347 7,1 88 2 , 270 986 
V1 
()) 
Ne ther-
l ands 5 , 967 4' 962 1, 131 1, 444 7 ' 057 5 , 808 1 ) 311 1) 623 7 ' 462 6 , 393 1 , 337 1, 82 2 
EEC 40 , 361 37 , 543 l O, L168 4 , 654 44 , 890 42 ,5 57 11,51 2 5 , 206 48 , 991 47 , 903 12 ) 374 5 , 925 
8 Calculated f rom da t a in(89 , 90 , 91 , 92a ) 
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members of the EEC trade industrial products for ag r icultu r al imports . 
All the member s states had a deficit in agricultural trade in 1965 except 
for a small surplus in the Netherlands . The deficit for Germany was $4 
billion or two thirds of the Community deficit . Italy had the next larges t 
deficit ($1 . 2 billion) while France and the B. L. E.U. had deficits in the 
r ange $0 . 5 - $1 . 0 bill i on . These figures would probably be considerably 
mod ified if intra - Community trade was excluded . We may reca ll f r om Table 
VII . 9 that 253 of EEC imports and 553 of EEC exports were intra - Community 
transactions in 1965 . Thus the gap betwee n imports from the rest of the 
World to the EEC and exports of the EEC to the rest of the world is con-
siderably larger . Imports of agricultural commodities f rom the rest of 
the world probably amounted to about $9 billion and expor ts amounted to 
about $2 . 5 billion in 1965 . Thus the overall deficit in agricultural c om-
modit i es into the EEC was probably close to $7 billion. Of course , as the 
trade barriers in the Community are reduced , intra Community trade increases 
in importance . In 1959 423 of EEC agricultural exports went to other 
members of the Community . By 1965 this had increased by ten percentage 
point s to 523. 1 (See Table VII . 14 . ) Only Germany decreased her portion of 
agricultural exports that went to her partners , from 393 to 333 . The 
decline actually took place in 1962 afte r the revaluation of the Deutsch-
ma rk raised German pr ices abroad . Both before and since the pe r centage 
was rising . The share of France ' s agricultural exports t hat went to her 
partners almost doubled between 1959 and 1965 (from 233 to 433) . A large 
1 
On our definit ion of "agricultu r al " we found the percentage to have 
risen to 553. 
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portion of this increase was between 1959 and 1960 and may have r e -
flected the de Gaulle fi nancial reforms and devaluation a year earlier . 
However, a steady growth in agricultura l trade within that Commu nity is 
evidence for all member countries f rom 1962 to 1965 , since the Common 
Agricultural Policy bega n to be implemented . This is likely to continue 
because of the protectionist character of the CAP, as we saw in the las t 
chapter . 
OE course agricultural trade i s declining in relative i mportance for 
the world as a whole . The move to self - s ufficiency by Britain and the EEC 
can par tly explain this . Secondly, we would expect agricultural trade to 
decrease r elat ively in impor tance in the long run because " Engel's law" . 
This sta t es that , as income rises the proportion of it spent on food will 
tend to decline , tha t is, as people get more money they spend a smaller 
proportion on food be cause their capacity fo r food is l i mited by the size 
of their stomachs . The percentage of the ave r age fami ly i ncome spent on 
food in the EEC has declined f r om 383 in 1953 to 343 in 1963 . (See Table 
VII.1 5 . ) 
We saw above that the EEC exports indus trial products and imports 
agricultu ral commodities . If wor ld demand for indus trial pr oducts con-
tinues to rise , EEC export prices will rise . Also if world demand for 
agricultural commodities rises only sl i ghtly, then the prices of many of 
he r imports will rema in fai rl y constant . Thus the terms of trade a re 
likely to be more in favor of the EEC in the future . At present this 
movement is smal l . (See Tab le VII . 16 . ) 
161 
Table VII . 14 . Percentage of exports o[ agricultural commodities which were 
purchased by ECG partners 
1905a (pl.!r cent) 
from each other, from 1959 to 
Country Year 
1 959 1960 19ol 1962 1963 1964 1965 
BLEU 57 73 75 75 74 72 74 
France 23 34 3b 39 .J 9 43 43 
Germany 39 37 --11 51 31 32 33 
Italy 41 45 so 51 54 5 (j 54 
~etherlands 51 57 56 57 57 58 60 
EEC 42 48 so 49 50 51 52 
a Source : (89 ) 90 , 91 , 92a) 
Table VII . 15 . Percentage of average family income spent on food for the 
a EEC countries in 1953 and 1963 (per cent) 
Year 
1953 
1963 
a 
Source : 
Tabll:! VII.16 . 
Region 
EEC 
U. K. 
u.s . 
Count r y 
BLEU France Germany Italy Netherlands EEC 
30 36 47 47 35 38 
29 31 37 43 29 34 
(97) 
a 
Index of the terms oE trade for the EEC , the U. K. and the 
U. S . from 1960 to 1965b (1958=100) 
Year 
1960 1901 1902 l 9b3 190-1- l 9o5 
102 103 105 105 106 105 
101 104 107 107 103 105 
102 106 l 07 106 104 105 
aExport price index as a percentage of the import price index 
bsource : (32 , 33 , 34 , 35) 
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The most important agricultural imports of the EEC are meat , 
cereals , fruits , nuts, vegetables , hides , skins, wook, vegetable fibers , 
tea, and coffee . (See Table VII . 17 . ) Since the EEC is an advanced in-
dustrial area , it is not surprising that agricultural products which are 
industrial raw materials such as hides, wool and vegetable fibers are im-
portant imports to her . Because of her climatic position she imports 
large quantities of fruit, vegetables , tea , and coffee . However , there 
are other causes for the importance of these imports also . Most of these 
products have high income demand elasticiti es . This means that as gross 
national product rises , expenditures on these commodities becomes in-
creasingly more important . Field , in ( 4 0 ) gives est i mates of some of 
these elasticities . If income rises by 103, expenditure on imported fruit 
and vegetables rises by 83 , expenditur es on coffee r ises by 53, and ex-
penditures on meat rises by 63. What this means is that when a man ' s in-
come rises he shifts the pattern of his expenditure in favor of these 
products . He buys commodities which he couldn ' t affor t previously and ex-
pensive commodities are often imported . 
The importance of EEC imports of cereals is very great . A large 
part of these is accounted for by wheat but it is declining in relative 
importance . This is because of increased production within the EEC and 
because it has a low income elasticity of demand ( - 0 . 3) . However , cereals 
used as animal feedstuffs are extremely important because of the high in-
come elasticity of demand for meat (0 . 6) and because high cereal prices 
cause high meat prices , with consequent lowering of consume r s ' welfare . 
Thus it seems likely that imports of cereals will continue to grow , al -
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though some incr ease i n EEC output can be expected . 
On the export s i de of the trade balance, very few commodities a r e 
net exports . All the exports of the EEC are processed pr oducts except 
for wheat . Much of the wheat i s French and goes to for mer French 
colonies . The net exports of the Community are food preparations i nclud -
ing margerine , cereal preparations inc luding flour and meal , meat prepara-
tions and drinks such as wine . 
C. Agricul ture in the French Economy 
In 1965 , France had a population of 49 million and a labor force of 
20 million , both of which were increasing sl™ly . (See Table VII . 18. ) The 
percentage of the labor force engaged in agriculture, however , had de-
clined from 203 in 1963 to 183 i n 1965 . However, this was still la r ge 
considering since the U. K. had only 53 of he r labor fo rce engaged in 
ag ricul tu r e and the U. S. had 83. (See Table VII . 3 . ) French GNP amounted 
to $92 billion r eflecting a 44% rise since 1958 . This was the smallest 
percentage increase in the Community , though la r ger than that of the U. K. 
or U. S . (See Table VII . 6. ) Since 1962 France ' s percentage increase in 
G~P was 153 which equalled that of Germany and was smal l e r only than the 
Dutch figure (2 03) . The con tribution of French agriculture t o Gr oss Do-
me~tic Product has declined f r om 93 in 1962 to 7 . 63 in 1965 , t hough GDP 
arising in agriculture has g r own by about 33 over the per iod . As in the 
case of the Community as a whole , the decl i ning economic importance of 
agriculture has created complex political and social pr oblems for the 
policymaker s , and thus i s one of the reasons for the i mporta nce of t he CAP . 
Ta l.d e V II . 1 7 . EEC imp orLs and ex1.Jor Ls of agricultu ral commodities from 1962 to 1965a (millions 
of dol lnrs ) 
1962 1963 1 964 1965 
I mpor Ls ExporLs I mp or Ls Exports I mport s Exports I mports ~xporLs 
Live anima l s 240 . 4 78 . 5 326 . 1 115 . 8 384 . 1 138 . 2 4l18. l 14 3 . 3 
Mea L a nd meat prepa r a ti ons 463 . 9 370 . 3 66LL 5 433 . 2 844 . 8 490 . 3 1 002 . 4 578 . 7 
Dairy products 501. 5 42ll , 8 546 . 2 456 . 0 551. 6 355 . 5 620 . 6 530 . 7 
Cereals (except rice ) 1341. 8 612 . 3 1480 . 8 631 . 7 1 622 . 9 771. 1 2066 . 0 859 . 9 
Cerea l pre pa rations 92 . 9 180 . 9 94 . 9 190 . 1 96 . 7 224 . 7 106 . 0 260 . 2 
(Meal and flour) 
Fru i L, nu Ls , vege Lab l es 1644 . 6 998 . 3 1665 . 5 969 . 5 1673 . 6 986 . 6 2136 . 4 1186 . 0 
Tea and c o[ fee 586 . 8 14 . 1 552 . 9 14 . 8 700 . 0 19 . 5 721 . 6 24 . 1 
Food preparations (choco-
l ate , sugar , spices , 
margnr inc ) 425 . 9 313 . 5 617 . 8 386 . 4 635 . 0 406.7 51 3 . 1 425 . 8 
Drink ( exc l . di s tilled ~ 
alcohol) 402.3 27 ll . 4 318 .1 293 . 6 380 . 4 318 . 1 421. 9 l t 64 . (j 
(1\ 
+:-
Hides , s kins , wool , hai r 
silk 1036 . 1 22 5 . 7 107 5 . 6 243 . 0 1141.1 235 . 6 115 3 . 8 383 . 5 
Vegetable fibers (cotton , 
jut.e 808 . 7 91. 6 836 . 1 105 . 7 856 . 0 115 . 6 770 . 4 130. 6 
Crude t obacco 317 . 6 34 . 2 313 . 5 28 . 7 340 . 0 23 . 6 332 . 9 25 . 8 
Anim~l oils a nd fats 
vegcLable oi l s and [a t:s 406 . 6 1 69 . 9 474 . 4 17 6 . 0 419 . 4 568 . 3 239 . 8 
e ssen tial oil s 
Tota l agricultural tra de 17 1 0 , 468 . 0 4 , 654 . 0 11 , 512 . 2 5 , 206 . 0 12 , 374 . 0 5 , 925 . 0 
acalcul ated from daLa in ( 89, 90 , 91 ) 92a) 
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Tabl.?. VII . 18 . Summarya table for France 
It .... rn Unit of account Year 
l 9o2 1963 196~ 
Population l OOO ' s 47 , 573 48 , 134 48,t.99 
Labor force 1000's 
Labor force in agr . per cent 
GNP billions of dollars 71 
Vol . index of GNP 1958=100 124 
Vol . index of GDP 
in agriculture 1958=100 123 
Contribution of ag-
riculture to GDP per cent 
Ir::ports 
Exports 
Agr . imp or ts 
Ag r . exp or t s 
Contribution of 
ag~i . to imports 
Contribution of 
ag ri . to exports 
Contribution of 
imports to GNP 
Cor.tribution of 
exports to GNP 
Agri . exports to 
EEC 
billions of dollars 
billions of dollars 
billions of dollars 
bil l ions of dollars 
per cent 
per cent 
per cent 
per cent 
9 . 0 
19' 2 98 
20 
80 
130 
119 
8 . 5 
8 . 7 
8 . 1 
2 . 5 
1.5 
28 . 0 
19 . 0 
11 . 0 
10 . 2 
39 . 0 
19,586 
19 
87 
137 
120 
7 . 6 
l 0 . 1 
9 . 0 
2 . 8 
1. 8 
27 . 0 
20 . 0 
11 . 5 
10 . 3 
43 . 0 
a 
Percentage of average income spent on food in 1963 was 31 
l 9o5 
49,150 
19,688 
18 
92 
14-:. 
127 
7. 6 
10 . 3 
10. l 
2 . 7 
l. 9 
26 . 0 
19 . 0 
11.1 
10 . 8 
43 . 0 
160 
The other reason is the importance of foreign agricultural trade . 
In 1965, total exports and imports each amounted to 113 of French 
G~P , and were ~ach valued at $10 billion . Agricultural imports amounted 
to 26% of t otal imports and were decl ining i n importance . Agricultural 
exports maintained a constant shar e of total exports (1 93) between 1962 
and 1965 . The val ue of her agricultural imports in 1955 was $2 . 7 billion , 
and so in ag ricul tural trade , France had a deficit of $0 . 8 billion . 
France was, h~vever , the largest agricultural exporte r, though those 
exports only exceeded the Dutch figu r e by $1 million. France is the 
largest pr oducer of all important agricultural commodi ty groups i n the 
EEC . (See Tab l e VII . 19 . ) She has the g reatest output of wheat , feed 
gra ins , da iry products , sugar and meat products . These commod ities are 
also her major exports . French exports of dairy products which are de -
fined as milk and milk products a nd eggs amounted to $176 million in 
19o5 . (See Table VII . 20 . ) Her exports of suga r and honey exports were 
valued at $120 mill i on , her wheat was $240 million and her feed gra ins 
amounted to $1 70 mil lion . French exports of wool a nd other animal hair 
were much lowe r than her impor t s of commodities in this class but s till 
amounted to $126 mil lion . The only other French agricultural exports of 
i mpor tance was one in which her climate a nd agricu ltural t r ad ition fitted 
her, exports of dr ink , part icula r ly wine , valued at almost $300 mill i on . 
The most important Fr ench imports a r e meat and meat pr epar ations , 
fruit , nuts and vegetables , tea and coffee , hides sk ins and wool, vegetable 
fibers and animal and vegetable oils and fats . (See Tabl e VII . 21 . ) 
Table VII.19. Produc Li on o[ major agr icul Lural comrnod j Lies hy the EEC counLric.s from 1963 to 
1 9658 (111c Lric t ons) 
Country Cornmod ily 
Meat Milk Butter Potatoes Sugar beets Fruit Wheat Rye Barley 
B.L. E.U. 
] 963 515 4168 84 
1 964 492 4231 81 1828 3113 259 945 1 1~3 534 
1965 502 44113 82 1306 2450 219 89ll 103 560 
France 
1963 3084 25 , 330 432 
1964 3015 25 , 227 436 11 , 553 16 , 240 1 , 367 13 , 838 389 6,791 I-
1965 3131 25 , 742 479 11, 971 16, 000 1, 34ll 1L1 , 523 383 7 ' 2 94 "' '4 
Germany 
1 963 2866 20 ' 702 493 
1964 2918 20 , 830 L19l 20 , 625 13 , 243 1,7 00 5 , 203 3 , 609 3 , 915 
1965 2976 21 ' 2 01 449 18,094 11, 000 1,479 4 , 348 2 , 825 3 , 368 
I taly 
1 963 1220 8 , 929 57 
1964 1222 8 , 649 56 3' 82ll 7, OG2 5,2 21 8 , 582 86 252 
1 965 122 6 8 , 825 56 3,842 7, 439 4,5 65 9 , 78 0 83 280 
Ne therlands 
1963 760 7 '011 94 
19611 744 6 , 956 89 4' 110 3 , 876 657 71 2 356 376 
1 965 816 7,303 99 3 , 239 3 , 650 389 720 274 390 
a 
Sou re .... : ( 97) 
Tab l e Vll . 20 . French impotts and cxpor l s of agricultural crnnmod ilies Crom 1963 t o 1965a 
(million9 of dollars ) 
Commo<lily 
Live animals 
Mea l and mea l prepa r ations 
Da iry prod ucts 
Ce rea l s ( excepl rice ) 
Ce r eal preparati ons (meal , 
Fruit, nuts , vege t abl es 
Tea and cofC ce 
1963 
lmpor l s 
ll9 . l 
129 . 4 
36 . 3 
2/0 . 3 
flour) 21. 1 
492 .7 
148 . 6 
Food pre parations (chocolate , 
sugar , marga rine) 
Drink (excl . distilled alcohol) 
Hides , skins, wool, s ilk 
Vegeta ble fibers 
Crude t obacc o 
Animal oil s and Ca t s , vegeta ble 
89 . 3 
202 . 2 
359 . 4 
2L~3 . 8 
37 . 2 
oils and fat s , essential oils 123 . 9 
Tolal ag ricultura l trade 2 , 480 . 2 
Exports 
39 . 4 
99 . 7 
127 . 1 
327 . 8 
54 . 4 
120. 7 
2 . 0 
168 . 7 
267 . 9 
19 . 0 
19 . 0 
4 . 9 
68 . 5 
1531. 8 
a 
Ca l culated Crom da t a in ( 89 , 90, 91, 92a) 
1964 
lmpor l s 
72 . 1 
223 . 8 
45 . 6 
186 . 9 
16 . 9 
477 . 2 
197 . 2 
106 . 2 
254 . 2 
235 . 3 
235 . 3 
36. 5 
145 . 8 
2755 . 8 
Exports 
47 . 1 
99 . 6 
137 . 8 
468 . 6 
67 . 7 
11 7 . 7 
1. 9 
165 . 2 
286 .5 
23 . 8 
23 . 8 
2 . 6 
78 . 8 
1767 . 9 
1965 
I mports 
60 . 4 
214 . 5 
64 . 3 
221. 3 
18 . 9 
515 . 4 
168 . 0 
96 . 3 
205 . 5 
203 . 8 
203 . 8 
35 . 2 
158 . 5 
2 , 663 . 3 
Export s 
52 . 4 
103 . 5 
17 6 . 3 
509 . 0 
78.1 
186 . 7 
1. 7 
155 . 6 
296 . 9 
25 . 3 
25 . 3 
2 . 5 
89 . 9 
1939 . 0 
Table Vll . 21. Gr rman imports and cxporLs of agr icu l t:u rn 1 commodiLies from 1963 to 1%5
8 
(mil J i ons o[ dollars) 
1963 1964 1965 
CommodiLy JmporLs Exp or Ls I mpor ts Export s I mp or ls Exp or Ls 
Live n11imals 88 . 2 26 . 5 99 . 2 34 . 1 166 . 0 31. 3 
Meat and meat. prcpc'.lraLio11s 240 . 6 19. 4 288 . 7 21. 2 372 . 7 21. 7 
Dai ry produc Ls :u10 . 6 17 . Li 213 . 9 24 . 2 223 . 5 56 . 2 
Cerea l s ( except rice) 511 . 0 49 . 8 597 . 8 59 . 4 722 . 9 85 . 2 
Cereal preparat i ons (rnea l , [l our) 38 . 3 48 .0 42 . 4 67 . 3 45 . 6 72 . 8 
Frui t , nu Ls , vegetables 868.9 29 . 0 946 . 7 27 . 4 11 94 . 3 31. 5 
Tea and coffee 220 . 3 2 . 4 26 1. 5 3 . 9 299 . 0 4 . 4 
Food preparations ( chocolate , 
sugar, margarine) 122 . 5 18 . 2 81. 6 21. 7 99 . 9 23 . 1 
Drink (ex cl . disLillc<l alcohol) 
I-' 
82 . 2 33 . 2 100 . 0 37 . 8 116 . 6 42 . 4 "' Hi des, skins, wool, silk 258 . 9 285 . 2 47 . 5 277 . 6 49 . 7 '° 51. 0 
Vcgetaule fib~rs 60 . 9 23 . 6 70 . 4 23 . 9 80 . 1 24 . 0 
Crude tobacco 165 . 2 1. 6 17 8 . 1 2 . 0 189 . 4 3 . 4 
Anima l oils and fats , vegetable 
oils and [ats, essenLial oils 152 . 7 30 . 6 172 . 3 35 . 0 207 . 7 47 . 0 
Total agricultural trade 3816 . 6 353 . 1 4 226 . 8 476 . 6 4905 . 7 574 . l 
8 Ca lculated fr om daLa ;n ( 89 90 91 92 ) ... ' ' ' a 
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~:os t of these commodit i es arc industrial raw materials (hides and fibers) 
or commodities for the production of which France has a climatic disad -
vnntJg~ (fruits, v~Jctabl~s, tea, coffee) . The only important food 
imports are meat and meat preparations where domestic demand has far 
outstripped supply . For two commodity groups, cereals and drink , France 
imports over $200 million but this is less than her exports of them. 
Nearly all important French agricultural exports are important 
German agricultural imports . The usual climatic imports, fruit, nuts , 
vegetables , tea and coffee, and the usual industrial raw materials , hides , 
fibers, are imported by Germany (see Table VII . 22) . Germany , however , 
also imports large quantities of cer eals , meat and dairy products , which 
are important exports of France . 
In 1965 the CAP was still being negotiated and the markets of the EEC 
countries were still not open to each other for many agricultural commodi-
ties . However , in the more i mportant commodities for intra- EEC agricul -
tural trade both the percentage of French exports going to her partners 
and German imports coming from her partners were rising rapidly . This was 
true of meat and meat preparations, cereals, dairy products and food 
prepa rations . (See Table VII . 23 . ) Thus a larger and profitable export·-
ma rket was opening for French agriculture and this is the second r eason why 
it was vital for France to negotiate a favorable CAP . 
In summary, we have found that the development of the CAP up to 
1965 was a result of the alliance between the " Europeans" , who wanted 
harmonization of policies for economic r easons . This alliance broke down 
in June, 1965, when the EEC Commissicn, the representatives of the 
Tab1c Vl l. 22 . Pe rcen t age of French agricultur<tl expor t s and Ge rman agricultural i mports accounted 
for by e.ach country ' s EEC p.:l rLne r s frolll 1963 Lo 1965a ( millions of doll ars) 
Commod ity 
1963 l 96ll 1965 
Frenc h Ge rman 
expor t s i mports Export s I mpor t s Exports I mport <> 
Live animal 8 62 . 0 10 . 0 65 . 0 6 . 0 64 . 0 8 . 0 
Meat and meat prepatations 52 . 0 48 . 6 6 L1 . 8 4 6 . 1 70 . 4 52 . 5 
Dairy products LI 7 . 6 65 . 5 LI 7. 7 68 . 8 47 . 9 71. 8 
Cereals ( except rice ) 33 . 8 21. 9 39 . 3 26 . 5 44 . 9 28 . LI 
Cereal pre para tions (mefl 1 
and f] our ) 25 . l 69 . 4 25 . 3 71. 7 22 . 5 7 L1 . 7 
Fruit , nut s , vege tables 45 . 1 4ll . 9 SO. Li 45 . 6 61. 7 47 . 0 
Tea and coff ee 33 . 5 0 . 4 55 . 0 0 . 4 55 . 5 0 . 5 
Food preparations ( choco-
l a t e , margarine) 29 . 2 34 . 8 22 . 7 46 . 4 29 . 5 53 . 5 
...... 
sugar , ......, 
Drink ( excl . dis till ed 
...... 
alcohol ) 32 . 0 78 . 0 30 . 0 74 . 0 33 . 0 70 . 0 
Hides , s kins , t·:ool , silk 64 . 2 23 . 8 65 . 9 25. 1 78 . 5 25 . 3 
Vegetabl e fibers 77 . 8 4 . 1 74 . 8 3 . 8 74 . 9 3 . 9 
Crude tobacco 20 . 0 6 . 0 50 . 0 5 . 0 55 . 0 3. 0 
Anima l oils a nd fat s 
vegetable oils and f a ts 25 . 0 17 . 0 27 . 0 17 . 0 28 . 0 16 . 0 
Essential oils 
Tota l agricultural c om-
modi ties Lil. 0 30 . 0 Ll 8 . 0 30 . 0 ll 6 . 0 32. 0 
Tot a l commod ities 38 . 0 33 . 0 39 . 0 35 . 0 4 1. 0 38 . 0 
a 
Cal cu l a Led from data i n ( 89 ) 90 , 91 ) 92a ) 
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"Europeans", proposed financing the CAP by extending the budgetary powers 
of the European Parliament and a majority ruling Council of Ministers . 
This was in line with their aim of establishing a federated political 
union in Western Europe and conflicted sharply with the Gaullist ob-
jective of a confederalist political union . However , because of the 
importance of the CAP to France , the "Europeans" hoped to force the 
French to make the necessary political concessions . 
The CAP has t wo outstanding features : a price control pr ogram and 
FEOGA the international agency responsible for financing the policy . 
Prices are controlled by setting a minimum intervention price which 
FEOGA will maintain by support buying, and by fixing a maximum price 
above which imports will be admitted f r eely into the Community . The EEC 
Commission proposes the policies to be enforced by FEOGA and the Council 
of Ministers of the EEC legislates them . The CAP as at present consti-
tuted tends to be protectionist and to be suitable only if the EEC is 
deficit in production . Even so, it is highly expensive and likely to 
remain controversial in the future . 
Agriculture is important to Western Europe as a whole , and especially 
to France because there is underemployment on the land and a swift 
rationalization of production would entail great social costs . In addi-
tion all EEC countries are very dependent on foreign trade as a source 
of growth, and agriculture is a significant part of their exports and im-
ports . Thus the "Europeans" may have hoped to frighten the French into 
making political concessions . The attempt, however , failed and the French 
made no concessions of a political nature . At the same time the French 
were forced to make some financial concessions to the other member countries. 
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VIII. THE DECISION TO BUY GOLD 
r. t~rnational economic policy makes decisions concerning the opti-
mum amount of intcrnai:ional trade which should be carried on by a nation 
and the means by which this trade should be financed . All nations 
want to experience the benef its of international t r ade but these benefits 
must be balanced against the costs of foreign competition . If uncondi -
tional free international trade has a n~t social cost then either this 
cost must be reduc ed or trade must be restricted . The French decision 
to reject a Western European Free Trade Area in favor of an economic 
union was taken because such unconditional free international trade 
would have broug ht them a net social cost . They wanted a common ex-
ternal tariff to rest r ict international trade with non-Europeans , and 
they wanted harmonization of national policies to minimize the socia l 
costs of free intra- European trade . 
I r. the international economy, unlike the domestic economy , the r e 
is no Central Author i ty . Consequently there exists no inter national 
institution with the authority to issue money and the power to enforce 
its a cceptance . Thus t he financing of international trade is a very 
complicated process and a major concern of the international economic 
policymaker . Every purchase in the international economy must be paid 
for in the sellers currency , so the policymaker must ensu r e that his 
nation has sufficient foreign currencies to buy what i t needs to import 
from abroad . This is usually t r ue if the policymaker ensur es that his 
nation ma i nta ins equilibrium in its payments to and from foreign coun-
tries, that is , in its balance of payments . 
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If a nation buys or invests nore abroad than she sells or borrows, 
her balance of payments will be in deficit . In o rd~r to gain time to 
correct -chis deficit, a nation must draw down its "reserves" or the value 
of its currency will fal 1 relativl.! to other currencies . Reserves are 
international means of payments which are acceptuble to a nation ' s 
creditors and which are held by national monetary authorities for the 
purpose of absorbing any excess supply of a nations currency in the 
foreign exchange market, due to a short term balance of payments deficit . 
If the international monetary system is some kind of Gold Standard , gold 
holdings will form at least part of a nation's reserves . 
Th~ present international monetary system is known as the Gold Ex-
change Standard , and its major characteristic is that gold holdings are 
supplemented as reserves by holdings of "key currencies" . The U. S . 
dollar and the British pound are the key currencies of the present Gold 
Exchange Standard . However , the growth in holdings of key currencies 
for reserves over the last twenty years has been solely due increased 
holdings of the U. S . dolla r. This reflects t he importance of the U. S . 
as a world economic p~~er, and her pledge to maintain direct converti -
bility of the dollar into gold . Because of the large foreign holdings 
of t~e U. S . dollar as reserves, U. S . short term liabilities to foreigner s 
greatly exceed her foreign short term assets . Consequen"tly the U. S. 
(like any other Bank) must depend on the confidence and goodwill of 
foreigners (her creditors) to allow this situation to continue. This 
being so the quest i on arises if an international monetary system based 
on th~ U. S. dollar as the key currency best serves the goals of the 
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various international economic policymakers . General de.Gaulle does not 
think so . 
A. The Issue 
It is generally agreed that th\! dollar is " the hub of the inter-
nationc.l monetary system on which the st..ibil ity and liquidity of or.her 
currencies de;Jend" ( 2 , p . 109) . General de Gaulle maintains that this 
situation reflects a different ecvnomic era and that 
CircLmstances ar\! such today that it is possible to wonder 
how far the difficulr.ies would spread if the states which 
hold dollars sooner or later reached r.he point. where t.hey 
wanted to convert them into gold . Even if such a widespread 
movement would never occur the fact is that there is a 
fundamental imbalanc~ (44) 
This can be seen if we examine the evolution of the present internation-
al monetary system since the end of World War II . This evolution can 
be divided into three periods . The first period runs roughly from 1945 
through 1951 and is the period when the dollar was the "world currency" . 
The U. S . had the materials needed by the Western Europeans to r evive 
their economies and the latter were too weak to earn the dollars to buy 
them . The gross national product of the U. S . was almost three times that. 
of the Six countries t.hat later formed the EEC . Dollars were as good as 
gold, if not better . As General de Gaulle said : 
As n\!arly a4l the world gold reserves were then held by the 
Unit~d States . . . it was natural for other States to include 
dollars or 6 old without distinction in th~ir foreign exchange 
reserves and for foreign balances of payments to be settled 
by trans:ers of American credits or currency as well as gold . 
All the more so because the Americans experienced no diff i -
culty in settling their debts in gold if called upon t o do so . 
( 44) 
l7b 
Indeed , in 1948 , the go ld r eserves held by the countries that later 
formed the EEC we r e va lued a t l ess tha n 53 of those held by the U. S. 
(See Table VIII . l.) Brita in' s go l d r eserves were va lued a t about the 
same figure . As ca n be seen from Tabl e VIII.2 the U. S. held over seventy 
pe r cent of the t o tal world gold s t ocks . By 1952 the U. S . s hare had 
fallen t o l ess tha n 653 and the gold reserves of the late r EEC countries 
had rise n by ove r 503. However the U. S. still had overwhelming domin-
ance . In 1948 the later EEC countries held less tha n a billion dollar s 
worth of shor t term c l aims agains t the dol l a r while the U. S . had over a 
billion dollars worth of short term claims aga inst other currencies. 
During the period 1948 through 1952, (as can be seen from Table VIII . 2) 
the short term cl aims on the dollar held by t he six count ries increased 
by very little in spite of the fact that the U. S . poured $20 billion of 
Marshall Aid into Wes t e rn Eur ope during the period. Fl~s of gover nment 
capital fr om the U.S. we r e needed to provide the Europea ns with enough 
purchas ing powe r to buy the ma t eri als needed for r econstruction. No 
European currency was convertible and the need t o maintain ba lance of 
payments equ ilibrium with the u.s . was an over-riding concern of t he 
countries of Western Europe, and indeed of the whol e world. Thes e a r e 
some of t he r easons why this period has been characterized as the pe riod 
when the U.S. dol lar was the world' s currency. 
The Marshall Pla n and other measures i nitiated after the War to re -
build the Western European economy we r e very successful and soon began 
to bea r fruit. Af t e r 1952, when Marshall Aid was terminated, the 
European countries were able t o maintain imports f r om the U.S. by earning 
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Tc.bl~ VIII . 1 . Wo~ld gold holdings from 19!..-b to 1965a 
Cot.ntry Year 
194~ 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
u . .:) . 24399 24563 22820 22873 23252 22091 21793 21753 22058 
U. K. 1611 1321 2862 2172 1483 2263 2530 2012 1773 
B .L . E. U. 024 698 587 635 704 776 778 928 925 
Fra:-icc. 5...,.b 543 t>62 597 582 617 708 942 924 
Germany 0 0 0 2& 130 325 626 920 149"+ 
:'.'\c. th"" r 1 ands 107 ... 95 311 310 544 7 37 7 96 865 844 
I-::aly 9o 256 250 '.j33 346 346 3'+0 352 338 
EEC 1435 1692 lbl6 1909 2316 2801 3254 4007 4525 
Other de -
ve1oped 2967 3047 3214 3653 3690 3981 4284 4490 4523 
Less da-
vc lo?ed 2630 2845 3045 3320 3155 3185 3090 3150 3180 
Al 1 coun-
tries 33065 33470 33755 33925 33900 34320 34950 35410 36055 
IMF 1436 1451 1494 1530 1692 17 02 1740 1808 1692 
World 34530 34975 35300 35565 
Annuc..l 
35795 36250 36920 37585 38075 
gold 850 b4b 897 940 980 
l q57 1955 1959 19b0 1961 1962 l 9o3 190...i 1965 
U. S. 22857 20582 19507 17 804 16947 16057 15596 15471 14065 
U. K. 1555 2807 2514 2801 2 2 t>7 2581 2484 2136 2265 
B. L . E. U. 915 1270 1134 1170 1~48 1365 1371 1451 1558 
France 581 750 1290 1641 2121 2587 3175 3729 4706 
Germany 2541 2639 2 t>37 2971 3o64 3679 38 .... 3 4248 4410 
:'\e~h..!rlands 7 ... 4 1050 1132 1451 1581 1581 1601 1688 1756 
Italy 452 1086 1749 2203 2225 22.+3 2343 2107 2...-04 
EEC 5233 67 95 7 942 9436 10839 11455 12333 13223 14834 
Other cie. -
velopad 4498 4811 5033 5332 5988 6421 7047 7267 7966 
Less de -
veloped 3165 3035 2875 2o90 2850 2760 2770 2790 2800 
Al 1 coun-
tries 37305 38030 37880 38065 38890 39270 40230 40890 41925 
IMF 1180 1332 2...i07 2..,.37 2077 2194 2312 2179 1859 
World 38765 39445 40195 40540 41140 4147 0 42310 43060 43300 
Annual 
golo 1019 1051 1127 1178 1215 1300 1356 l!;-06 
aSource : (52 , 53) 
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Table VII.2 . Total short term ass~ .. s and liabilities of the U. S. and 
the distribution of tne liabil itie.s in the EEC a CS mill ion) 
Cot.ntry Year 
19~8 19!.i-9 1950 1951 1952 1953 195-. 1955 1956 
U. S. ;:;:1ort 
term assets 1020 830 900 970 1050 900 1390 1550 1950 
U . S. short 
term lia -
bili;:i~s 5850 59o0 1:..20 7660 8960 10020 11150 11720 13490 
B. L. E.U. 145 134 140 1-+7 1:9 134 104 111 130 
France 193 172 261 289 343 429 715 lObl 626 
Germany 179 1-+9 222 406 531 899 137 3 11..54 1&35 
Italy 334 30~ 315 300 30~ 466 579 7b5 930 
)lether lands 123 171 19-+ 149 203 243 2<+9 164 134 
EEC 974 930 1132 1291 1535 2171 3020 3595 3655 
U . K . 540 574 657 643 S18 709 b40 550 1012 
1957 1958 1959 1960 l %1 19o2 1963 1964 l 9o5 
u. s . ,;short 
term assets 2200 2540 2620 3610 4820 5160 5980 7960 7730 
u.s . shor t 
tc:rr.:i 1 ia-
bilities 13640 14620 16230 17260 18780 19780 21330 23900 24070 
B.L. E. U. 146 131 145 155 342 188 427 453 419 
France 354 532 655 519 989 1154 147b 1663 997 
Gerr.:iany 1157 1755 1987 3476 2841 2730 3041 2010 1429 
I::c.ly 203 1121 1370 877 1234 138-+ 803 1622 1620 
107 9 
~etherlands 203 339 485 328 216 248 360 3o7 389 
EEC 3339 3b7b 4642 5355 5622 5704 6104 0115 4854 
U. K. 1275 873 990 1607 2226 1009 l-.S3 188~ 2714 
aSource : (52 , 53) 
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dollars with thl.!ir own exports and atr.ract.ing a large capital inflow 
fro~ the priv~tc sector of th~ U. S. How~ver, they were not able to 
attract. as many dolla=s as they wanted and careful management of their 
dollars was used . This period has be.en called the period of "dollar 
shortage". International payment::. were in gold, dollars and sterling 
bu~ ~he most im~ortant means of payments was the uollar . It was the only 
officially convertible currency and the demand for it was seemingly in-
exhaustible . Foreigners held $5 billion in 1957 , an increase of 3003 
in five years . Many people wondered if the dollar would ever not be in 
crir.ical shortage. again . The answer came in the third phase of the 
evolution of the international moner.ary system which began in 1956 . 
Tne third phase of the international monetary system has be~n called the 
period wh~n the system was in continuous crisis by Giscard d ' Estaing , 
former French Finance Minister . By 1958 , the gold reserves of the EEC 
countries amounted to 353 of the value of the U. S . reserves and their 
holding of short term claims against the dollar had quadrupled. The 
short term liabilities of the U. S . dollar now amounted to $15 billion. 
Europe was experiencing a boom while growth in the U. S . was relatively 
slow . An even more dramatic change had occurred in the balance of pay -
ments of the U. S. In Table VIII . 3 we see the U. S . surplus on current 
account fall from almost $0 billion in 1957 to almost zero in 1959 . As 
a result of this fall the capital account of the U. S. was financed in 
1959 by a foreign capital inflow into the U. S. of $4 . 5 billion. This 
inflow t.ook r.he form of inv~stments in the U. S. If the inflow had been 
cashed in for gold there would hilve been a dramatic fall in U. S. reserves . 
loO 
Tabl~ VIII . 3 . U. S. bal~ncu of paymen~sa (millions of dollars) 
Item Year 
1957 
Exports 2o,733 
Trade balance 5 , olO 
Pensions + remittances - 702 
U. S. gov . capital -.'2 , 574 
~low 
U. S . ?rivate capital - 3 , 175 
flow 
Direct investm~nt - 2 , u58 
Portfolio investm~nt - 1 , 117 
Other lonJ term c laims na 
O~her short term claims na 
Flow of foreign capital - 107 
Errors and omiss i ons 748 
1962 
Exports 30 , 0d4 
Impor t s 25,021 
Trade oalance 5 , 0o3 
Pensions + remittances - 738 
U. S. gov . capital - 3 , 547 
E.J.ow 
U. S. private capital - 3 , 434 
flow 
Direct investment - 1 , 654 
?ortfolio investment na 
Other 1 ong term 
cl2ims - 1 , 227 
Other shor t term 
claims - 553 
Flow of foreig:1 capital 102 
Errors and omissions - 1 . 111 
asou r ce : (93 , 94 , 95 , 96) 
1950 
23,199 
20, 951 
2 '2 48 
- 707 
- 2 , 577 
- 2 , 81..4 
- 1 , 09 .... 
- 1 , 750 
na 
na 
3,L.39 
4.;.,.l 
1963 
32,020 
2 6' 335 
5 , 685 
- 826 
- 3 , 785 
- 4 ' 307 
- 1 , 888 
na 
- l ,o85 
- 734 
311 
-339 
23 , 709 
23 , 537 
172 
- 791 
- 1, 986 
- 2 , 375 
- 1 , 372 
- 1 , 003 
na 
na 
1.1- , 452 
528 
1964 
37,099 
28 , 637 
8 , 462 
- 896 
- 3 , 560 
- 6,542 
- 2 , 435 
- 677 
- 1 , 284 
- 2 ' 164 
685 
- 949 
19c0 
27 ' 013 
23 , 188 
3 , 825 
- 842 
- 2 , 769 
- 3 , 8o2 
- 1 , 694 
- 2 , 188 
na 
na 
4 , 2o0 
592 
1965 
39 , 147 
32, 203 
6 , 944 
- 1024 
- 3 , 375 
- 3 , 743 
- 3 ' l;.18 
- 758 
- 320 
753 
278 
- 415 
19ol 
28 , 066 
22 , 923 
5 , 1 LT3 
- 878 
- 2 , 777 
- 3 , 953 
- 1 , 475 
- 2,478 
na 
na 
3 , 067 
602 
1960 
43 , 039 
37 , 937 
5 ' 102 
- 1010 
- 3 , 4..,..6 
- -+ , 132 
- 3 , 462 
- 482 
225 
- 413 
2, 512 
- 3S3 
Such a fall would have precipitated a wave of specula ti on against the 
U. S. d.:>11.:;r and if holders of tr.c :;>16 b:llion dollars of short term 
liab~liti~s of t~~ dollar had pan~cked the U. S . raight have been forced 
to d~v~lu~ . It was evid~nt that the capacity of fore i gners to absorb 
dollars was exhausted . In 1960, there was widespread conversion of 
doll~rs ir.to gold nnd the U. S. gov~rnment h~d to intervene to save the 
dolla= . For th~ first time s ince the World War the U. S . had to consider 
the external dim~nsion of her economic policies . Policy measures must 
be consider ed in the light of their probable effect of foreign c onfidence 
in the dollar . Th~ balance of payments became , in the words of President 
Ken:i.edy , "one of the key factors of (U . S . ) national life" . Because 
the dollar is no longer overwhelmingly strong and because the present 
international monetary system was established when it was, the system 
has been incr~asingly criticized for its archaic dependence on the dolla r . 
We observed that under the present international monetary system 
e~cn nation must maintain a stock of reserves of gold and key currencies 
in order to finance short te r m balance of payments deficits . However , 
under the present system the supply of gold and key currencies for re -
SGrves, called th~ supply of international liquidity, is not governed 
by the need for it . Of course 
International liquidity is h~terogeneous ~n character and the 
ne~d for it at any tim~ cannot be .:, .. , 1)resscd in a single overall 
fi~ur~ . • • . Whether or not the availabl~ supply is adequate or in-
aaequcte must always be a matter of judgmc:r:t and a collective. 
judgm~nt is particularly difficult to arrive at because the balance. 
of advantage, at any rate in t~e short run may be. different with 
respect to and in the opinion of different countries •... Whether 
o= not the commo~ objectives of ( i nternational) economic policy 
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woul~, on b~lanc~ , b..; promot..;d by a l~rger world tc~al of 
li~uidity ~~p~nJs on rnuny factors, such as ~ts composition •. . , 
the way in which the incrcas~ is distributed among countries , 
and the manner in which any increase is brought about . 
(51 , p . '.29) 
There is fa irly 
0
ener al a0 re.ement , however , that th~ pr esent i nte rna-
tio~al monetary system do..;s not utilize its sources of liqu i dity auto-
matic~lly in such a way as to mcike a shortage of internati onal liquid ity 
inconc~ivable . Up to 1962 internutional liquidity consisted of two 
forms of money having quite a different origin : (81 , p . 105) 
Tn..; size of one depends on the St;ccess of mining and Soviet 
gold sales co the West, while:. the size of the other de. -
p~nds on the fortuitous circumstar.ces of how far t r.e balances 
o2 payments of the key currency countri~s are , or have been , 
in sur plus or deficit . 
The fact of t he matte r is t~at even today when the credit fac ilities 
available to national mon~tary authorities have been greatly increased , 
the supply of inter~ational liquioity has no responsiveness to the need 
for i t . If liquidity und~r the pr esent system i s not increased other 
than by increasing the supply of gold and key currencies it can be a rgued 
that the system contains the seeds of i ts own destruction . The r e mi ght 
be a ne~d for so much liquidity that very large deficits in tne balances 
of paymer.ts of the key currency countries would be needed . However , these 
large deficits would be liable t o cause a " run" on the key currencies 
leading to thei r collapse . 
By far the most damaging cri ticism of the pres~nt i nternational 
rr.cn.::tc.ry systeG'l co.,1es f r om those who believe that it creat~s an "adjust -
rnent problem" . 
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The orobl~m of ad'us tm~nt is to ensure that threatened 
l.:istfng unbalance; i.1 for-.ign payments are avoided by some 
appropriat .... structural change in the economy . [ M1...ade (72, p . 3)) 
Traci::ion.:al ir.t..:r;:"tational economic tr ..... ory he::.s recommend~d to the inter-
n~tioncil economic policymuk1...r to inf l~t .... if the balance of payments i s 
in surplus (this will make it more difficult to sell abroad and to 
fina~Ce im?orts) and to dc:late if the balance of payments is in deficit 
(this will ra~ke it easier to sell abroad and more difficult to import) . 
However this ignores the goals of the policy maker for the domestic 
economy . If an economy is undergoing an inElation and i t still has a 
surplus in its balance of payments the:1 the policymaker wi ll be very re -
luctant to pursue an inflationary policy . If an economy is already 
undergoing a deflation and it still has a deficit in its balance of pay-
ments then the policymak.;r will be very reluctant to pur sue a deflat ion-
ary policy . 7he adjustment problem arises because the traditional theory 
takes no acc ount of capit~l movements for the balance oE payments and 
because in the present international mv .. etary system there is no in-
centive for surplus countries to inflate, or for the U. S. to cut down 
her balance of ?ayments deficit . Capital movements do not necessarily 
increase during a period of inflation or decrease during a period of 
de:lation . Thus governmGnts have increasingly r esorted to control 
rueasures to preva:1t capital movements from disrupting their balance of 
payments equilibrium. The lack of incentive for surplus countries to 
i~flGre to restore equilibrium in their balance of payme~ts (instead of 
just accuoulating r~serves) partic~larly when the surplus is generated 
by capital ~ovements, has increased the use of exchange r ate ravQluation 
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instead of inflation as ~n instrument for correcting a balance of pay-
mc.nt.s s1...rplus . This , :::o..,'-'vcr, is reg ... rded as objectionable in an in-
t~rn~tional monetJry system which is based on fixed exchange rates . 
The lack of inc~ntive for the U. S. to corr~ct her payments ceficit 
is t~c. part of ~h~ adjustment ?rob~em which nost concerned Gen~ral de 
Gaul:e . Under tt~ present international monetary system there is no 
pressure on the key currenci~s to restrict their spending abroad wh i le 
there is confidence in the v~luc. of their currency . If the U. S. spends 
too much abroaJ the excess supply of dollars will eith~r be used to buy 
more U. S . goods, and brinJ about balance on current account , or they 
will be absorbed by forei0 n central ban~s and lent back on the U. S. 
capital mar~et , and so b~ing about ba~~nce on capital account . If we 
look at Table VlII . 2 we will see that a foreign capital inflow into the 
U. S. finances the U. S. capital account deficit in 1959 , and has financed 
a significant portion of it every yea r since . Jacques Rueff puts the 
Frencn argument this way : ( 78, ? · 3) 
1: I had an agreeu1ent with i::y tailor th.a~ whatever I 
pay him he returns to me the same day as a loan , I woi.:ld 
have no obj\,;.ction at all to ord\,;.ring more suits from him . 
There is no incentive for the customer (the U. S. ) to ever earn the money 
to pay the tailor (the rest of the world) because he can always get credi t . 
Other countries lose their reserves but the U. S. can always print ffiOre 
dollars to finance her deficit abroad . 
. . . (in the) cas~ of dollars • •. outflows (from the U. S . ) always 
exceed inflows . In other words capital is cr~ated in Am~rica 
by means of what must be called inflation .•. (this inflation) 
185 a 
makes investments at home seem less profitable, so ther e is 
a growing tendency to invest abroad . The r esult i s for 
certain countries a sort of expropr iation of some of their 
business firms . ( 44) 
OL course Eoreign countries could demand the reserves wh ich t he U. S. 
holds to back the dollar , gold . However , if they do this t hey thr eat e n 
the value of the dolla r and thus " the hub of the international monetary 
system on which the stab i lity and liquidity of their own currencies de-
pend . " Thus the present international monetary sys t em traps them into 
what Machlup has called "involuntary foreign lending" . He summarizes 
the argument as follows : 
1 . The gold - exchange standa rd, or in particular the dolla r -
exchange standard, implies that the centr al banks absorb , 
through purchase at fixed exchange rates , any excess supply of 
dollars in the for eign exchange markets . 
2 . Such an excess s upply of dollars may be caused by a def icit 
in t he balance of payments of the United States . 
3 . Such a def icit may be caused by capital movements from the 
United States . 
4 . Some of these capital movements may take the form of American 
acquisitions of European enterprises . 
5 . These acquisitions, therefore, are financed, at least indi -
rectly , by European purchases of the dollars which the Americans 
have "created" and used for buying assets in Eur ope . Since t he 
dolla r s are balances in American Banks or obligations of the U. S. 
Government , their accumulation constitutes involunta r y l oans to 
America by European Central Banks . ( 69 , Pp . 9- 10) 
The accumulation of dollars by fore i g n Central Banks is voluntary as 
long as they can cash in the dollars for gold . HowevC;.r, the dollar ·i s the hub 
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of t he inter national monetary system a nd if large scale gold purchases 
are made by fore ign Central Banks :ram t he U. S . Treasury , c onfidence in 
the dollar may be shaken and the whole inter na tional mone t a ry system may 
be jeopardized . Thus , foreign Central Banks may be af ra id to cash in 
their dollars for gold , and hold them (lend them on the U. S. market) in-
stead . Th i s i s involuntary fore i gn lending . 
Machlup ( 69) points out that " lending t o the depos it banker is im-
pl i ed i n a system in which bank deposits function as circulating media" 
(69 , p . 129) . Holding money is " an exchange of pr esent fo r futu r e goods" 
or a loan . However , i f the country holds gold it i s , like the country 
holding rese rve currencies, making " some of it ' s own r e al resources avail -
able to other countries in the hope that , if and when a need a rises , it 
may exchange its gold holdings for real r esources of ot he r countries (69 , 
p . 92) . Thus holding gold is also lending . Of course, a gold su pplying 
country has to spend much more of its resources to pr oduce gold t han a r e -
serve currency country spends pr inting notes . But to avoid any kind of 
foreign lending , "a subs tantive r eform of the international monetary sys -
t em woul d be needed" (69 , p . 129) . A system without r e serves of a ny kind 
would have to be introduced , namely f r eely flexible exchange rates (69 , 
p . 118) . 
Ge neral de Gaulle does not go this far. He would be satisfied with 
the Gold Bullion Standard because " gold has to be ea r ned" a nd because his 
a rch rivals, the U. S . and U. K., would not benef it at the expense of France . 
Thus he sa id : 
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For the.>e re.1sons France. rcco::nm~nds that the system be changed .. • 
ch-t incernationa1 l;!xchang~s be ~stablished as was che c~se b~­
for~ the great world wide disast~rs , on an unquestionable rnone -
t ... ry basis wh~ch docs not be~r mark of ~n individu~l country ... . 
Wh~t b ... sis? Actu~lly it is difficult to envision in this re -
;arc, any ot,1.::r staP.durd th ... n 0 old .. . . The st.preme law •.. that 
must be ~nf orced and honorl;!<l ag.::.in in int:crnational economic 
relations, i s the duty to balance, from one monetary area to 
anoth..:!r, by e.":fectivl! inf lows and Ou1.fl ows of gold , the payments 
rl;!sulting from the exchanges . (44) 
B. T~e Historical Alternatives 
For the past few centuries the system ot intE:.rnational payments has 
been based on gold , and three international Gold Standards can be dis -
tinguished . The first of these is the Pure Gold Standard , or the Gold 
Specie Standard . Under this system each Central Bank buys and sells 
gold in quantities at legally fix~d prices . Bank notes are backed 1003 
by gold and gold coins circulate f reely . Automatic me chan isms are in 
force to correct internal and external disequilibrium. In the case of 
external deficit gold flows out of the country and this reduces the 
money supply . As a result of this reduction in the money supply a de -
:_ation occurs and ~xports are encouraged while imports a r e discouraged . 
Thus external equilibrium is autom.:.tically r estored . Co:1sequently there 
is 1 ittle :-ieed or scope for gover:.raent pol icy . But , as in other area s 
o:. ... conomic activity , simplistic automatic occhanisms hc.ve come under 
gover~~ent rnan~ge~ent and dir~ction because of wages and price rigidities . 
There is resistance to deflation by organized labor and net debtors in 
the economy; there is resistance to inflation by consumers and net 
creditors . Because there are polit~cal consequences of using monetary 
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policy to r~store external e~uilib=~~n, it c~nnot be relied upon to func-
tion automatically . Germany in th~ period 1956 - oo , had strong surpluses 
on her be.lance of payr.1cnts . The classical "automatic" ml!ans of r<!storing 
equilibrium in h.c.r balance of p.:i.ymcnts would have been to inflate (al -
though .:;he was not on a Pure Gold Standard) . She resist.!d this infla -
tio:i very stro .gly and so aggravated the n~~d for deflation by the defi -
cit countries (chiefly th~ U. S. ) . It is now agreed that r eliance should 
not be placed on automatic mechanisms for correcting external dis~quil ibri­
um, but the.re should be some built - in automatic force which compels 
cou:ir.ri~s to act to restore equilibr ium. Thus automat ic "disciplinary 
mechanisms" are favored rather than "automatic corrective mechanisms" . 
This is the chief: m~:.-it of the second "historical alternat ive" we 
shall consider . The second system of internat ional payments based on 
6 old is called the Gold Bullion Standard . It is exactly like the Pure 
Gold Standard except that bank notes are not redeemable in gold and gold 
coins do not circulate fr~ely . All gold is used for international re -
serves but the Central Bank must buy and sell gold at fixed prices pro-
vided a certain ninimum quantity is ordered . The f ree import and export 
of gold is allaved . Thus under this system balance in internati onal pay -
ments i s maint ained by compensatory international movements in gold . An 
external defic it is f i nanc'!d by running do-."n gold r eserves in the 
~hart run and by devalu~tion in the long run . To stO? the depletion of 
r~serves before they are exhau$t~d the ~ov~rnme~t must initiate a de -
f latio~ary domestic econoQiC policy . I n the case of an exter nal su rplus 
in=lationary measi..rcs in the: dor. .... stic economy can be used to r estor e 
lbS 
cquilibr:.ur:~ . n-.us the scope of g overnment ;..olicy is enlarged under this 
syst1.-r.: . How..over, raost ?..:!ople disl:'.. • .;.e this system on th..! g round s that it 
depends excessively on gold producc~on fo r f ina.~ing world ~rade . Also, 
-:'t'.ere is a so-c.::.lled "ratc .. 1.-.: ._ __ ._;::t" Khich means that the pressure on 
the Cl.!tic~~ Cvw~tries is ~ggrav.::. ed by ~he re l uctancc oz so ~~ny countries 
to in-~ate in order to reauce their surplus . 
C. The Historical Settin6 
Prior to the General's Press Confer~nce the estublishment of a c om-
posite res~rve unit (CRU) had been the major French proposal for the r e -
fort:i of t h(! interndtional monetary system. The origin of the CRU can 
be trac~d to the sec or:d " Ber nstein Plan" . The first Bernstein Plan wi ll 
be discussed in the next chapter . E. M. Bernstein made his proposals 
for the establishment of a CRU i n 1963 . The details are as follows : (4,6 ,7) 
1 . The present reserves of foreign e xchangG of the countries would 
be r eplaced by CRU ' s . 
2 . The CRU would be composed in agreed pr oportions of the count r ies 
of t he major industriali~ed count r ies . 
3 . These pro~ortions wou ld be d1.-termined according to a n agreed 
key . The French favored the cetermination of the ?roportions according 
to t he proportion of the World ' s golc stock held by each country . 
In 19o5 , the fo ll ower s of Bernstein in ~he U. S . and the Fr~nch anc 
Ger ffians in Europe all f~vor'-d the CRU sys tl.!m, but it is a fact that the 
Frer.c:i. President ' s Press Conferenc..! was 6 i ven aft~r the CRU system had 
failed to gain &CC..!ptance . In order t o unders tand why the Franch re -
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pLd::.c.tcd the CRU schemE.. \.'hich they were credited with advocating we 
wil 1 give a brief example of what it would Lnt:ail . The most important 
c~ar~cteris~~c of money is that it is acce~tabld . If an international 
~oney was to be printed by ~he • . 7 then its acc~ptability would depend 
on whc:t ........ _·: .... r:cics wer~ b.,ickin6 it . If the uncerdev.;lopdd countries 
\J~re to Jae~ a large ?Ortion vf the currency then its va~ue would be re-
gar .... ed as unstable and its acceptabilil:y would be limit ed . On the other 
h~~d if the u~acrdevelupv~ countries did not shar~ in its backing then 
they would not share in some of its ben~fits either . This is especially 
true if the r G is a gold ti~ as proposed by the French . Why did the 
French want a gold tie of the CRU? Because they felt that some dis -
ci.i,)l i~ary force sh0<.:ld be built into ~he L.ternational oonetary system 
to ensure tha~ countries would maintain equilibrium in their balance of 
payme~ts . Suppos~ that there is a world of :our countries , the U. S. , 
Britain , France, ~nd Germany . Suppose further that total world gold re -
serves are $30 billion, with $15 billion held by the U. S . and $5 b::.llio:1 
held by each of the other three count r ies . Suppose that the four countr ies 
cecidcd to crente a CRU . If the unit of account of the CRU is one dollar 
then according to the French Plan the backing for the CRU would be sup -
plied in the foll~~ing proportions : 50 cents of U. S . dollars , and 16- 17 
cents fron the othGr three countries . Suppose r.hat it was decided to 
issue $t>O billion worth of CRU ' s . Then the U. S. would deposit $30 billion 
in do:lars witn the Cen~ral Institution charged with administering the 
CRU and r~ceiv~ ~30 bil_ion in CRu ' s . Each other country would d~posit 
$10 billion i:-i it s ONn curr~ncy and be credited with the saml! amount 
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o: CR"J ' s . From then on al 1 countries woul-.. settle their inter national 
debts by paying in gold and CRLl ' s :n the s~oc proportions as t otal gold 
supply to total CRu ' s created . 
Th\..S sine\! total go.d rcse:-ves w"'re;, $3v billion and totc..l cau · s 
cr~ated were $00 billion , all coun~ries would pay their debts 333 in 
gold 2~d 67~ in CRU ' s . (~n prac~~ce the amount of CRU ' s c r eated would 
be much soaller . ) An annual change in the supply of CRU ' s c ould be made 
to handle the prob - em of int~rnational liquicity . 
At ~irst glance this syste~ seems to hav~ m~ny adv~ntages . Those 
countr-i..~s who Eel t that u.~y [lad excess dolla r s in the ir reserves coul d 
sell them to the t . S . for gold anc CRU'~ . Thus t~e int ernational mone t a r y 
system would no longer depend on the dolla r . Secondly the pr oblem of i n-
ternatiunal liquidity would become subject to the conscious decis i on 
of the Central Institution and not to the whims of gold production , 
Sov iet sales and the deficits of the r~servc currency countries . Fi na l -
ly the U. S. and the U. K. wou ld no longer be able to run a defic it at no 
cost by involunta ry foreign lending . The CRU would be assured of a home 
because it would move automatically with gold . It would force out 
ELropean c entral bank noards which have bec.:-i built up by " first in last 
out" gold policies . The most desir..;d reserv0.s <.i.re 
0
old c.nd the l ast r e -
serves to be sold to finance ~xtcrnal diseqLilibrium are bold . 
Eowever, there are m~ny disadvantQges to a gold linked CRU . Firstly , 
~ven if the undercevel Oj)ed countries wl!re g ivl.!n an al lot::ie.:-it of CRU ' s , 
:= t~e ~penc~ng o2 the CRU ' s was conditional on the spending of gold , 
the ~~d~rdev~loped count:-iGS wo ld nev~r bl.! able to use ~heir allot~~nt . 
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Rob~rt Roosa (77) d~scrib~s the other reason for not having a gold 
link : 
. .• (It) would be tantamount to a devaluation of all the 
doilar holdings of the contributor coun~ri~s in terms of 
:;ola . That i::; '.Jy compact ano.1g thL.m ... h .... y could henc .... f or th 
obtai~ for $35 dol~ars only half an ounce of gold plus 
$17 . 50 (cquival~nt) in C.U's . .. , To outsioers it would appear 
Lha-c the Unitea States was buyir,<> anc selling gold inside 
the circle for $35 p~r ounce plus $35 equiv~lcnt in CRU ' s . 
~11.e conseeiuences woi..ld aimos-c inescapably b~ that out -
siders would bril'.g as many dollars as they could obtain 
to the United States for conversion into golc • . •. The clea r 
r::..sk, however, would be that a reform intend~d to strengthen 
t~e ability of the international monetary sys-cem to main-
t~in its one fixed benchmark of stability, -che $35 gold 
price , would ins-cead have jeopardized (it) ... . 
If the centr al bank of a nember country has dollars i t can sell then to 
a non member country who will then cash them in for gold . If i t sells 
then directly it will get only half the amount of gold . The way to pre-
ven-c this is to have all countri .... s as members but then you run into the 
problem of the underdeveloped countries who have no gold . Thus the gold 
l i nk is inherently self contrad i ctory, and on failing t o get suppor t 
f r om other countries the French dropped the CRU sche~e in 1965 . 
To re?ea~ the quotation given above, we see what Gener al de Gaulle 
pr oposed as ~n alternative to the CRU . 
:nternation&l exchanges should be established, as was the case 
before the great world wide disas-cers, on an unquestionable 
mone-cary basis which does not bear the mark of an individual 
country .•• . What basis? Actually it is difficul t to envision 
~n this regard, any other standard than gold • • • • the supreoe 
law .... -:.:n .. t must be enforced and honoree aga:..n in international 
economic relations is the duty to balance , from one monetary 
area to anothe~, by effective inflrnvs and outflows of gold , 
the payoents resulting f r om ... he exchanges . (44) 
Fron -chis passage that wr.at de Gaulle had in mind was a r eturn to 
t he Gold Bullion Standar d , though this inter pretation is not unanimous . 
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We may r~call that undur ~uch a ~ystem the domestic currency of each 
co\:ntry is '- ?aper curr~ncy and external deficits ar..! pc.id in gold . 
~he French position was fLrther elaborated some days after the 
Pres:oenis Press Conference by the Finance ~inister of the time, Gisc~rd 
d'Estaing, in an address to the Fc:.culty of Law at the University of 
Paris . He defined four criteria by which the value of a wor ld mone~ary 
system should be assessed: ( 16) 
1 . Reciprocity : "countries other than the U. S. or U. K. have to 
set~le ~heir deficit by payments in gold or by recourse to international 
cred:t, whereas countries with reserve currencies can increase their 
credit inoefini~ely . " 
2. "The system should allow the adjl:stment machinery to operate 
properly which is not the case with the gold exchange standard . " 
3 . "The system should provide a sufficient amount of i nternational 
liquidity for the expansion of the various economies without provoking 
inflation . " He rerr.arked that the I~1F had produced a study. in 1963 which 
said that there was no shorta6e of international liquidity . He failed , 
however, to ancilyze the effects of his proposals on the international 
liquidity situation. 
4 . Solidity: The system should have the confidence of the States 
participating in it . 
It is useful here to point out the relationships between these cri-
teria and goals hitherto attributed to the in~ernational economic policy 
of de Gaulle . The first two criteria stress the need for reciprocity in 
the internationcl monetary syst~m. This is of course a major goal of 
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French policy . The third criterion spc~ks of the need tor suff iciant 
int.!r-n ... tional 1 iquidity to ensure the "expansion" of th~ econo::iy, which 
is a::10th.::- i::.1port<:nt goal c!: Fr1..nct policy . The third goal we have at -
Ttis bo ... l is not explicitly stated in th~ sp~~ch but can be derived 
as :=?lications of his position. The need for ~olidity arises because 
of the exc1;;.ss ive "d ..... Jcndance" on the col lc:.r . 
~l. d ' Est:Ei.:ng than outlined =he French proposals : (16) 
1 . "Tne m...tjor Stat~s should formally declare that they would in 
future ~ettl~ their deficits in gold and not by m~ans of an additional 
rese:-ve currency . " 
2 . To ~voia fina.ncing de.ficits oi a "fu.1.damental nature" countries 
should be able to resort only to the means provided by the IMF and the 
Group of T1..n facilities . 
If a Gold Bullion SLandard were cst:abli~hed then the question arises 
ss ~o how it would be ph~sed in to the present system. Jacques Rueff , a 
Fr ench economist , who has had major influence on French :--loneta r y Pol icy 
since 1958 has outlined a plan for accomplishing this . He condit:ions any 
return to the Gola Bul 1 ion Standard o .. c:..n increase. in the pr ice of gold . 
Suppose that the U. S . bold reserves w~re $15 billion and that foreign 
official holdings of doll~r clai=s were also $15 billion. Yne price of 
.;olc is $35 per fine ounce . Now let us doubl1.. the price of gold t:o $70 . 
This dou~l .... s th"" U. S. gold reserv1.:. to $30 billion . l\ow if the U. S . 
gov~rnment calls in the saort tern li~~ilit:ies of t:he dollar and p~ys 
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t~~ Eor~ign ~onctary authoriti~s , this woulc reduce he r gold reserves 
to their pr.::sent d3.J lcv~l in Ve..:~..! but they woulc exchange dollars for 
golc 1,..•ith. the f orcign c ..... nr.r..-1 ba .. ks . The 1~...:r it of tr.is system is that 
it woula r1.-ducc th~ prcs~ur~ on ~•~ dollar ~n~ 1.-ncouragc rnor~ 6 old 
procuction . ~owev.::.r si.rrce the world• s r.ir.jor :rnppliers of gold are South 
Africa ~nd the LS~R , t~is w0Jld b..! poli~ically obj..!ctionable . In ad -
dition, unless som1.- other :aea:u; was e.st:ablishcd o:: cr<!ating internation-
al l~qui~ity in th.c lo~g run i~ would encourage gold hoaraing by specu-
lators antici?ating the n~xt price incr~as ...... 
Row docs the a~ov..! system answer the criticisms we have made of the 
Gol~ Exchange Standard? :n the first plac~ it does not depend on the 
dollar for its su?po:t . Gold rcpl~ces the dolla r and the obligation to 
µay ir. gold fa11s ;ac;ually on every.)OC)'. T~1ere can be no involuntary 
foreign lendir.g in this system. Howev-..r, the question of the SU?ply 
of i~ternational LiGU~Lity i3 not taken care of under the system. Refer -
ence is c:arie to i::he n:F study, but this stu~y only sh01'1s that under the 
pre~Gnt system ~he supply at this time is ~dcquate . But would the supply 
be adequate un~~r the Gold Bullion Scandard? The French stated that 
On the event o~ it bGing objectively asr.ablished t~at the 
world total rescrv~s h~ld were insufficient ••• joint mach i ne ry 
for cre~i::inb re~erv~s bac~~~ by go:~ could be brought into 
play through a joint decision by those states whose currencies 
~e=e c onvertible into gold . (le) 
Anot:h..!= s~r ious drawbac~ of th~ Gold Bullion Standurd as an international 
monGta ry systea is that it would do litr.le to solve the general p=oblem 
of adjust~~nt (except for tie spcciLic aspect of involuntary foreign 
lending). ~he~e would still be no i ncent ive for s~rplus courrt:ries 
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~o inflate . If a balanc~ of pay~c~t s d~ficit was experienced by a 
co~ntry during a aaflation, under the Golc Bullion Standard, the policy-
nak~r would not pursu~ a d~flationary policy but would aevalue in order 
to corr~ct th~ daficit . Thus the Go ld BLllion Sta~dard, while ensuring 
r~ci?rocity in th~ intcrnatio~al monetary system, would do little to 
solve the basic problGms of liquidity &nd adjustmGnt . 
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IX . TEE ALTER:\.-\TIVES TO T't:E GOLD BULLIO;\ STA.'DARD 
Thura is no doubt that any rigid appliccition of the principl~s of 
t.h"' Gold Bu lion St.:indarJ would ~ .. no w;;,,y ::;olve the problL:ms of th~ 
international ~conomy cruatcd by the Gold Exchange Standard . The system 
would no long~r rely on the U. S. dollar or permit involuntary foreign 
lending, but the basic problems of liquidity and adjustment would rema in 
unsolved . However , given France's goal of international reciptocity 
it is no surpri::;e that General de Gaulle choose the Gold Bullion 
Standard from among the availabl~ alternatives . In this chapter we will 
examine the other alternatives op~n to the General . 
A. The Free Market International 'Monetary System 
This scheme for an international monetary mechanism relies on flexi-
ble exchange rates, and is favored by a large number of prominent aca -
demic economists . Ja~es ~eade sums up the argument of those who favor 
comyletely flexible rates: ( 72 , p . 12) 
A country is in deficit; its uxchange rate will in consequence 
de?reciat~; this will make its exports cheaper in terms of foreign 
currencies and wil 1 r:iake i-cs impor.:s dearer in its own cu:-:-i:!ncy; 
its exporLs will thus be promoted and its imports discouraged 
and thus adjustment will be achieved . ... 
This ~rgument can be expressed graphically . In Figure IX. l we r epresent 
the foreign exchange market in which there are two currencies, the dollar 
and th~ "foreign currency" . The curve S no.presents the supply of the 
for eign currency at each dollar price of the foreign currency . Because 
of th.e re.ct t. .. at tr.e aollur price of r.he foreign currency is r.he recipro-
D~~ lar price. p' 
t.: !.i: vf .. orei.gn 
Cl rrancy 
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0 
l. 97 
D 
q ---QuaritTty~of-f-oreign­
currency 
Figure IX. l . Equil:.brium in the forei.:;n exchange market (~:achlup , 68) 
cal of the price of the doliar in terms of the foreign currency , then 
the supply and demand of dol:ars is implied by the supply and demand for 
foreign currency . D is the demand for foreign currency at each ex-
change rate . In a world of two currencies as assumed by the above fig -
t.re tee demand schedule for foreign currency is the reciprocal of the 
supply schedule of dollars . In the figure the equilibr ium is a E where 
the supply and demand of foreign currency is 0 and the price of foreign 
currency is p dollars per unit . At a price of l/p units of foreign 
cur=ency the demand and supply of dollars is also eGual . Another point 
wo=th making h.::.re is that the supply of foreign currenc:· reflects the 
cemanc for dollars and if the major part of the dem~nd for dollars is 
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att.ribut.ed to a d..!manJ for U. S . exports th1.;.n we can say that the supply 
of foreign currency refl~cts the d~mand for U. S . exports . Similarly the 
U. S. demand for the foreign cxcha .. f>e reflects the U. S . demand for i m-
port.$ . 
S.ippose Uiat the U. S. n .... s a ::;u.'.'?J. ... s on her balc1nce of payments 
bro~£;ht on by a sur~lus on her current account with the foreign country . 
This means th~t the amount of Lorcign currency supplied to the U. S. a t 
the ?revailing exchange rate exceeds the demand for it . Thus the price 
of the forei6n cur~ency in terms of dcllars will fall , that is the foreign 
cur~ency will deprec~ate . If t.he ~rice of LoreigJ currency falls in 
r.er~s o= doll~rs then t~er~ is a t.~ndency for foreign goods to become 
cheaper relative to U. S . 5oods and this .. 1ak.;s U. S . exports relatively 
dearer abroad and U. S . imports relatively cheapl.!r at ho~e . Thus there 
will be an automatic tendency to rcstor~ equilibrium. 
The a??eal of this method of adjustment of ext1.;.rna~ disequilibriuo 
is rr.uch the same as the ~rgu~cnt for d~ylight savir.0 time, as i s pointed 
out by Fri"'dm.:in : ( 43 ' p . 17 '.)) 
Isn' c. it absurc to change the clock in ::.ummi:!r when c.xactly ... he 
saae resL-t. could be achi\;ved by havin0 each in~ivi~ual cha~ge 
his h~bits? All that is requirl.!d is that everyone decide to 
co~e to nis o=fice an hour ~arli~r, ~ave lunch an hou r earlier 
etc . But obviously it is much si~pler to chan0 e th~ clock 
t::-.a-;;. guk1.;.s all than h"'ve 1.;.ach individu ... l s~;:iardt:ely change his 
pattern of r1;.actions to the clock ev~n thou~h all want to do so . 
The s ituc.1 ti on is .._xact ly the sam1;. in thl- exct.angG t!larket . :t is 
::;;.r sim?ler to allow one pr ..:. c..! to cha.-..g,e tr:.<:.n to rely on chanaes 
in th~ multitud~ of prices that together constitute the inter~al 
pr..:.ce structure . 
In terc1s of our objections to the preser.t system, the case for flexible. 
exchanges is ~lso fairly convincing . Flexible exchanges do not d~penc 
on one national currency to work ;;.nd the problem of adj~strnent is solved 
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in t~~ for~~~;. ~xchangc murket . In additio:-i the scteme is supposed to 
solve th .... ?roblem of internation£1 liquidity bec~usc : 
. . . priv.:itc. s:> ..... culr .... tor!'l will r~.:i.1 isc that the . . . dcpr..:.cic:.tion 
(call._,c ron:r. Oil the (or..:.i~n .,;XC~._..10e t..ar.;;et in rCSl)OrlSc to c.. 
-..~ficit ii thi..! b.:il.:inc..:: oi: pc.yn.::.nts) is more th.m will be required 
i.•1 c.,1-! lon~ ::::un r.o .:h:.Li .... v..:. z.d~i.:stm"'nt: .:..-iC: tr ...... y will, th~re.:ore, 
pt..rcha.sc tlle dc.prcci<:iteJ cur::::..:.ncy ..it t.h-.! prc..s ..... nt bargaining 
;n· ..:.c'"'; th..:y wi 1 - ::hu"' ~rov ..:.c..i! t ..... rr._Jorar:y fur.cs to covt!r t~e p::::es -
cnr. J._ficit; priv~te speculat ive funds will thus meet any need 
:or liq;.:idity . (72, p . l'.:) 
Other \,rit...:.rs hav~ shown that this a.rgum.:.nr. c.tssu.nes thc:.t the :or .i!ign 
exchange market is stable . I:-i Figur<=- VIII.2 we re;_:>r oducl;! three diagrams 
from Y..:.ag..:.r to illustrate stable and unstable foreign exchange markets . 
I n pa::::ts (a) and (b) of th<.! figure we h~ve stable markets (113) in (a) if 
the dollar price of the foreign currLncy leads to excess demand for the 
foreign currency then the exchange rate will rise until equilibr ium is 
r ... d.ched . 1:1 (b) if tnere is excess supply of -i:hc f or.:!ign currency then 
i:hG exchange rate will fall until equilibrium is attainec . In case (c) , 
however, if the exchange rate is too high cXCLs:. demand will bid the 
rate even hig~er and further ~way from equilibrium. If the rate is too 
l ow t.hen excess supply will push the rate even further away from equilibri-
un . This is the c~se. ot a bac~varJ sloping supply curve which is not 
offset: by suff.:.cient: elasticity of tr.e .:.ownward ::.loping a~mand curve . 
Thus the stability of the zoreig,n exchan0 e :n ... rke't boils aown to a question 
ot the de~~nd anc supply elasticities of fo::::eign exchange . These alas -
ticiti~5 are bcsGd ulti~~tely on the elasticities of supply and demand 
for imports and exports of commodities . Let us define the different 
elasticities : 
::> pr .:..c .... per unit 
ot for~is. currency 
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Figure IX. 2 . The stability of the foreign exchange market 
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e ~lasticity with respect to price in terms of the foreign currency 
m 
o[ the foreigner ' s supply fo goods import~d into the U. S . 
ex elasticity with respect to price in dollars of U. S . supply of 
export$ to for~ign~rs 
e ulasticity with res?CCt to price in dollars of U. S . demand for 
m 
im?orts :rom foreigners 
nx elasticity with respect to price in terms of the for e ign currency 
of the foreign demana fvr U. S . exports . 
The conditions uncer which the foreign exchange market is stable are 
given in the following formula : 
~.cxCnm+nx- l)Tnm nxCem+ex+l) 
Cem+nm)Cex.,.nx) 
NO\" since each of the el~sticities is positiv~ we need only concern our -
s6lves with the numerator . If nm .,. nx is greater than one then the 
market is stable . If this is not so then we require the second half of 
the numerator to be larger in absolute. value than the first . The case 
where the demand elasticities are so small that the market is unstable 
is called the case of perver se elasticities . Yeager says that this case 
is unlikely to occur in the real world but this is a matter of contra-
ve=sy . It is argued by some that the above formula is invalid because 
th~ elasticities are based on partial derivatives rather than total 
derivativ~s . We will not pursue this controversy because it is mainly 
academic ; we are more interested in the objections of those in a posi -
tion to change the international monetary system. 
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~.:itional monetary c:iuthoritics usunlly st ress the lack of discipline 
tha ~ r.:ay occur unjer f l.:::.xib le. cxc:icrng~s . 
If central bDnkers in particular and the country in ge.ne.ral 
r.eed not worry about the. iP.ter:i<:1.tional re .. erve. position 
the most important resistance against inflation will crumble . 
( ... 6, p . 119) 
It can be suown from General de Gaulle's domestic economic policy and 
from his s9eechcs on economic affairs that he. is very preoccupied with 
the need for a stable currency and i s concerned abou-.: the " dangers of 
inflation" . Therefore it is likely that thi s argument agains t flexible. 
exch~n;es would be sympathc~ically received by him. 
There is likely to be considerable. difficulty experienced in intro-
ducing exchange rates . Countries with large r~serves would have diffi -
culty in explaining why they wanted to introduce them, and perhaps :ake 
a loss in the value of their reserves . 
Secondly their introduction would occasion large. scale movements of 
short term capita. which would cause. grei..t difficulties for the reserve 
currency (most important) countries . Harrod argues thdt flexible e.x -
changes do not solve the problem of international liquidity bec~use : 
If adverse circumstances occur then people. will expect the 
exchange rate to f~ll and thus will begin to cover their 
?Ossibl.~ losses . Bu~ how do we ~now that t:-tey will cover 
just enough to keep the raarke.t at i'i:s n~w long te.rm 
equilibrium? The proba.bil ity is that they won ' t and thus 
~he. country will continue to need reserves to main~ain 
equilibrium. (4o, p . 125) 
Fl~xible exchanges introduce uncertainty in the. international economy 
and this may discourage foreign trade and some economists therefore ad -
vacate pegging the exchange rate within wide limits . The probleo with 
coi~g this is that the prob~Jility of speculation is greatly increased . 
10.:: 
I wo~ld fdvur flexi~le uxchdnge r~-cs but my _ .... ~lina is ~hat 
t'.~ .... U1v:.1e:.ary institu .. io .. .,, .i11d b~:L.· s u.r.d tr..ickrs cond so on 
-= •• ·d · ~~~-"'~t'-;~ sol \ ou·c1 ~~ .. ·,rs.,~n 4 prc_._\..or t.l. .. \.C r'3. ... \.!.:S • .... ,..._ L.. •• c.. J\......_~ .. '""' -..... .-.CJ.'- .. iv- t"'~'~ 
ray tir..c on how -i:o m.:."c. that sys-i: .... Jl \..'ork (f ixca exchange 
rc.tus) th.:::1 on c...dvocatir-."" .... system which do.:::sn ' t seem to 
:-,ave a char.c.:! ot b;:.i.n.; accepted . C::>o, p . 226) 
B. Aa Intu~national Central Bank 
Th ... n .... xt most populr..r sc .. en.c a:-:;o:1gst economi:;ts for the r e::oro of 
the i.atcrc~tional monetary syst~m i:; -i:~e set of proposals to establish 
so~e ~ore of ~n~crnational c ... r.tr~l ban~ . Keynes in 1943 first proposed 
this and tte idea has recuiv .... d attentio~ ~y ~ar.y people over the years . 
The ~ost importan: rec ... nt .... xpon~nt of this plan is Robert Tri:fin and 
oost r~ce~t ciscu~sions t~ke nis ideas as th .... ir point of departure . 
We will thus confin~ our iscussion to thu Triffin Plan . 
We may remember that the present int .... rnational monetary system has 
been shown to have thr~e d .... fects, c:.n excessive d ... pendence on a relatively 
weak aollar , no mechanism fo r adjusting the supply of international 
liquidity in response to the need fo r f i nancing int~rnational trade, 
and involuntary for .... ::.gn l~nding . Triff in is very concerned about the 
neL.d for an a~~quat._ supply of international liquidity and he usually 
begins his d i scussions by making the case that a. shortG.ge of inter!1ation-
al li~uidity will occur if the present sy~tem is retained . We shall not 
rcvi.uw his position on l:h::.,; b"'cc..use , as mentioned .:ibove, th~re is littl..! 
G.gre~rnent on hc,.v to mc.asur'"' internatior.al liquidity or even how to d...,finc 
it . ThL.re is no doubt, howcv..:r, ~:-.at c... shortc.g.: o~ liqui-.::. ty is ;JO.ssible 
under the present systc.~ . Tr~ffin propos~s : (80) 
1 . Al 1 count.rL ... s ba:i the us~ 0f tr ..... .:.r currencies z.s reserve 
currencies . 
2 . C.:.~.:t:rl.es .-cep ::.heir nu1-gold r..!s\...rvc. .:is gold convertible de -
posits at the HlF . 
3 . The .... xchange rute values o: ~~esc. d~posits should be guaranteed . 
4 . Inter~st shoul~ be paid o:i these d~posits . 
5 . A oini~um of 20% of ~ country's r .... servc.~ should b~ held as IMF 
1.kpos it., . 
o . Tb~. L'.lF should be able to chan6e the sup,;:>ly of int.ernational 
liquidity by l-.:1ding and O?en mar.< ... t operation . Limits on the powers 
of the I~IF in t.his re&arc sl:'.oul ~e establ is r.e.: . 
7 . The lending of the D1F oould go to finance economic development 
of th~ developing countries . 
b . The replacement o~ a multi- centered system by a centralized 
Wor::..d Ban'.' would !_)revent ha r:::iful shifts of short term capital or "hot 
money" be'l:we~n center s end so tcok'- ouch prc.ssur .... off the dollar . 
The benefits of the Triffin Plan have been surmnarized by Altman : (1) 
1 . The world would at long last have a worl~ currency beyond 
question in quality, elastic in qu~ntity, responsiv~ tothe needs of wor ld 
trade, a:ld .:.ssu'-d o~ 'l:h~ basis of world n .... ~cs rath~r than bold t.ech-
nology or nation~l policy . 
2 . ~~e special constraint.s placed on the domestic ~cono~ic 
pol icies of t~e ~~y currency countries would be lifted . 
~ . Holc~rs of key cL~renc~~s w0~l~l:>.! a~le to exchange them for re -
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serves that are guaranteed in quality and yield interest . 
Triffin's plan has been critici~ed on ma~y fronts, however . The 
plan p rovided a r emedy for the excessive dependence of the present sys -
t~m on the doll&r and its lack of involuntary foreign lending because 
his plan contains no mechanism to ensure that countries will correct 
pay~ents imbalances. Another argument against the Triffin Plan that 
would be liable to ap?eal to de Gaulle is the fact that it advoca~es the 
establishment of a federalist international institu~ion . We know from 
our previous study that the General is opposed to such institutions on 
principle . 
Also, the creation of a world central bank on the lines suggested 
by Triff in assumes the problem away . This is because the problems of 
~he international economy arise because there is no central authority in 
it . The creation of such a central authority solves the problems be -
cause it reduces the internationai authority to a single domestic economy. 
Ho~ever the nation states of the world have indicated their unwillingness 
to submit ~o any central authority and until they do so some other scheme 
oust be follmved to solve the problems of the present international 
nonetary system . 
C. St r engthening the Present Gold Exchange 
Standard 
In this section of the thesis we will examine the proposals for 
strengtheni ng the present system o~ fu~ctionalist lines . The proposals 
of B~rnstein, Zolotas, Posthuma, Maudling, and Roosa all fall in this 
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c=t~vory . These paople r~prcsent t:ha opinion of most ne:.tional govern-
mer.ts and monetc:..ry authorities . Ti1ey believe t~e:.t the international 
rr.or.c~;;.ry sysc.::m mt:st re.L.c..i:l "two s.:ron6 surviving attributes of the 
Gold St:.:indard o.: carli~r eras", nam.;ly, "a fixed _int< must be pre-
scrv.::d with gold and at least one national currency • .. and all leading 
co1.rntri.<!s must: meintain [ix.:!d rates of exchanve. within narrow P'='r -
r:iis.sible bands around the declared par value . • . • " This statement would 
no~ be challen6ed by either ~he F~cnch or Triff in but in his next state-
mer.: Roosa s=-.a.,:s where he departs from t~<:;m : (77) 
Tn(.!. adjustment process towards balance oi payments equilibriu~ • .• 
reqt:ires c~angc and adaptation by both the deficit and the SLr-
-plus countries and th.: t .:'.".e process requires, increasingly, the 
ex.ercis..; of positive judgem ... nt etnd action by gov~n.ments .. . on 
the basis of extensive cooperation and joint analysis of many 
interrelated probl~ms . 
Thus Roosa rej~cts any pla~ for cst~blishing a wachanism :or ensuring 
automatic adJu:stme.nt of balance of payments dise~uilibrium such as the 
gold bullion standard proposed by the French, and he rejects any federal -
ist solLtion s~ch as a world central bank which is not based on volun-
tary cooper~tion and confrontation. 
After the run o~ the dollar in 1960 ra?id agreement was reached by 
mon~tary authorities and national ~overnments that strengthening of the 
present system was neede:;d . In 1961, E. M. Bernstein pro:_)osed his first 
plan to the U. S . Congress subco::nmittee on international ?ayments for 
strengthening the present system. (5) 
1 . The 1~1F should issue debentures to the surplus countries and 
lend these funds to the deficit cour.tries under ~ simple procedure . 
207 
The. n.:F WuUl~ Sl.!-11 ~-.:.bc.ntur-i.;s t.J .:h\! s.:rplus countries ;:::-id b1.; paid in 
tl'.cir curr .... :-icy . T!"l~n th .... .:._f icit countr.:.es wvu.1.c. bor:-ow these currc:.ncies 
frun -.:he H:F . Inter..::st wou::.c be pa.:.d a:-,d th.:: Ol:!bentures wou le be r..::. -
1 . A Reserve Settlement Account of t:hc I.HF coulc bl?. est:ablishec 
3 . :nstc..id of issi.:ir.g C(..ber.tu!:"es a syst"'"m o: stand - by credits col..ld 
be:. ._.::; ... ~ol is=-.i..c . 
'i'~.e :::.·W ql..o-.: .... s of 1.. .... cl, cot.i'.try should b-.. re0 ci:-ded as working 
r..;:;..:;.n:e:s unG shou.ld be pay ... .;l..,. on demand . 
5 . Wr.e:i cou;;.tri.::s drciw there: shol..ld be no 1 imitation on the cur-
r .... ncies in which th..::y draw. 
In 196: some. o.: -;:hese proposals were establbhea . A system of stand - by 
cr~ ... it:s was set up cal led thl:! Genera 1 Agre~mcnts to Borr ow (GAB) . Also 
no restrictiuns \..'ere pla~1..d or, which currencies borrowers could draw 
f r om the Fund wtcn making use of their quota . 
:::n 1961 th~re was a re.valuation of the Dectschmark in Ma r ch. . As a 
r<?.s..il t oz this t:.c:r'-! was a mov~mcnt of short term speculat ive capital , 
11 :-.ot money" , to Germany to speculate on the poss ibi 1 ity of a future 
reval~atio:-i or sim?lY to h~dgc against it . As a result: oz this the pr~ ­
mium on the mark rose substantially in New York to further encourage a 
ncv .... mc.nt from collars into marks . In ord\!r to prevent this f r on becoming 
~xcessive th~ U. S . Tr~asury borrowed Deutschr.: .... rks !:ron the German 
Bun::: ..... sbar.:..... ar.d sold t:her:i on t:h1... N<:.w York :: or1..ign exch<lng~ r::ar~<:!t . This 
redc.ced the prcm:. m o:i the ~E<r • ..; a:-.d r .... duccc the doll.:.r outflow . As a 
:...Ob 
~-0.sult of t:;.is ::.gree~..:nt was hasten..:d 0.1 th ... "GroL;_) of Ten" credit ar -
range~e~t by which th0. C-~~ral banks of the ten leading industrial coun-
tr.:.. .... ::; (c.n.:i l.:t~r Swi.t.t ... rlan<.) woulJ !end t~eir curr..:ncies to each other 
::o m.:..tigc. t.~ th0. cl:. fee ts of movcm .... nt.s o.1.' "l-.ot money" . ThL. operation by 
t:ne U. S . Treasury also ::;tartc1.. a n.:;w er<.1 in th~ir poJ.icil!s . For the 
first. tim ... <:hey l·~d int:.:!rv..:ned in the .... oreign exct,ange rr.arket and this 
became a p~rt of ~cc..:pted policy . Yncy began to hold as reserves small 
bala;ices of t:oreign c .. rrenci.z.s for this purj>osc . 
~he y..:ar 19ol al::;o is o .... ~or~ble in the:: for the fir~t time the leac -
i~g industri~l coun<:ries began to s~udy togl.!th .... r the problem on the inter -
~ational mon1,,;.tury syst. ... ~ . A comnittee oz the Groc~ of Tan was ..:stab -
By the end o= 1966 
five years o~ ~egotiations o~ five ~oints zccorcin6 t:o Roosa : (77) 
1. So:::-.e n.:;w res"'rve u~.:..t or dr<:.wing facilities wust b..: est ... biished 
T'"te ~rincipl <! c:ioi.ce l.:..es bet1, .. :~en th1,,;. crec.::io:1 o: addi<:ional 
c.rawing fi:.c i. i. i<: _ .... s o.::: a ~. uas i -autor.1~ tic na tu::-e in the IMF 
and the cr~-tion of a reb~rv~ ~ss"'t in the form usually referred 
to as a res(;.rve uni.:c, thr0ugh tr.e (.:<Chang~ of claims bi:::. tween 
a r~~~rvc cr~a~in; institu~ion and the countri~s to which <:he 
newly cr~atec reserves are initially di~tributed . 
2 . !he ~CServe SjS~ew ~U~t not c~pcnc en the b~lance Of payrnenL: S 
sit~ation of ~~y ~ountry . 
3 . The. rc.:>crve 5yst.~u~ mL!:it not be.. lin:-<e.d to dcvelopmant aid . 
~ . T~e ~~s~rve systeo ~ust op~rat~ through th~ :~1F and noL soma 
other i~~ernational instit:ution . 
5 . The reserve system must be open :or use by all countries that 
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By t.h1.:. en .... 1.h. l 9c6, t.k Joll ... ::.- was sc1..mingly sr. ronger thoug,n r.hr:.re 
wns a pcrs :. .;;r.~nt CJ.nc subst ... ntial Cc.o?ital inflo•" :':ro,n c:.broad which raight 
be ....ittribut'-ct r.o involun1..ary forcig'1 ll;.ncia., . In ~ddition th~re Was a 
ce.c-:..:-.-.:. .:.n tot.:!l world :---serv1.:s during 19o5 in s?it~ of r. str ong dG:nunc 
fo r the:~ . ':'~--- o:-:.ly incrl.!a.:ie t!-,~t too.:e plc;.c._ in t~L. rese:ve:; o: th.::. world 
.:it t°'.'.e -.:ir.:i"- WdS in th-.:. form of incree.s~d us.:. o:: t'b.e. IY'.F ... nd t h is source 
coLl~ not be ex?~ctcd ~o incr~"'se i~c~_init~ly . As a result of t~is 
ond this bo:-1.: fruit in tne 1957 prcposdls . 
Tn1..se. propos~ls bear~ s1..rik.:..
0 
rcsernol&ncc to the Roosa Plan (77) 
Rooscl re.alizc.d t hnt the two alternc.tiv~s o;:i1..n at the end of 1960 were 
the creation of sor:1c form o=: CRU a:1d tr.c extcr.si0n of dr ... wi ng rights of 
This ~muunts to the distinction betwe.l.!n the creation of r::oney 
by odned as s~ts like currency or by credir. . Roos& favored the c r eation 
of an owr.ed asset or CRU b~c ... usc i: i.:; u:o r <! f .::.xible . If exr.cnd""d DIF 
ere.cir. facilir.ies ~re r.o be providca tnen what means is there of ensuring 
thar. tte I~~ ~.:.-1 tav~ enoLbh of th~ requir~a currancy? Tha weakness of 
the CRU s c hem"' as ?roposed bj the Franch is that it was .:i.::d to g old and 
had no aLtoma~ic m~chanism to discipline co~ntries in exter nal dis -
~qu::.1 .:.br:.Ln i= the ~old l:.~k was nor. ma.:.ntaincd . Roosa suggests the 
" lic'.i:::~d groL? ap?roach" as a way out of t:-. .:.s difficulr.y . (77) 
.1. . The Ct\.L' must only ~e bclcKed by leaC:ing Cl: rr1.. nc::.'-s to ensure ac -
2. L1..adi:-:.g countrit?.s c .. -..3t a0 r~a to accern CRU' s up to a certain 
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·~101C..:.:1g lie.it" .::t 2boi.!-:.: t:u:c. .... l:im\.!S tL .... &::wt.:nt w:-• .:..ch i s is,,,ucd to them . 
try . 
3 . The CRU nu~t b~ crL ... tcd by t~'- IMF and availabl~ to ~ny coun -
I .... . Ti«- currency b<Jck ing of I.he c.rn shot!ld hc.v._ it:. va::.ue f ixE::.d i:i 
terms o: go.i.d . 
5 . The CRU's shoula be distribut~d according to t~e size of each 
Thi.s IJlun , however, is prc.occupi~d with the probh:r.. of i:-. t~rnC<tion-
... 1 ::.i'-!uidity . It is a me thod of cr"-ating a nc.w world money whose supply 
c~n be reg lated to ensure an adequate amoLnt of r~serv~s, in the inter-
n&t~onMl mon~tary system . ~0~~vcr the prc~len of international liquidity 
is a distribution problem c.s weli .'.lS a:1 aggre 0 ate problem. The injec -
t..:.or. of new i;it.crnational liquidity i:-.to the: inte:-n ... tional monetary sys -
te:n is quite likely, in Roosa ' s sche:x:c of ::r.i.n0 s , to fl c,w to countries 
wh:ch al ready pos~css surplus reserves . Th~s ~~y not benefit the deficit 
coLntr.~s at all . 
The Roosa pl~n cont~ins no provisions for solving the adjustment 
probl~~, perhaps the most s~riot.:s defect of t~e ~=~s"-nt in~ernational 
~onet&ry system. There will still be no disci~li~ary device to ensurl.! 
that c~ficit key currencies will b~l~nc~ th~ir p~y~ents in the long run 
withoL~ resorting to controls o: trdde and capital ~ove~ents or varying 
t.hc exchan.;c rate . Th1:..rc will still be no inc~ntiv.:. for surplus countries 
to reduc.:. th~ir s~rplus a~d for countries already undergoing dcflction 
-co d.:..fl.::te :i.;:--.::·1cr. Tr.c ir:"t<.!rnational rco,1.::.tc.ry syst..;m will continue to 
rely on cor.fic\;.nC(! .:.n t::c st .. bi::.ity of th~ U. S . doll ... r ana involuntary 
foreign 11::ncing will ;nobnb::..y cont.:.:iue . 
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X. THE DEC::.SIO~ TO CO:\TlOL FO.EIGN DIRECT DVSSTMENT 
I~ FRA~CL 
A. The Issue 
fc;.ir of foreign t ake-overs of domestic 1.;ntcrprises has existed for 
a 1 ~g time. In ? ranee it hos been widely criticiLed as economic 
c.olvP.iL""tion a:'.C it is ra-..icn tl'.c s<:nc sc.1tim .... nt: as that w:iich l~d Lenin 
( o5J to cJ1l iraper~alism the highest form of ca.pitalism. A n .... w di -
ir.ens ion was ... dded, howeve:.·, by General oe G<.ul le in his Press Conference 
of ~cbrLary 4 , 1965 . ~he General blaccs the ;resent international mone -
t:c:ry sy .. tem Eor allo-;,;ing ;:h._ c ... pi;:al c.xpor ti:lg countries chie:ly the 
U. K. and U. S . to "ir.deb ... tne::r.::;c1ves abroac at no cost" . This, he main-
tclincc , rcsLlt"'d fo r certain countries in " an expropriat.:.on of their 
bus inc.ss E irm::;'' . This occurs beC"-LSe the systeo leads ;:o involun;:ary 
r: orcign i .... nd.:.ng; . 
Und .... r the Go: ... Exchan0 c Stnndard rc::;~rves are kcp~ in gold , U. S . 
collars or British poui:.ds . If th.:! U. S . ru .. s a. deficit in her balance of 
pay ....... n;:s, the .. xcess s .... pply of dollars is absorbed by C .... ntral Bc.nks , 
?~rt~cular:y in w .... stern ELrop.... . Ir: these b~n~s cannot transform tha::;e 
mon~tary claims in~o real as~ets, spec:fically gold, without endangering 
th~ monetary system , they are forced to lend involuntarily to the U. S . 
Tnis is th~ situation kno\..:n as involuntary for .. ign lending . Such an ex-
c~ss su~)ly of dollars (U . S . bal~nc~ of puywents dc::icit) can be ac-
cumul2te.d in cany dif:':ercnt ways . Th.:: u. S. usu.?.lly has a large su r plus 
on cLrrer.t accoLnt in hc.r b ... :;.~ncc of p<.ya.cnts (:$6 bill i on) . The deficit 
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cir ........ t .:.nv..!::.tr.:ent ~bro~d . Tn.t:s di:.-ect invest ....... nt .:;broad is seen as a 
prime cause o~ L~C U. S. deficit ~·~ this is one reason why the question 
th..! iat..!rnnt.:.o:-. .:.1 monct~:-y ..,yst..:.::1 . This \..'as th ... ap;.1roac'.1 takl;:1 by dl! 
Guullc in his 19o5 Pr .... ss Conf..!r..!nC~ -
::owever, th..! i:itC!rn., tional m0n..!t<:.ry eris is wa.s only one dimension 
o: ;:!' ..... co::c.::-oversy abo.it U. S. dir.;ct .:.nv~st ... ..:.nt in Franc... . Johnstone 
( 59) J~tes a n1...w French policy on for~ign investment :ro:n 1963 . In 
Augu::.t -Scpt~mber subsia.:.~ri~s of G1...nerul Motors and Remington Rand both 
<:. .. :Lounc..!ci t:--.(! 1.:.ying off of s.:.vc:::-co.l hur.cr.::o 2rencn workers for rc.::.sons 
of r~~io!"la:!.i:zc.t:.o.-i i ::1 p:::- ... ;::icor..tt.io:1 Lor .. n.;... co.:i ... oa r:i;:rket . There wc.s a 
)Uhlic outcry and th..! Minister for Indu~try issued a public denunciation 
ca::.1.:.n0 th~ ~ctions irr~sponsible b1...cc:ius1... t'.1.L:y do not "honor the social 
contr~ct linkin~ a r:.nz.nc i~lly pow'-rful enter9rise to the labor it 
em?loys" . H.ancefortr. foreign conL:olled companies were r.:.quired to con-
su:t wit'.1 af~ect1...C ministries in P~ris b'-fore dismissing r'-dundant em-
ployees . In e~rly 1963 C~rysier ar.no~r.ced th~t it had ~ncreased its 
holdings of Sioca to beco~.e th'"' .::r:fective co'1trollinJ voice in the com-
pai1y' s c.ffairs . S~mca is the fiftn larbest tirm in France and again 
th~re ~as ~n outcry but the deal w~nt through . In 190~, however , th.:.re 
was evidence of a new gov\C..rnr.i ... nt po:icy . Tte gove:-nrae:1t rejected aa 
<:.:.-'plication by General Electric to supp:.y short term capita: to ~1achines 
3ull, t~ ... nat:on's only Jo~es~.:.cally contro:1 ... d computer firm in return 
Lor co:·..-crol o ... th..:. conp .. .. y . .Jo:rns_o:i.e points out that 1::,.is refusal 
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" stc:nr.· ..!~ f:.-0 .. 1 t'.-.c :.:,o,·..;rnu..:!nt ' s unwillinzn..:::;.s to ..,:...v..:. to i.1 toreign investor 
the cont:.-olling voic .... in th~ only ~ruly nctio~~l conp~ny in c..n industry 
.... sse:: ... i.:al to r.h.! nution's d-.!fens1.-" (59, p.25 ) . This W..LS the appli-
(59 , p . 27) 
F!::;:.nc-- is t:ot hostile to forl.!i_,01 investr.i~.Lts: however c. limita -
~i >~ a?9 .... ar::; d...:.sir~ble i, pr~ct~c~. Fr~nc~ u01.-s not wish that 
th ... in1......:stry of ~ pcrticu ... c:.r- r1..:t,ion, or ..i particular oranch of 
injJstry b1... dooin~ ....... d by _oruign c~pital, ~or 1.-x~nple, A-erican . 
:;.-.;. .. .: ... t::tl.! ~ov-::rnment fc..vors a co:-.-::~·ol i,-.,:c .. i,•oulc prevent the 
-....;ve:opr.1eni: o.: sue •• monopolies, thi::. being tru"" not only fo r 
,~~:.-ic~n capi_al bL: for ~11 ~orei~n c-pital 1...xcLpL that of the 
Six ::or whic.1 t:h~rc .... :xi~ts co::.?lCtG fre .... do::n of i.aov .... rracnt . 
!or pursuing this ?Olicy th~ Gdullist gov~r~ment has bee~ severely 
criticizLd by their political o~pon~nts in Fr..incc . They are alleged 
' If - I h • 1 d 1 .J h h • to oe sort' on t ~ issue an Johnstone conc~u..:..e::; t u.t t ere is a 
"r .... al an .. continuing ir.t.:!rest of th. .... Fr...:.nch gov-..:rnII:ent in ai:tracting 
U. S . capit..il to ce.rta.i.n inaLstries ... r.d to ur.d'-'rc.!v..:.lope.d are.as of France" 
( 59, p . 26) . ~h~n t~c economy has a consistent surplus in t he balance 
of ?~Y~'-'nts th~n the cangcr thu~ it wi:~ be a burden to s-..:rvice the 
:orei~n debt ~cquir~d by f or~ign inv~stment in France is sl:'..ght . The 
da~ge::s of loss of national independ.:!nce can be controlled by the 
proc~ssi~6 of a?plic~tions for foreign dir~ct investm~nt and the only 
way ~o f:gh~ :nvoluntary ~o::ei0 n lending is to pressure the U. S . and 
other countries to rcfor~ the international monetary system . This , in 
ge.1er ... l, has b ........ n t:h~ policy to low'-'d by the. French government . 
' 
-Kulski (o3, p . 407) mentions c;wo prominent Frenchmen who warned 
ag.::.inst: the "colonizatio:-i of Fr~nce by Ar:: ... ::ican c .. pital : (l) tl".e form.?.r 
Pr .... s:.c~nt of E ... :ar.om, Etienne Hirsch and (2) Fr ... nco.:.s ~:itt ... rand . Both 
~hes~ rr.c;.n are iraplacabl~ ~nemics of de Gaulle . 
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~ . The Historical Setting 
Bci:wccn 1957 c;,.nd 1900, U. S . tot.il as::.c..ts and investment abro.s.d have 
doub~~d, and in 1966, they ~re ~x?ected to total $112 billion . (See 
Table X. l . ) 7hc largest portion of U. S. assets and investment abroad 
is nade by the private sec~or, ~nd it is in this portion that the wos~ 
sign~ficant chanses have occ~rr~d . U. S. Jrivate investment and asse~s 
~broad have risen by al~ost 1203 si.ce 1957 ($81 billion) , while gover n -
rr.ent assc-.:s and investm'-nts arr:ountcd to $25 billion. (See Table X. l . ) 
The dist::ibution of U. S . j_)rivate investment abroad between long term 
and short tc..rm projects hes changed significantly since 1957 . 
The percentcg;e of private investm.:.nt spcr:t on long term projects 
was 923 ~n 1957 and had fa~l~n slig~tly to b83 in 1965 (~71 billion) . 
This probably can be explain~d by the need for greater liquidity abroad 
to finance '-~)G.nded trade and investments and to hedge against an un-
steble im:er:-iatio::al r.:.o::-.e.:a r y system. The perc.::.ntage of U. S. private 
:!.ong te::-m i::westrnent abroad that is "d~rect", as O?posed to "portfolio" , 
also ~ell slightly during the period 1957 - 65 from 743 to 703 to $~9 
billion. In fact the " direcL:" percentage was about 70% from 1960 
throu0 r. 1965. 
7hese fi0 urcs are from the U.S . c.epartmt.!nt of Comrn .... rce Survey of 
Current Busi:1ess . Tht.!y d~fin~ direct investments as investments in 
:oreign business enterprises (chiefly branches and subsidiaries of 
dou..estic firms) in which a U. S . resid<:;.nt or orgc::nizatio:-i owned a 25~ 
L~t~~~sL: . Layton (6~, p . 2 ) s~ys tha~ th~se figures underestimate the 
Tabl•• X. l. u.s. fl sc l. .s and ill\'CS1: tri\!11 L r1J,roa1l , dist.:ributed bE:.thCCll long Lenn and ~;l10rl. LcrL1 :1s .c·t.- , 
by thC' g OV\! l"l llHCll l. a wJ p riv:11:(~ sector for 1 950 , 57 ' ;1 n<l 1960 - 6'..>a (111il 1 io11s of dol la1.. ) ------- ----
Type ) e··r 
1950 1957 1 %0 ) 961 1962 l 9G3 l 9GL1 1 965 
To Lal 31539 511237 71497 7 50111 00343 88301 9911 9 106174 
Pri\·~1 Le 19004 36814 50393 55.:>13 G0025 66513 7 5Q:rn 81051 
L ong term 17118$ 33632 45110 49003 52732 58330 6LI 91 9 70...,98 
!Jirect 117 88 2S238 32778 / L16Gl1 37226 L10GS6 4Lt38G 119328 
f\.J 
Shor:t L~nn 1516 318? LI 983 6510 7293 8183 1 0901 1 0153 ....... V1 
u.s . govt . cn:diLs , 1/ '..>35 1741 8 21104 19'.JOl 20318 ;il]Hk 23299 25123 
clait•ts 
--
8 Source : ( %, 99 , 100, 1 01 , ] 02' 1 03 > ) 011 , 1 05) 
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t:.ot .i !)1..:cause t:~ere <.re t:1nny sue'!:'. inv .... stmcnts in which t.hc U . S . share is 
:!.es::; than 25;~ and al.:.o thnt "valu~-::.ions on fixed ~s.,ets ~re rreqL\.!ntly on 
$1 . 7 biL.io.1 in l 9o2 w;1ich wa"' 70~~ ov'-;:- th..: Dl!p~rt:.:.1..:.nt o~ Cor:r.r::erce 
re5ular comprehc .. sive surve:.y o ... dir~ct invcstc. .. nt, :;.owe will use them 
for our stuoy ( 98 , 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, .l05) 
In Ta.bl\! X. 2 we have. a regional brca, ... down of the v ..... lue of U. S . 
The strik~n6 L ..... ct ..... bout this table is the 
1~57 and 19c5 . In 19~7, E~ropc ~ccounr:ec :or ~~oLt 16% of U. S. direct 
priv"'"te inv1..:stme:1t whi.le .:..n 1965, th.:. .,.>d"Cl!nt.agc h .. d aL..ost doublL:d (283) . 
Th~ valL..:. oz ~ . S . direct inv~stment in Europe w .. s $14 billion in 1965 . 
Withi~ ~his great increase, th~ share of the 2~C countries rose from 
abv~t 4~~ to 45%, ($0 bil_ion in 1965) . It ~s i~t .... r~sti~g to note th~t 
within the E~C cou~t:.ries Germany ' s parcenta~e of rlirect ;riv~te invest -
nent increas'-d from 323 in 1957 to 3b3 in 1965 (~2 . 4 b : 11:on) . This in-
creuse was due to a fall in the share of France from 293 to 25% ($1 . 6 
billion) ~nd the ~~thc.rlands from l~~ to 11% ($0 . 7 billion) . The fall 
in the ~~=-~r.ch shar.;: may be dLe to -cwo tact:. ors , the unpopular _;_ty o;: Gen-
era_ de G~ull~'s international ~co~omic policy and th~ rr.~asures t~ken 
by :.is 5overn.::er.t to 1 imit the .;:xpansion or u . ~ - inv~stc:i~nt in certain 
sectors . 
To 0 ai'1 some p..!rsp~ctiv..!, !1.owavcr, when ar6L:aents about the loss of 
natio~al i~d'-~~~d~nc~ du~ ~o A~8r:ca~ i~v~stmc~t ar~ heard , it should be 
'l'etl>l(' x. 2 . ll. s . tljreC'l i11vc:sL1ncnl :1hro:1d for 1950 , 1957 a 11d 1 %0-1 965 ( $ 10 i.11 io I )a 
----
Typ~ Yl <' r 
1950 1957 1%0 1 9( ] ] 962 1 963 l %11 1%5 
- --- -
\~ orlc1 117 8fi 25238 32778 311667 37'i'J(, £10686 L1/1~:SG 493/8 
Cn 11ada 3~79 8332 11198 11 602 J2U3 l3 0L1t1 137% 15223 
Ot 1 .;r wcs Le t 11 
hc 111isphcrc '-157 6 86611 9/1 l 9L09 94711 9891 1020:. 1 0836 
Euror,c 17 33 3993 6(1fil 77 L1 '/ 8930 103'10 1 2J.09 ] 3985 
EEC 637 1 ~55 26'14 31 011 372'/ L1 L190 5426 6304 
DLl,U 69 156 /31 2 62 286 35 6 L155 596 
I ' 
Frei nee 217 457 7111 860 ) 030 1211 0 111 116 1609 
I-' 
-...J 
GL· t 11any 201• L1 96 1006 1182 1476 17&0 2080 24~1 
1 ti 1 y 63 213 381.1 4 91 65~1 668 850 9f 2 
Nc-L h<;,r l ancls 811 2 13 283 3 90 3/6 4116 593 686 
U. K. 8117 1899 3 2J J 35 511 382LI 4172 45117 5123 
OLhc r I :11 rope 2119 5119 806 l OSL1 l 3 8LI 167 8 2136 2558 
A!;i;i 1001 nss 2291 21177 2500 2793 3112 3569 
Africa 287 711 925 1 0611 1 271 111 26 1685 1 918 
Occ.rn i <t 256 652 9911 11 08 1271 111(,0 1593 1813 
aSourcc : ( 98 , 99 , 100 , 1 01, 102' 103, 1011' 10') ) 
Tnl.>lc X.3 . u. s. dir .... cl illVCS LHICll L in the EEC from ] 959 t o l 965a (111 i.l lions o[ doll; .. 1._) 
---
1 c r 
I ndu.try 
1 959 1960 1 961 1 962 1 963 1 964 l 9G5 
---
Pc Lro)cum 732 827 ( 31%) 9116 1 0~.3 1330 1 ~23 162!1 
Mnnufac t urinr; 11 35 1 436 ( 5 11'/~) 1G59 2063 2~28 3139 37/S 
Public u til Hies 28 29 (l k ) 29 31 34 L~S 4 6 
Trnde 209 254 ( 1010) 799 361 li38 528 Ci60 "-' 
I-' 
(fl 
Other 91 90 ( ,, '") 99 1 2/t 15 0 178 233 
T<>LH 1 = 100% 261i/1 3104 372/ L1 l190 51126 63011 
a 
( 9.'.) ) Sour C(.. : 99, 100, 1 OJ I 1 OJ , 1 03 ) 1 OL1 ) 1 05) 
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r.ot-.oj t~1at U. S . i.w...:;:;L.::.ent in C.:: r., • .:!c. ($15 billivn in 1965) co .. tinues to 
b..:: ;::-.!~1 '-.;r l.!..ich yl.!.:lr t1un th.::tt i.1 Eur op.::. al thoue;h Can::id.::t has a popu -
l:.i-::i0:1 of 0.~ly 20 million w.1ih:. Wcsturn Eu:o.h:. h.::.s cJ. pop ... lation of ov1.;r 
~00 ~illion . Ho~(:V~r, thl...! s iz~ o: tv~~l dir .... ct for~ign invc:;tment is 
In Table X. 3 
~·e ,,_v.._ a br1..-kdown of th<::. U. S . dir~ci:. i:.vesr.m .... nt in _:te EZC . The 
petroll...!u:n inaust::-y is a trc.d.l.~ional placl...! for U. S . di r l...!ct: investment to 
go, out in the ?~riod 1957 - 1905 its share fell f r om 313 ~o 35%. The 
industry whos~ s~~re : ncrl...!db3d fro= 5~3 to 60~ in 19o5 , to re&c~ an esti-
mated ~3 . 7 billio1 i n 1J65 . T:".is trend w~s ..;V1..n r;,0re narked in FrancG 
were pctrol~um ' s :>L'.c..re ae.c.ineC. f::-om 32% in 1957 to 173 .:.n 1965 and rnanu -
fac~Lrin; in .... ~stry incrl...!as1..d it:; sta: .... from 53~ to 0 03 reaching an esti-
~ar.~d $1 . 1 bill i on in 1900 . These =igures a re &iv .... n i n 7~ble X . ~ . 
~~e ~nflcw of u.S. priv~~e ion~ te r n airecc i nvestmen t has enabled 
the :,·astern El!rop.::.ans to i ncre.co.:k. ~:te.ir reserves anc to ex?ort c-pital . 
(U . ~ . off :cial:; h~ve ~aint.::tine~ that the y have ex?orted too little cap:tal 
ar.d acCUQ~lutl...!d exc~~s r~s~rves . ) Thi.! French balance on cur rent account 
(goods, se.r,:ces anc tr&nsf~r Jaymcnts) ave.=agcs about $0 . 5 billion per 
y~~r in su~plus fron 19o2 to 1965, though ther .... was a s~ull deficit i~ 
190!.. . (S.::.~ Table .LS . ) On c2pi1:.:.l accoLn: , :-1c.t .::. on-l ca?ital :lows a :-~ 
con~ister..tly L: ac.:icit with a s!'.-rp rise to $0 . 9 billion in 1905 . T~. is 
o-c _ : lo~., Wu5 b.::tlancca by a foreign capital inflow in 1963 and 1964 , though 
nol: in .~o2 or 1 965 . ~See ~~me t~blc . ) The sh- re of private capital i n 
Tnblc )..,L1 , U. S. direct invc~d111cnt in F1.:1ncc fru111 l'l'.i7 to 19G5a(rnil1ions of cloll;irs) 
Industry Ye; r ---- ------
1950 1 %CJ 1 9Li 1 19G' 1963 1964 J 965 
Pc trol c·rnn } 117 (3;.i'}') 179 201 723 2L1/1 257 ?61 286 281 
Manuf ac:tu r i11g ;1113 ( S3'/o) 270 3311 L102 L1GO 582 761i 909 1076 N 
"'' 
Puul ic utilil ies 6 ( lt) 10 10 10 ] 0 10 11 22 11.i 
0 
Tl..id!.! 22 ( ">'t.i) 26 61 76 9? 122 158 1711 178 
OL11cr 32 ( 9%) 35 18 21 25 26 38 46 50 
ToL<1l 45/ ?Lil 860 1030 1 '.1.110 111/10 1609 
a Source : ( 98 , 99, 100, 101 , ] 02 ' 103, 10'1 , 105) 
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T~bl..! X. 5 . fo'r..,:'...:::i b.::iL ... nc .. ..,:: pay .. 1..;r.ts fro ... l lj62 to l 965a (mill ions of 
doll~rs) 
1 t..!.::: Yec:r 
: 9o2 l .., 
- "' .... .J 
19c-. : ~65 
B.,, ~ - ~' •'-'- 0"1 CU':"?:"~r\~ ac-.;..:>u:'..t 862 !,~2 - 102 7 61 
N-..tL :onc..l cup i tn l f 101,..rs - 368 - 1 o~ - 164 - 892 
?r Vd-::_\,;,.. - 1bo - 114 - 113 - 667 
--iCl.c ~cr~.L - oL~ 59 - 76 -:'..75 
Di..r~ct - 49 9" - ..,. - 132 - 189 
?o: __ oli.o - 2 1 1 .. _o 78 59 
Sh .... ~:~ t..;rr.i - :~ c:, - 113 - J7 - 492 
OLf ic.:.'-1 - 100 - 149 - 51 - 225 
Fvr~ ig:n Cup ital flow::; - u4 - "S 769 622 
?r.:.v~tG 529 5o7 s:3 083 
!..ong ter-:::i 460 ~57 603 5- . .:.o 
D.::.r~c _ '..:51 :.. : 2 232 'i""'7 - .) . 
?ortfo_ io b24 , :, 0 137 115 
Sh.:irt t .... r~1 o:. :2 230 152 
Cf!: .:.ci2: _59.:, - '."c 9l - 6..,. - vo 
R1.;.s ... ::-Yes pur-chascs - o~ u - o-+3 - 763 - 920 
Co:-.tr"l au th.or i·c i'-'~ - 714 - 8!.,.5 - 782 - 666 
C on.u .... r c ia 1 t ... nks bi':S 202 19 - 254 
.1.:.rr0rs anc. omissions 196 176 260 429 
c:.Source : (35) 
t'r ..e r .... ti..onnl cc.pital outflow slight.ly incr<ao.s .... d in impon .. c:nc e over the 
p~r iod from 72% in 1962 to 753 in l9o5 ($0 . 7 bil~ion) . The c omponents 
of this outflow arc: quit.:! ~rrc:tic, however, Lnlik.:; those of the for .... ign 
caj_)ita l flow . Tt1..; r.atio:-• .:11 c.::.pit .. l outflow d .... clL1ed f r om 1962 t:trough 
190..,. and then jumped by 1007~ .::.n l 9o5 . This w.:ts du;; to a 6003 jump in 
r:!-. .a :ni..vat.:! r.a::ion~l c ... _:>itnl o...:tflc>1 to $0 . 7 bi.11:.on . :'r . ..!. official po:--
tio~ .::> .... i:he nc.ttional capitc._ outflcw <::::.o incr ....... sed signi: icantly (!.00%) . 
The inc_·ease in the p r ivate nution...;l c-..pital outflow was due to an 
L.c::-... "'s'- in sho::-t -.:..:::.::-.., inv1..s:::r.en.: ..iorocic. o: 1600~ .... o $0 . 2 bi l lio:-t 1,.:hich 
may h~v~ been occ~s:.on~d by the ~ •. ~i -in_lc.tion~ry monetary policy intro-
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duc...:...i by the .;ov""rn:::-. .!nt at th.:; ...:.:1..1 o: 1964 . Fri:;nch private direct in-
v.:..:;t ... ant: c:.::>rocd is only slowly rising in i.::~ort:a:-:ce, by about $50 mill ion 
Tr. -.. for1...igr. ccpit<..l inflo1'-1 jL .... _)el. 700~~ fro:n 19o2 to 1965, to a.l:nost 
$0. 7 :,::..1::. .:.oi1. All t:hi.; can.I.! :rou.. privc.ic~ sourcGs . Short terr:; :orei~n 
inv~s:~G~~ in Fr&nce is very smal~ (~0 . 2 billion) but is 6row.:.~g r~lative ­
ly r&pidly, if the 19o5 reduction is ascribed to the deflationary do~estic 
po::.ic~ .... s . Jor~isn dirLct inv1...stmcnt in Franc~ rema~ned almost constant 
($0.:s billion) rrorn 1962 to 19o5, althoug~ t~e govl.rnmLnt limited its 
sco'._)~ . In 1965 and 19ob U. S . dirc~cl: investn...!r.t in France a r.-.oun:ed to 
~95 r..illion z.nd $11.9 million respl.!ctiv<!ly, or abou-..: 45% to 50% of the 
tote:.: . ~h~ rise in the foreign Ca?ital in:'.loN over the ~eriod is cue to 
a shar? radLction in the out- low ot fore i!bn o:.. f icial capital in Fra:1ce 
zron $0 . 6 billion to ~06 nillion . 
The Cif:~~Gnc~ b~t~een tne current account balance and t he ne~ 
authorities and b~nking system. Between 1962 and 1965 , $0 . 7 billion was 
spent .... ~c~ year to purchaSG n .... w re~~rves . It is notewort~y that in no 
y1;;,e.r c.:.d t!-. ...:. priv'-t'- C""i:J.:.tal outflo"· exec.ad th~ SL:ns sp~nt on purchasing 
new r ... serves . 
Fon ... i£,n assets and inv...:.st:.1.!nt in th ... U. S . amountl.!d to $58 billion 
in 19o5, or atoLt )0% OL thu valu ... U. S . ~ss""cs Jnd invl.!stml.!nt abrocd . 
(Se~ Tabl2. X. 6 .) Hu,.,rc.v .... r, 5570 of tt•I.! forl.!ig:i inv..,stncnt i;i the U. S . is 
in short t~rrn s~c~=ities, co~pa~ea to a figuru of only 303 for U. S . in-
Vi.;stc~r. :: abroc;;.d . In acC:.itio .. , alr::ost 301~ of fore.:.bn inv.::stments in thG 
Tal>l c x. 6. ForlOi[, 11 ClSS<!lS and i.nves Lrc11 L in Lh1• U.S . ;) ( rni 11 ion~ of dollars) 
-----
T) pc Ve'•r 
1 950 1957 1 %0 l 9Gl 1962 1%3 1 %4 1965 
-------
Tol:nl 17635 314'.J I 4%70 4687 8 Ll6280 514 8G 5G883 58739 
I.0110 Lei 111 7 997 12 83L1 /14/tll 21 L144 20./16 22791 /11 979 7037/f "' '" w 
Direct 3391 478'.L 7 392 7 39L 7 617 79ll4 8363 8797 
a 
Source : ( 98 , 99 , 1 00 , 101 , 102 , 103, l OL1 , 105) 
')?' --"T 
'U • .S • .:::r-.: owa.?.~ by foreign 60vcrnrr.1..:nts, in~ico.ti.1g; thl..! position of the 
U. S . .:is .-. rc::; ..... rv ..... cu.:-r ..... cy . 
Foreign diri.!ct invcst1:1~nt in tl·.d U. S . a:noi..r.ted to $9 b.;.llion in 
1965 ,:;.!d T-!:>l~ } •• 7) . Of t.'.-.is , C.::.n«G<- cwncd 27i~, t~1c Ei.:.C 22% , a~d the 
U .i.(. 32%. Thu.:> 1.i':.csc. cou:-:tric,s .::ccoun~"'-c for over 803 of: direct in-
V'-S '=-··'-" c. in ti.."" U. 5 . Surp::-isinglj enccgh, the ~~jor share of the ESC's 
$2 0illion dir1;;.ct ir.vcscc..,cnt in th.! U. S . is owned by the. :\ctherlands 
70%). ::ii .. cc 19o2, ?::-~nch c.:.rl.!Ct invastm1.:nt in th.::. U. S . h~s risen only 
sEght:ly to ~200 millio:-i . Of course, .:.t is cxtr-..mely difficult for 
for~~gn firus to ta:e ova~ D. S. cance::-ns bcCdt..Sd of l~gal discrimination 
aga inst th.:! prdctice e..1d the buy .' .... ('!rican policy of the U. S . governoent . 
tion U. S. firras are , on averab~, bigger than th~ir to r eign counterpa rts . 
w:--.an the foreign invcsi:rr.ent is broi<;;;.n ccw .• by ir.c!. .. s-i:ry as in Table 
x.s \~e see S.:>m~ cir:::erences in the ..:m~h.:.s.:.s of investment between EEC 
ar.d J . S . In the L. S. insurance e.hd other financ.:! accoL~ced for about 
22~ i n 1965 ~,itn trc.~nufact:urini:, indLstry C:.;...ounting to so:::.cwhat over 30-".. . 
This c~ trasts witL ~he si~u2tion in :he EEC, and France in particular , 
wr,-.;rc fin<:.nce z..1c i~s .. r,ince is n-.!gl igibl...: but manufacturini; indust::-y is 
very ir:1portant . 
C. bconomic An&lysis of Forei~n Invc.stmant 
B.:i.lassa 5 .:ves 
the " textboo:c .::rg..tm.::it for for...:ign inv'-'stment": I~ wa assuma t!Lat condi-
is more. 
Tntilc x .7 . Din:.c L f Ol l! it,11 inveslm( 111 ~; j II ll. s. by C:OU I otry in 
(1ni l J ionr. ol c1 ol J ui s ) 
Co11t1try Yc .. r 
] 950 ] 962 l %3 ---
To t.:11 3391 7 612 7 9t1L1 
C<1t1:idrJ 10:.! 9 20G11 2lf1J 
El'.C nssb 1 675(:::07,) 1728 
Bl.I U llS S 158 1 (, l 
rrn11ce. IW!> 183 182 
G t:ni !l)' nss 152 ] 119 
Italy nss 100 . 1. 0/ 
NcLhcrla11<ls 331~ JO~/. 11 :'11 
U. 1· . ll 6f, 21174 2665 
Other Eu rop1 7'2 5 ) 096 1090 
J <J pc: I l 118S 112 l JSS 
Lnti11 Arncrj c::i nss nss nss 
OLhc·r 1 311 1 90 1311 
" Source : ( 98 , 99, J OO , 1 01 , 1 02 , 103 , J Oit , 105) 
!JN<1 L s P<' c if j cc] [H!p:t c:1lc1 y 
] 950 ell HJ 19G/ l: O l 9CS'1 
----
}9(,Lt 1or5 -------- -
8363 8797 
22b1 ~ 2 388 
1 1341 1 97 5 
175 175 
] 97 200 
,...., 
·~ 156 20" lJ\ 
82 87 
1231 1 3"11 
27% 2857 
11 8/ 1249 
7 2 11 8 
nss 11 (i 
187 53 
Tab.le .A.8. FOl'l!i.~ll inv..;s t 11e 11 t. i 11 u. s. hy incl us Lry i It J 9.'..iO and f r0:11 1 960 to 1965" ( m:i 11 i O l1!; o[ 
d o l J <trs ) 
I ndu! ll y Yen r 
-----
1 950 1 900 1 961 196? 1 %1 1 CJ C.4 1 %5 
- -------- ·-
To La l 33 91 6 910 7 392 7 612 7 9• 11 83G3 87:J7 
r ct.1 •d eum 4 05 1738 1 325 11119 l'.113 1 612 1710 
M<ll1 1 r.h~luri11g 11 38 2 (ill /75LI 28B'l 30)8 3?13 3117 8 N 
'" C• 
TrC.111sp0t·t n,.,.b '-'., 408 L1 95 Li QI! n ::;:> m;s n's 
Tracie nss 63!l 652 7 50 7 06 675 748 
F im111ce <111<1 ill SllL'c'.HIC~ 1 065 J 810 2045 1 9'.3 20:15 2lhl 21 (19 
Olhcr 7 811 209 231 ? 12 6 G3 (i )3 (193 
a Sou ece : ( 9& , 99 , 1 00 , 1 01 , 1 O.? , 1 03 ' 1011 ' 1 05) 
b 
No l specif i cd separately 
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_.):-uf ..:. .... :.,. Lv :.nvc.st in tL . .: ccmr.try w'.l"'re. the a~our.t oE c"_,ital 
p.!r wor:.-~r _s s;:i:o.l ... · .. nd th.:! flow o~ c.:ip..:.tal wil 1 :cau to 
3n i~yr0v~~~~t in ~~ .... ~lloc~tion oi resou~c .... s in t~c. world 
u.s a vho~.! . =~~..!~~ bo_h cou~tri .... s -:~ cssuc~~ =o b .... ncf it 
f1:u ... for¢ign i:w .... .,tn .... nt: .: ·'-' i!".vc.stor ,_,...J.i..~ J:,y ob ... &.i.ni:1g a 
hi."": . ..:.r pi:-.:if :i.t --.bro-d wiu. __ .. .; rc.c::.p.:."'''- .) .... n1..;.f its .._ rorr. in-
Crl.!.-.sl.!S in l..J.bor pro<.tuctiv:..~y anC. WuS1..;.:> . (3, p . 15) 
'.i'hc. i::-...:_ow of forei_;n cz..p..:.r.al :)rovices 
:Ln~s _u::-, 2n~ often brings \.Jith i..t, the i.... UOption of nc.;w produc ... ion 
•.:..::..::.r.ol o~y and mu.rket::.n.; ..:echniqucs. T~~ c~s~ of the ~stablishment 
o: - ~ranch o: Li.oJy and Co . in Fr~~ce has c-~scd the modcrni~ation of 
wuc~ o~ r.hc Fr .... nc~ :oo~ ?roc .... ssing indus~=y with the introcuction of 
Sorr:e 
of t> .. csc in .. 1ova._ions w---::-..! pcirr.ly L.nanced by &overnme.nt subsidies and 
:.ncc~~iv~s ~~ic~ ~ad cx.:.sted before Libby c~me -nd had been ignored by 
?ren.:h p=oduc~rs . \59) 
It WOL-...:1 th.::-ow so::i.e li6: t on .:i:"'- c:ucstior.. o: :oreign invc.str.tLnt i:'. 
we ~ON cxa~ine t~~ ~otivcs attributed ~v busincsstuen f o::- investing in 
Fr&r..cz (and ~he r~st o: tuc EEC) . r~e question is posed : why invest 
t~ay c~oos~ to invGs= =~~h .... r than cx?o=t; th~ high tariff wall ~bout 
the -=c and the c~ea?a= cosr.s oC produc ~ion within it, ~vc.n when ~e 
e.xclud~ t:i.~ tr<::nsl.'or~ cosu; . He conclud .... :; h.:.s analysis by saying tha t: 
tnc lcw~!'." costs in the Cm .. mun.i.ty c:.rc.:, how"'v...:r, a mor:-e i:::iportant 
r .... ason th~n is tar~_f p~cf~rc.ncc for direct investment in tt .... 
~~c . At ?=esent (lJo~) the total costs inc.uding taxes o: ir.-
""'sti:1~ .:;;nd opc.ra.:i::lg int~'-.:: U. S .:.rl.! on c.v~r'-lgc .:.but:t a 
'*u2::-tc?..-- h.;..gr~\..!.::- ~: .. ~!"' .. ., th..:. Co1~rr1on ~~-:-k~t count:-iL:.~, r.:,a i nly 
b..:.calls.! of th.:: \ ..... :-y bi.; diff...:rer.ce bc.tWl..!Cn thl..! co.:.t of c:..n 
~our' s l .... ~0r .:.n t~I! n,~ ~~e-~ . A firra ~~.:.c~ i~stallcc 
c .... .,i.::-- ..!L..:inmem:. on _::1._ ~~-:."' :-. u!:" .... : .:. .. tr.e U. S . w0uJ.ci, 
i .o~c.ov..::r ) 0 f i;d Of'. C!VC.L bi~•::..:.r COc.t acv..intL . .;c' ar0urid 40 
to 5J p.;.r c ..... :-:.t ir. ::: ... vor u -tt.:. .. .,, u.? .:..:\ ;:.. Co.11:::io . . ~· ..... r~et: 
country, si..c~ l ... :.:i0r coJ _ _, .......... no_ b1... o!:rsl!t by lower 
outpu~ per worK ..... r . ( 15, p. 70) 
g rv . .;~h r a. t:...::. .. 
.:.nv-.;:,t:-.1 ... nt be cc...Us\! "it .:.s usu~lly r;10r..! dif: icul t for ... ncwcom...:r t.o se ll 
in .:. sta::ic . :i.-. rk~t , how ... ver larg ..... , wr.~rc existing fi rr.1S a rc already wel _ 
l.!r.r.r---:1c.:,ed , tnz.n i.n a r.:ipicly ~ :::- ,.m.:.:1.,, onL. . " Tn i s is akin to th.; ar_,u -
~~nt o: B ... lassa (inspir1...d by an Erticle he refers to by Hymer) in whic h 
he. says 
• .. ::he motivating f o::-c1... of for..::ign i .. vcstu.~nt is th-t by 
c.:. .... qui.ri..; control ovar foreign e.nt(.;rpris1...::., oligopo: is tic 
f:r~s Cc..~ r~dLCd cc~?etitio~ a~d :nc=eas(.;. ?:::"ofits .•.• 
.-1.- ter h'""vi.1"' .. -.:ta· .. _;d a m0:-.::. or 11...ss stable share iri the 
.. or..e ~ar:-et , selling ~ffon:s air..ed c...t .:.:1.c.::-ac.si:-:.g thLo 
_i:?:"c'.s sh.:;=e ir. dor::~s"tic sc..le.:; a_-"' ouunc to ~-ect "'· it~. re-
t-liacio:i on the p~rt of other c.;r.tc.:-p=is8S r~ising the cost 
of exJ.:insion . On the other h~nd al ~ ~ou"'h the cost of e:1try 
into :or'"".:.g;n :narket$ r .• ay be "'LbstLntia.J., it ...:.:.11 o:ten be 
e .... sier • • • c.si:i'"'.::i.s.lly i.. f th'- rc..te of 6 r owr.h of C.t...oanc is breater 
Qnd mark ... 7. s~ructur~s arc narc. fluid abroad . (3, p . 15) 
There r cr::air.s one fu r ther explanation for American privc.te d:=ect 
ir.ves t::iem: i. . ::esi:er:l E'..!= O?.:! w::-. i ch i s wor d1 cons id .... ring . T:lis is the 
<:r6t:rr:cr.t of K.Lnal"'!>l.! .. :6er (60) . The Unit ... d S~atcs is not 1...ngaged i n ex-
changi~g =ea _ goods for lon0 tc:::-::i securities , but short tdrm monetary 
li~~ilities for long te=m CJ.a i ms . Consfa,...,r e.i clos1...d econor.1y with a high. 
r ate o: saving anc ir.vest~ent. If th(.; sLvers h~pp~n to h~ve a tigh 
iiqui~.Lty ?r~~crcnce and the icvestor s insist on lor.g te:::-~ obligations 
u. s . 
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F:.~ure X. l . International market st.ructure of interest rates 
one will :: ind a h.:gh lo~g ter;... :-ate o:: i:i.ter~st an'- a low s'.lort te.ro 
one. Tir:e deposits will yield a low r(!:urn oecausc. they are aoundant; 
bo:1Cs ~ill ~ave low ?rices bL.caus~ th~ ~ ... mand for them is snall . Assume 
conv .... r:J..Jility a:i.c an O?~n econo:!ly . Cor.s.:.cer a cou:1.try wi1ere liqu.:.dity 
pnderer-.ce .:s ::::uch low"'r . Investors will borrow abroad, a;-.d save.rs will 
thcs :1.~v~ to lend abroad . K.:.ndle.berger sums up : 
~.uch of Curope2r. im?.s.tience wi...'.l '-h.:. li . S. balcinc~ o: p.s.ym ... :1ts 
~~-icit, its caus..! ano lt.S duration, is misguid..!d . It is not., 
as r .. 2.1y Eu:-op .... ans r.: • .:.n.,, th<:t \.;.:; or..! \Nl:iton_y bt.yi.._, Uj) ,.;uropean 
pl "nt and cq_u:.p:1l!n.: "-n.: payin., ~or thL.1:1 wit.h l..Li."ny money, the 
dollar . For the most~rt w .... are provi~ing Europe with l i qu idity 
.:.t cannot or will not provid ... for itself . ( oO, p . 20) 
He i_lustrates his a=Jt.~ent ~~ometrica:ly (see Figure X. l) . 
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S~v..:!rs in the U. S . hav"' lcw liquidi'ty prefer"'-nce and thus the s:tort 
ti.!:--;:-. ir.:: .... rest. ra-;:.:: w.:.11 not ui:f<;r froi.1 't~ ..... iong tl.!rm rate if the U. S. 
i.::. 2. closi:.:d econo.Jy . :n Euror;>c sa.v..!rs have a high liquidity pr1::fc.rence 
.;.:td bor:-ow.:;r"' 11.<!v~ n Cl.!sir..! for lo<.; tl:!r.r1 c--!:lt;:;, so the short te:-~ in-
:."'r ..... ;:;~ r~_e will bl.! much i .... ~~ thzn ~he lor.g t'-rm i~teres~ rate if Europ~ 
is a c~osl.!d <...conomy . If the two ma:-~et..; 2.re join'-d the European market 
w:::.c:-. is snall"'.ot will cha .. ..,"' T!1U.Ch .:io:-"' thz.n the U. S . T!:'.e di:-ect..:.on of 
the. c~.ar-. .;es ~:e shown by t!-.l! arr0\.,1s where the cot t:~d 1 inc is the n.::w 
(cocr..on) ft:r:c.tioi.12.l r .... lationship bc:.wec:t th.:- int.:::rc..st ra-;:e str ucture and 
funcs in Lhe U. S . and t~~ ELro?e.;.:t sav~rs .;.r~ ..:.:tcbled to lend on the U. S . 
of -;::i.e :.J. S . Ft.:rthe.rrr.o:-.._ ~..:. <...g :-... es .:hat the net cr~d.:.tor posit ion is a 
de~to:-s o:i. lor.g te:-m dCCOLn_, so tha't their 5hort ter~ net creditor pos i -
t...:.o:i. is dLe rr.a:.nly to involurctary foreibn lending . 
:Lropcan short L'-rm cl~..:.ms on the U. S . ar~ abou't $12 . 7 billion ~nd 
hi.!:- :ong ter m ind..:.b'tcdncJs is $7 . 1 billion . The total of official short 
-;:~rx c:ai~s on t~e U. S . h~ ~stinates at a~out $9 billion and thus con-
cluc~s that Europca~ ?riv~tl.! short term i:lvcstmcnt ..:.n t~e U. S . (in re -
s;onse to a hLbh liquidity pref .... rence) is only a sm~ll fraction of total 
Eur-opec.n .::>I.ort t~r:::i .i.nv.;stm..:.nt in t .. e U. S . Thus the n ... t creditor posi-
tion of Euro?. e on short term accour.t- i.·" 'U'' "'~ l.· ""ly to o-= - : i.·a1 h 1-' · - ~ " ~ u .Cl a - = -C 0 ,.d. ::;_; S • 
Q:;. ~o:-i-=- term .:cc u:-.-;: Tri::;:.:.:;. :.:.~as th~t L1..!."v:_:>i.;.;'s lor.g t~ru inve.s;.uc.nts i:l 
t~~ U. S . ~re a..:>ou _ \!SU .... l ;.u thos..:. of t~~ U. S . in Ehrope although the 
Th'- r."s.i:l l..!X?lc:!.na~io~ o: t\...:. .. ~ Ci:::cr\jnc~ ir. :or~~ of .:.:iv~s~ .... \.!r.t 
1.:."'s ~ .. -·o..:>~bly :!..::-. t .. -.! -~cc ... l'..<.t i:: L \! .... ;;;ier i:or Arne-ican Cc..pi~al 
t:v :..:.o.-='~ - majo= !'ar:ici.?a\,.iot! ~~ \Jx~..,,t- ... 0 ..... o:-:.:s :.:i -l..rO~...:. .... :---"t,;...n 
_or ~L:-ope_n c.:.:_:>i.:.:1 to p\!rt~t:-ett.\!, or 1.;. .... J:..ite iri th..:. sa:: .. e :z.shion, 
t: . .! usu.:!:) l~rgc-::- for7.:3 of t:._'- li . S. !.s _ .... r ~s d.i.-· ..... ct inv"';,t -
mcnt is co~cc.rnad, th..:. initi.:.tiv..:. certainly lies fa: more with 
-::t ..... ':.l".ler.::.c-=.:t i.1ve.,to::- ".::h.'.!:1. wi_:. i!::ly _ .... to:-1omous c.:;.,,i;:-c. of 
E .. iro)-.?.ar'..s to rais ..... :.ong t"'rl:! !.u:-11. .. s i:i. 1...::.e :r . s . (85 , p . i ::. ) 
Thus T:-iffir. co:i.clL.dcs -: .. ..;.r. tr,..:. ..... n • .:-1i.ric .... l delta do •. ot bear out 
?h-.! Eu~ope.s.ns do :to: l .... nd shurt t erm to the 
t; . S . anw borro." 10rt.; tcrr.1 frc:n ~10r .A.!c .. t:se of difrc.rences in liqt.iic!ity 
;_)refer-.!:1Ces . ::u:opec:..ri .,,;i.o:-t t1.;r.11 .cnt..ing in c.hc U. S . is m.:iinly offici al 
.... na a high ?roportion is due to involunt~'!:"y .Eor..:.ign 1-::nding . 
Tl~s, in summary , ~...:. c~n say tnat ~he t~~e~its o~ foreign invest-
~aintained anJ proviced ~h-.?.y ar~ nvt ~ir.a!"l.C~d by involun:ary f orGign 
lc:-icir:g . T".:te rc.c:...Jient co.intry of fo:-e(,,n ir.v.:: .. ti:.~nt ben..,.'.:its by hc:ving 
his labor productivity (and w~2~s) rais~a an~ by th~ catalystic effect 
capi::al , thG growth of l·,is co::npany and cheaper labor costs . 
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XI . INTSP~ATIO.~.\L ECO::\C:·~IC ~-JLIC'! D~C:3IC .. S : S~:-r·:ARY 
A~lJ CO~CLLJS _O • .:l 
_,::ono: .. _c :_;.'.-'.."'nora..: ... .: "r.,! o •. y int.::.r .... sti. .. _; in .:.O tar ... s t:hey relate 
::::n the casi:: of 
micro-.... conomics, ~:-..a dL.cision mak~r.s ~re. coa .. ,. ... :ne=.; c:i:.d ?=oducers . T:-.a 
consL ...... :s d~cid~ on a c~oicc b.:..twL.cn the purchase ot cifEcr cnt bu~dles 
o: ;oods &nd ~he producdrS Cdcidd on ciff..:~c.nt dlloc~tions o: production 
In m.c.cro-.... conomics, how-
..:ve=, t!:' .. -=:. u.aci:;,ion n<..! ... er.s arc the. organs of 5 overnmc.m: in a coL.nt:ry . 
.. ... • t ... ~hc:L C.Ct....:_O~ i.:. ~u~:\..;.:~ by :l ?=~-u.r:in£!:1t :ore\,.;., - u •.• Ost cawe.S 
the C.an;;.rai Gov~rnment, in such ;.. way that the macro-econor.iic 
.::uant.:.t.:.cs (which night r\,;.s1..'i t froi.... _.<.:. .. y ... ic=o deci.s.:.ons, o= 
c""ci..;;i.or.s .:.1.t a loV-· .... r 1 .... v..:1) c:.ra in.:lt...:..nc~c. one way or anot .. 1 .... r . 
(Eysk.ans, (:";9, p . 72)~ 
Th~s t:h~ d.ac.:.sions o: cco~0~ic po:icy are ~~c:o c""c.:.sions becaus~ th .... y 
a=.a takdn ~y a pr .... domir.ant fore .... , tne C .... ntral Government, in such a wa1 
th&t the mac=o- economic ~ua •• ~ities are influencad in one way or another . 
~est \,;.conomic ?ol.:.cy c\,;.cision:;, ar .... ~ltimataly conc~r~ed wi.~h one macro-
~conoraic qu~nt~ty, the n~tionul incoma o: the count!'."y . These decisions 
c'.l!'."e usLc..lly tak .... n in order to ensure th~t the nationc:.l i..come will grow 
c.t an optir;.al rat..;, ... it:h n.;.ximu:n stabi.1.ity vr s~curity, and an equitable 
dis:::-i.!)L.::.:.on o:': inco .. n ... ::i~tw<:!~n -:::-....., i::r.<.:.bitants of the country . Yr.us, ai::. 
t°i'." .. ~ outset o: this study, th.~ rr:.:..jor go..ils of econom.:.c policy were as-
sunec i::.o be 0:-owt~ , secLrity and ~quity . 
~nroughout, this st~dy has ~\,;. ... ~ co~cernec with tha ::ne ?rocess o: 
coo?~ration, at~ cnoic~s J~two.:!en tne c.assic ~~tnods of international 
f i:-i .. H".ce . T'.1e ce.cisions were tc;.ken in order to max.i.nizc French national 
wel:ar~ by ~chiev::.ng an O?i:iwal rate of growth of n~tional income, 
s~reguarding national security and distributing income equitably both 
bet.ween and w L hin countries . 
Th~ need for choice <:.r .:.ses b~cause there are dif fe::-ent al te::-natives 
and each alternative wo..ild L::!ve diLf(;.n... .._;ff"°cts on a na._ion' s bro..,rth, 
::. .... cLrity ar;c ..:.t.-..ity . Tne 0 oals co::ipet:e with .:o..icn othc.r tecz.use the 
--t~r~~tives s~L .... ie~ do noL accc~~lish the. goal~ eqLa-ly w~ll . ::. .. ch 
:-,a_io:-i woonts ::o uaxi:niz .... tt,e e:.-ctc.in:n~nt of al_ thrl;!.e goals but the means 
.... v ... L.c.b~e do not po.::r,ai.t it . A cax..i..:r.um rate o'.: i:,rowth is desired but, in 
=~ct, it is limited becaus~ it is subject to the achi~vement of an equitable 
c.::.~tribut.ion of incor.:c c.nd a re""so .. cble national s1::curity . 
I~ t~e i~t~rn~~ional econo=y, nat~ons are ~o~ or;ly conc .... rnec with 
t~c growth and S(;.CJ=ity of national income but with the international dis -
t.ri;,ut:.o:'l of: i::1com~ ... s well . 7.1e ..,,oal o~ ec;uity attribut~d to aomestic 
~~0::10illic policy becomes the goal o~ i:'lternatio~al reciprocity for the 
int~rnational ~conoroic policym~~~r . 
policy woLld rai~~ a cou:'ltry's nat~o:'lal inco~e it =i;ht s~ill ~e rc -
jcc~~C. by the policy1aab .. r . T:.is \,ould occur if th-:. ;)olicyma;.;;er :e:t that 
the J~cisio:: t1..-ne:.f itt~d in a "ciscrimina .. ory" manner , the distribution 
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or b~ne~it~ between nations w~s not equitable . The distribution of the 
incom~ generated by an int~rnation~l economic policy decision is equit -
able if it allott~d to partici?ating nation3 in at least the same pro-
port~ons as t~~ social costs incurred as a result o~ the decision &re 
sha r ed . A nation's income may rise if it unilaterally reduces its tariffs, 
but it is unlikely to accept the pain o~ the internal adjustment that 
mus~ b~ unc~r~a~~n a~ a result of the tclriff r~duction unless sone recip-
rocal ta riL E conc~ssions are made by oth~r countries . 
For the decisions analy~ed in this study the likelihood of g r owth 
of national income \vas ~ccepted by all . Howev~r , conflict arose because 
or th~ i~plications ot the aiffcr~nt growth promotino alt~rnatives for 
each country ' s nat i onal security and for international r eciprocity . As 
usual, differences of opinion aros~ due to different analyses of the 
alternat ives . however, most conflicts arose between General de Gaulle 
and his fellow international economic policymaker s because of different 
values or emphas~s being placed among the three goals by the parties 
concerned . Gener~l de Gaulle was more concerned with national security 
and intern~tional reciprocity than were the Anglo- Saxons in the period 
1956- 06 . The subset of feasible outcomes from a policy dec ision which 
were acceptuble to him tended to be close to the vertices representing 
security a~d equity in a policy triangle . Such an acceptable set migh~ 
be represented by the shaded region in Figure XI . l . Tte acc eptable set 
of feasible outcomds from international economic policy decisions that 
was acceptable to the Anglo - Snxons ~r pnasized growth more strongly . Thus 
this ~~t was cios~r to the v~rtex r~presenting growth and might be 
rcpresentea by shaded region in Figure XI . 2 . 
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C ... nsidl.!ring t:.hc n<iturc. of G.:.iullism, the conc..!rn for nationals~ -
curity a:1d i. •. tern.:.tion2l n .. ciprocity i::i a not unsurprisi.1g feature. of 
Fr-!nch international 1..:conoi:iic policy in the period 1956- t.6 . We have 
su"',; .... st.-!d "an in .... -!j)C.nd ... nt Franc -.. wichin an inde;:>cnd ... nt: Europe" as an 
appropriate. slogan fer G~ullisa . Inc~p ... ndcnc~ can only b~ achieved by 
a strong nation . To bc. strong , however, a nation must not only have a 
growing economy but a secure one and must not allow any other competing 
na-.::.o:-t to i;,rm.; Clt her 1.!Xp~nse . A.1y situation where t:herc is not a 
m i <,imu m 11.!vel of international reciprocity allows other nations to 
g row ... t France's expense and is intoler.:ible to the Gaullists . In ad-
dition, such a situation cannot be rectifi~d by a nation that has lost 
(or rel.:.nquished) its nai::ional independ-..nce . Thus the chief character-
istic of French i:-ttern~tional economic policy is t:hc desire for greater 
natio~al s~cu rity and :.ndepl.!ndence and for France ' s due share of the 
benefits of internatior.al negotiat:.ons . 
The alternative choices between which France made her decis ions in 
t.he p~riod 1950- 00 were the classic methods of .:.nternational trade al -
~ocai::ion , internationcl finance and international 0 overnment . Economic 
theor y has demonstrated that world welfare is maximized under a system 
of fr.:;e trade and that some trade is a lways better than none . However a 
!1.0:tion is co:1c~rn.:!d wit. the mazimiz.:.tion of its national welfare and 
not worlC. W\.!lf.::.r.; . T.'.:us on~ of th ... most: important decisions to be take!1 
by an international economic policy ma~er is in answer to the question 
of how much int ernational trade it should e!1gage in . Som ... trade is bett ... r 
th~~ no tr~de, but unconditional fre~ tract~ has many costs as w~ll .:is 
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b-.;::.!f it"', ... nc.. so th.2. Oj)tim.:il ;;,raount of trade for a nation may :-:.ot be the 
maxil.'.t::-J ar..ount, i.e . frl.!e tr .... .:.e . Tnere r:re two sect i ons of internai::ional 
economic policy which a~al with this problem, taritf policy and the policy 
on i~ternational economic cooperction . To prGvent undesirable ~ffects 
Zrom unconcitional free tr~de (exc~ssive in~t~bility ~nd ddjustment) mos t 
n~tions impose tariffs . These tariffs are designed to restrict inter-
nationul L.rc..de w·.'"'re tht..:. costs outweigh tne bene::it s . Th..! decision by 
the Fr~nch to r~ject a :re~ trcldZ area was made because they refused to 
r1..:.linquish the po.-1er to restrict trade rrom non- European nations by 
using a collimon external tariff . IE a fr~e trade area was formed other 
par~icipai::ing nations could preve .. t France from achiev ing her due share 
of the gains without incurrin~ vast social costs . Because of France ' s 
history of hig tariff proL.ection , the adjustments required to enable 
Fra:-:.ce -i::o cor.ipete in a .t re.a trade situation would b.; large e nough in a 
tradinb association which forced to corapete with the rest of Eu roj)e, 
without admitting competition f r om non- Europeans as well . Thus France 
demanGed a comr.ion external tariff to enable her t o ensure that her inter-
~sts w~re con~ic~r~d when other European nat:ions mJnipulLted their tari~fs 
against non- Europeans to control the amount of international trade . 
International cooperation among nations can also prevent the harmful 
consequ~nces of internation~l trad1..:. . Intern~tional coope~ation involved 
the coming togethl-r of tradin
0 
n<:>tions to tckc. coopl..rativL. action to 
r..aximize the amount of L rec trade subject to "rules of good conduct:" 
accLptl..a by the participatin; nations to avoid or mitigate the undesirable 
~:tect~ of free ~~ade . Suen rules of good conduct ~re meJningless unless 
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some intcrna:i0nal institution is L.st..:iblishe~ to ensure that they ~ro 
obcy.:.d . This r iscs th..: question of hew much pCY,; .... r should be granted to 
~n i~tcrnation~l institution at the expunsc of national ind~pendence . 
The so.;cond d~cision m~d~ by General de Gaull~ dL.als with this probl~m . 
:his ct~cision w~s his r~fus~l to accept the move to tie the CAP to 
Europ~an politicdl un~on . He showec by this decision that he would 
sacrifice the efficiLncy of int~rnation~l coo?eration to mitigate the 
ha:-:ni:ul cffcc ... s oL fr..:e trad~ if it inv0lvo..:d a large sacrifice of na -
tion .... "!. ,)olitic..:il ind.!p'--r.dence on the pZirt of Fr.:.nc<.! . 
Finally , ~n int~rnational cconooic pol~cym~ker must decide on the 
app=opriatc means for rinancing international trade . The absence of a 
Ce:,-:;r,d Au<:hority to issue currl.:!ncy anu ..:n.fo::-ce it:s acceptance , o.:ans 
that the financing of int:crnational trade is a complex business . The 
cccision by the French to pay for her imports in gold and to convert ar.y 
other currency which shu receiv.!d into gold involved considerations of 
the international monetary system which de Gaulle felt best served the 
~oals of French international econo~ic policy . It implied the r ejection 
of th~ Gold Exchange Stancard in favor of a Gold Bullion Standard . 
Tn~ first decision read~ as part of French international eco~omic 
policy which was analyzud in this study was the cecision to reject a 
ject2d in favor of a tra~ing association with a common external tariff 
~nc ~ar~o~ization of n~tional policies . Tne need for choosing among 
trading associntions grc.w out of th~ desire of the Western Europeans for 
a re5 ional a??rouch to reconstru~tion aft~r World War II which caused 
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"the low tariff countries' dilemma" and encourag.::d those who wanted to 
create a Third World ?ower, ~ United St~tes of Europe . 
~ow tariff countri~s, whose m~jor policy instruments for protecting 
dom~stic produc~rs were quantitative rGstrictions, had their home markets 
opened to foreign suppliers as the. OEEC program of quota reductions was 
ca~=ie~ ou~ . The high t~riff councries, who relied on tariffs to protect 
domestic producers , did not ope.n up their home markets as much because 
the U. S . Executive did not have Congressional support for the GATT pro-
~::-a,:i of tari::f reductions . The high tariff countries in Europe would 
not laJe.r their tariffs against the low tariff countries because this 
would have been extended to the U. S. by the most favored nation clause 
in GAIT . It was a time of "doll'-r shortage" and no European country was 
prepared to lower its tariffs against the U. S . without a quid pro quo . 
The lo~J tarif!: cou:-.tries were also pr.::vented from raising their tariffs 
because of GATT. Thus they had to find some way of increasing their pro-
taction or obtaining reciprocal tariff concessions which would not vio-
late the provisions of GAIT . In 1955, they proposed the formation of 
some form of trading association in We.stern Eliro?e . 
At the end of World War II most national governments in continental 
Western Europe had become discredited in the minds of the. people . Ther e 
was w~despread support for some form of regional political cooperation 
to prevent a recurrence of hostilities . In addition, the problems of 
reconstruction and redevelopment were regional problems, that is, we.re 
common problems f~ced by all the countries of the region and it seemed 
only r~3bonablc that som~ sort o~ rcgion&l ap?roach should b~ tak~n to 
solv1.. ::hem . In the decade Eftcr the War, w~stern Europe lost many of 
ovcrs~ ... s co-onics ... nJ were highly cc.:ri..;ndent on American goodwill 
for r~sourccs nc~cec to r ... ~~velop &nd r.._construct . Tr.~s convinced many 
Europeans of tnuir impo~encu i~ th~ modern wor!d clnd th~ desir e to play 
a significant pnrt in world events one~ aga~n buc ... mu a significant mot~ve 
fo r political u"ification in Wcst~rn Surope . In 1955 the ?roponcnts of 
this view w.::r-=. ;r1..atly strengthen ....... by th1;; proposal of the low tariff 
countries to foru a re6 ioncil trading association . 
In ~~c bebinni ng the British ~articipatea in the ne6otiations fo r 
a regio:1.d.l trading association but in 1950 they withdrew because thuy 
wouldn • t join "' trading assoc ia::ica with a co::i:no:i. external ta rif f and 
harmonb: ... tion of nat ion.11 policio.::s in the economic and social spheres . 
~hey pro?osec a =ree tracu ~re~ i~stead but this was rejected by the 
Co;i.tinental Powers . In 1957 , fearing discrimination, the Brit ish proposed 
th<:.t "' free trc.._.I.! a:::-e<:t be forn;~d b ... tween th"' Europ ... "'n :Zco:1omic Community 
~"d the othe:::- OEEC countries . NeJotiations began and continued until 
~ovemb~r 1958 . On the fourteenth of t hat r.;onth the French announced 
t:-.:it ::h..:.y would not join any regional trading association that did not 
have a common cxt~rnal tariff and harmonization in the economic and social 
spnere~ . Thus the deci~ion by the French was b~twe~n alternative trad -
ing associativ• s . 
~-=- only concer ned oursclv~s with thu reasons why the Fr~nch wanted 
a common o.::xternal tariff because their viuws on h~rmon~zation b~c~~~ 
~uc~ c:~~r~r from the ana~ysis of th~ second decision we studied . T~~ 
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associc.itio •. s was Sl'.rv ..... y~c and ._hr ..... e possible 
reasons a country night reEusc to join ~ tradinb association without a 
co:.:· .... 0:1 ..... :xtcrnal t~ :-iff w1..:rc found . The int"'rme iate cost argum<!nt ror a 
co;:n:i;-vn ... xt~rn.:::: t ... riff arises for tho:.c comraoditi-. .. s wh..:;,r~ France ' s 
costs of prodt:ction are intermediate betw~en a higher level in her 
?.::..r~~ ..... rs 2nd ~ lower 1 ... vcl in non- oemb ..... r countries . If France conpetes 
LnsLcc ... ss~u1ly wit~ her p~rtner countri~s ' domc~tic p r oduction, then i t 
rr.ay ?ay t~e purtncr countries ~o reduce ~h ..... ::.r taritfs to zero against 
non-~emb~r countries in order to bring the commodities to their consuner s 
at least cost . A co~~on ..... xternal tariff would ..... n~L re that France ' s 
tracing partn~rs would not do this w~thout France ' :. permission . 
T:-ie trace uiversion argt:r::cnt f.:> r a co:..::ion ..... xt ..... rr.al tc1.riff also 
aris~s ~or t hose commoditi ..... s for wnich France is ~n intermediate cos t 
p:-oc:uc~r . In this case domestic proauction in the pa rtn~r count r ies i s 
not th~ issue . When free trad ... is establish ..... d trade is diverted if 
French procucers replac~ produc ..... rs from non-~eob~r countries as SU?Pl i ers 
to the ?~rtner countrias . In this case ~lso it will pay the partn~r 
countri~s to reduce th~ir tariZfs to zero usa~nst non-mcmb~rs in order 
to supp1y their co~sum~r:. at least cost . Without th..:. securi t y of a com-
rno~ axt~rnal tariff the French would hava no guarantee that he r interests 
would o~ consid~red before such a turiff r..:.duction was made . 
The third ~r6ument for a regional tradin~ associat i on with a co~~on 
exterr:c:l tarit t is that it woLld be a much mor ..... et:L..:.ctive t r ading unit 
than a ~re~ trade area and far :;iore likely to r~ap gains in terms of trade 
fro~ its economic size . The rise in i ntra- trace would b~ greater in a 
cus::om::; union bccause or tr~J..: div..:rsio:-i th.:rn in a free trad._ area . This 
ri::;.:! in intr...i - tr ... J..! would mean .... f<!l l in th~ d1..;.mttnd for non - union cx -
?u::"ts i...:1~ .:i fall i:-i the supply of 1.:-xports to '10.1 union count:ries . ':'hus 
t~e ~ric .... s of the goods the unio:-i i~ports rrom the rest of the world 
\,'ould f.ill and the prices of th ... goods sh...: exports to the rest of the 
world would rise . This would bring a.bout an improvement in the terms 
o!: tr ... ..:-- . In acdiT.io:-i, .:i larger trac.irig 1.rn.:.t would gain more concessions 
in incernational economic n ... gotiations thun would the less cohesive and 
more ineff~ctual f r ee trade nrca . 
IL was not possible to estimate qu~ntit ... tiv~ly the significance o~ 
the int...:rm..:d~ate cost argument and the. tr.:ide divl.!rsion argum..:nt fo r the 
Fre:1ch decision to r eject a We~n:crn Euroj_) .... an Free Trade Area . However , 
we foune v...:rbal ~vidcnce Lhat the French wcrc concerned about the two 
c.rguments during the nl.!gotiatio:-is and we founc a s ... c::or of th~ 2r~nch 
e.co::iomy w~erl.! e..icl'. o= them would c.p_?ly . T~,e i.1termed i ate. cost argument 
would <.:p;?ly to the Franch t~xtile industry, significant portions of wh ich 
have cost l~vels intermeui~te betwe~n higher l~vels in other Eu r opean 
cou::itrics and l~ver costs of A~iatic produc1.:.rs . In agriculture, the. 
Frenc~ were likely to gain fr~d trade diversion in the Brit i sh mar~ec at 
t.he expens~ of least co.st Commonwealth :_:>reducers . 
T.:1.e terms of t r ade c.r0um~nt also applied to the Western European 
situation i 1 195& . Overall WEFTA accounted for 433 of world imports and 
393 o: world exports . In 1958 , it account1.;.d for 62% of world i cports 
of food , 51% of raw m~terials , 073 of min~ral cue.ls and 093 of oils a~d 
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;,. .... t~. \·::.:.!:'TA abo account..:....; Ior 50-,J of world L:Xports oE chemicals, 503 
of rn.:c.tin .... ry a.nu <..c.uipm.:.nt, ... :-id 5lc~ of oth ... r rr.c.nufc.ctur ed goods . Thus 
if il'.-;::..·.: - Eu:::vi?.:!an tr.:iae incr..! ... s..:.c by 5 or 101~ .:i.s a r..!sul:: ot th.:; forma -
t.ion of .:i t.r.:i. ... ing a,,sociation this would b(; likely to cc:ius e significant 
i:1provcr. ..... nt ir .... he term.,, of trade with t'.lc r.,;st of t.he world . Thus wa 
;e:~ev..! that t.he terms of t.r~ce argument wus valid for the WEFTA nego-
tiations in 19~S . 
:-:1e s~cond c .... cision of Fr<.!nch int.;rnc.tionc:i.l "conomic policy which 
was an<..1ly~c.:<l in this study W'-:> th" dec.:..sion to reject the movl! to tie 
tha Co~mton Agricultural Policy (CAP) o~ the Luroyean Economic Community 
(EEC) t.o political u ni on in Western Europe in 1965 . Tariff policy had 
beeG ab~nJon~c by the me~bers of th~ EEC including Franca ' s met.hod of 
protectin~ th~ir econor .. ies from the har mful effects of unconditiona l 
free trace .:imong ther;:selvc..::;, w~.e::-i they form .... a a custot:ls union . T"nus 
t~a only way to sa:eguarc Fr~nch interes:s was by using some foro of v""' 
inte::-n.:.tional cooperat.ion . In the agricultural sector the form the 
coo?e::-ation took was the compl~te unif ication of national agricultural 
~olici(;s of the member countries ~nd t. he est~blishment of a corr~on 
agricu_-;:ural policy which tr~ats farmGrs in all the rnamber countries 
exactly .:ne sa~e . 
o.1iy by such a Lnification cid the Frl.!nch believe it possible 1:0 
~stdblish t.rL.,; and equal competition and aaequatc pr ograms to mitigate 
the ~armf~l ~ffccts of uncondition~l f r~e tr~c~ in agricultural procuct.s 
bc<:Wc~n th._. ~~C countries . Thus the French SU?port of the movem~nt :or 
unificat:ion of na.tional po.icics wc...s for l.!conor.-. .;.c reasons . Those who 
w ... :-it..:-.c politic..il unif..:.cat:;.on in Eu!:'0p1..!, the "Europe.ans", strongly st.p-
!Jvr.: ... d t.h<.! :~r ..... 1ch c..,::.ir.:! for c. COi.::lOn J.gricu'ltur.::.l po ... icy . Tlt<!y did so 
ho\,'"'"""r, t 0r d.:.ff<.!rent r<.!.:i::>ons; t!1<.!y b ..... l i ... vl..!<l th~t a CAP would be a step 
nearer to political uniLic~tion in Western Europe because it was a move-
ment: to· ..,ards "'cono1J1ic int ... gration ... :id th .... v ..... ry d..:.sequ..:..librium produced 
~y ..:..nt<.!
0
ration in one 3 ... ctor wo~ld lc~d ~u ..:.nt~0ra~io~ of other sectors 
~nd ~hus ~o an ascendin~ S?iri~ o: int<.!grntion . Thus the development 
of ~;-..... c.-lP , and inde .... d or th.:: whole EEC curing the period 1960- 05 , can 
be traced to this alliance b1.::otwecn the Gaul lists who wanted harmoniza -
tion of nd~ion~l policies for c.cono~ic r .... asons and the Eu r opeans who 
want: .... d such har~onization Lor political rc~s0ns . 
T~ . ..:..s allL ... nce of convenience broke: down in 1~65 . Thc CAP was almos t 
co~pl .... t<.! except forfi.nancing it fron 1965 to 1970. The European Com-
mission, the ... xe.cutive branch of the EEC c.nd pt;.oplcd by well known 
"Europeans", tried to tie concl..!ssions o:i 9olit:.cal unification to the 
fina~cing of th~ C~P . The proposals of the Commission would have yield~<l 
a budgetary surplus dur..:..ng the period and they proposed that the European 
Parliarr.~nt b.; given some sc..y about the disposal of t:he surplus . This 
woJ!d ~ave bel..!n a firs~ st~p towards creutin5 a f~~~ralist political 
univ~, in w~st~rn Europe . Such a union would be concerned with the in-
terests of the federat~d people ~s a group, and :iot with the interests 
of the member states . A union that ~ctcd only wr.en all the menb.:;r states 
~pprov~c the action would oe a con:~dera1ist political union . This was 
t~~ obj~ct..:.vc of t~a Fr~nch . G~neral de Gaulle :elt t~at Fr ench inde-
pendence and national security would be endangered in a federalist uni on . 
Thus t!"Ll! Fr1.:.nc:1 rej~ct..:.d th .... p::opos"ls ~nd pursu\.!G an "empty- chair" 
pvlicy l!n'-il th'- C0: •. ::1issi0n wi.t:hdn.:w its politic...il d ..... mands end acc1:..pted 
?:,._ er ..... nch decision jeopa::di2-.!d th .... commo:1 agricultural pol icy (CAP) . 
~his ~ad b ..... ~n ncgotiat~d v ... ry painfully from 19o0 through 1965 . Its 
;:.os-.: s :.~nif ica::lt £eat:t..re w"'s its us~ of i.nport controls (variable levies) 
price su.)port sy,,,t:c.rn to establish a min.:..mut:i l.;v-.:-1 of agricultural prices . 
The policy is t.L~ncc.d by .:i fund known as FEOGA and its revenue comes 
?art~y ::ru .. 1 contributio:i.s by mer..b._r states a::i~ partly from the rev.;nue 
colleccec us im?ort duti~s . Th._ concern of FcOGA is with financi::ig the 
war~e-.: support policies of the CAP and provicin~ grants to improve ag -
ricLltural efficiency . The CAP is a protectionist policy and thus eases 
the burden o~ French surplus agriculture . 
. ;grict.ltur ... contribut .... c 7~o vf _;:-oss .:or:.l;stic produc-c of the. Et:C in 
1965, whicn was less than th .... Italian figure (12 . 0) but considerably 
core than the Belgian (5 . 5) und German figures (4 . 5) . The percentage 
share contributed by a0 riculture to GDP has declined in all the EEC 
councrias and ~or the araa as a ~hole ic h~s acclin~d at the rate o~ one 
th~rd o= one perccntabe point per annum in recent y~ars . The lnbor fo=ce 
c.::ntage point p ..... r annum. Thus structur<:l ch......1
0
c is taking plac"' r.o:.pidly 
ana ucc~leratinb the nL..... tor the resettlement of labor du..:. to freeing 
tra~c in agricu~tural prod~cts is a 8ajor reason for the inportancc o:: 
c.~r:..:1... _ turc in Western Eu.ro.c> ... . 
Anoth~r r~"'::;on r:or th~ import ... nc1... of agriculture in W<!"'tc.rn Europe 
i~ .. he. im~ortancc of c..gricultural trad~ . Agricultural exports are a 
(.::. ,) . I:1 Frar.cc t:hey ..i.ccou .• -.:. for 20% o: l:Otc.i.l ~xports , in ti'.e ~ether­
l:rnd::; 293, Italy 14% and Belgium- Lux:embourc; 103. A0 ricu ... tural imports 
arc. ~n i~?ortc..nt ?art of total imports in a.l the ~EC co~nt:ries, in 
pc..rticul.::r .:or Franc.::: (:.o,,), Cermar.y (.::0%) anJ Italy (29%) . The trade 
Jl!ticit of the EEC countri\,;.s conbin~c ~n agr~cultural commodities a~ounted 
to $7 oillic~ in 1965 . In r ... ccnt y~~rs intra - ELrop ... an trade in agri -
cul cur a 1 cor;.rr.od:.ties has incr-.!ascd in importance . The share of Fr ench 
agricultural exports thdt w~nt to her EEC ?artncrs almost doubled be-
t~<..cn 1959 and 1965 . (23% to !.,.3%) . :'hLs :.f the CAP had not been imj_)le -
t::l..::. t<..d it would have been <.1. s"" r iou3 blow to Fr ... nch agr iculture . I t 
w0Lld have jcopar~iz\,;.d ner expo r t ~ ... rkets and forced a core rapid and 
nore pain=ul c~clin(.. in tue incustry . 
The EEC Commission r.ope:.d that the French stak..?. in the CAP would force 
G~r.eral ce G~ull..?. to nake concessions on his poli~ical position . He re -
fuse~ . The blow to the d~veloprnent of the French econony r~sulting ~rom 
the 1 os::. of th1::. CAP was not large e11ou~h to : orce him to accept the 1 oss 
o;: nz.tional ind..?._?c.nd..::.nc.:! and security chat the Co1.1niss ion ' s proposals 
ent:<:iil.ed . 
The third d~cision of French international ~cono~ic policy which 
w.::.s "'na:yzc.d wzis th<=- de.cision to buy ..,old in l 9o5 . This decision was 
::ic.c~ ~s part or: Genera 1 ce G~ul le ' s position to reject the role of "k~y 
currencies" in international f~nanc~ . The syst1...n o: ir.~ernational financ~ 
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in opc::-~tio:i in the wor l d today is kncwn as the Gold Exchange Standard . 
[n ... er t:i.is sys~cm gold hol~ings arc SL?Pl~c-.:nt-.:d as reserv~s ~or intcr -
n-tio~~l tr~ns.'.lctio:is by hol~ings of rcscr:v~ curr~ncies , th~ U. S. dollar 
.s.nc the. B::-L:ish pounc. . ':..tc. collur is t L .. ..:::d in va me as one. thirty-
fi:t\ of one fine ounc~ of gold and all other currencies a r c f~~ea i n 
T:-..c evolution of tn.:.s syster.i since WorlL War II ca:i. be div id""d i::ct o 
tnrc~ perioc.s . Th~ first perioJ, fron 1945 - 51, the dolla r was so over-
whelmingly strong that it was the world ' s curr~ncy . Dollars were as good 
::.s g,oid, if :lot b..,tter. The U. S . held ovl!.r 70/., of total world gold 
stoc:,s ui:1d her ::.hor t t"'rm claims on other currencies exceeded her shor t 
term liabilities to for~i0ncr,;. Even WesLern ELrope needc:d massive: 
foreign aid Irom her . The s~cond period, from 1952 to 1958 , is known 
as the -.:ra o: "dollar short .... be" . U. S . short t..:::rm liabilities to ;:or eign-
c;rs c:.l:::.ost -..oublcd a::.d her shc:.n .. o: :r .... wcrlu ' s gold stocks fell tu 
ouS. Th"" c.o:lar, 1'.cr.vev"'":-, \·.'.'.ls s ::il 1 the \..'Or l.d 1 s stro:1gest currency ar.d 
all co· ntric.s were scill vitally concern~a with r(.;.ducing their balance 
of paym~:1ts d~ficits with the. U. S . T~e third phase of the international 
~one~ary sy::.tcrn runs Eron 1959 to th~ pr~sent c~y . In that y~ar the 
=ass ~ve (~5 billio:1) SLr?lus tru~itionally cx~~ri~nced by the U. S. on 
current .... ccount was reduced to ~ero, (this has not continu~d) . The 
deficit on capital account was fin.:.nced by i..I foreign capit ... l inflow of 
S-. . 5 billion . If this inflow had been c.::.:,hc.,d .:.n for gold there would 
have been a dra~atic fall in U. S. r~servcs which ~i~ht h&v~ s~urt~d a 
rLn on the dollar . If the hold~rs of th~ $lo billion of U. S . short term 
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liabilities to foreigners hJd panic~ed, th~ U. S. might h&ve bc~n Eorce.d 
L:.O r=..::.se t!1e price of 601<.. (c ... vc'.lluc t:•~ collar) . T~.us i:i this latter 
?eriod, the int ... rnatio~~l ~on ... tary syste~ is criticized for its anarchic 
dcp.;nd ... ,.c ... on concidl.!nce i'1 the U. S. dollar . 
The second criticism ot the pr esent international monetary system 
is tnat it cr~~tes ~n internationul li~Lidity problem . International 
aLt ~or .t _cs for the purpo~e oZ m<.. ... tin6 balance of payments ceficits, 
n;;.;:,"":y g,old , res ... rve currencies and credit facilities . In the inte.rna -
tio~al econo:r.y ;:h~ re i::. no Centrti.l Authori::y with the power to issue ar.d 
goods to .:.::rntr.cr co~:--.try .• ~ usu.:.lly i,.:ants to b ... paid in his own currency . 
In order to finclnce imports a co~ntry nust ensure that it has enough 
foreign currLncy in r eserve . Thus i: a country spends and invests more 
abroad tl.~n it e<.1rc1s or borrows, ther\! is a deficit in its balance of 
p~y~ents . Tnis means th~t the country's curr~ncy is in surplus abroad . 
When t:-.is currency is repatriated , foreigncrs will de.mane their own cur-
rc'.1cies or gold (in the. forei.;n '-Xchange marl;;ct) wh.:.ch must be provided 
by a re~uction i~ the country's reserves or els~ tne forei0 n exchange 
va:ue o: ~he n~tional CLrrency (which is call~a tne exchange r ate) will 
:a:l . Thus ~<-ch country w .... nts to ensure th;:it it has enough reserves on 
hand to meet short run balanc~ of payment~ d~ficits . 
hoAev~r, un~er the pres ... nt i~~ern~tional con~tary system tne SU?ply 
o= a;:,set:::. c.V<.ii: .... t>:e for U::.c .. s rcscrv~s by natio~s is in no way rcs;:io::sive 
to the n~ed for them . Cold production is r ... lat:valy small (thou0 ~ it i s 
aLg~e.ntcd by occas ional Soviet sales) and international credit facilit i es 
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are usu-lly not used exCl.!)t as a la~t resor~ . T~us the major ~upply 
o:: ir.tern.::.tion:.l l i qt.ici ty cor::~s from def .:.c it:.s ia che be.lance of yayC"aen-.:s 
of the re~e:::-v~ cur:-cncies, p ... rt::.cu~arly th-... i.J . S . lio'wGv"":::- , from the 
point o~ vi'-"~ of inter~-tional li~uidity , thcr~ rniaht arise a very great 
:leec for U. S . dollars, but sue~ c:.. cl.!:ic.:.r. in th~ Anericun balance of pay -
~er.ts ~ight c~us~ a run on the ~ . s . doll~r and jeoparaizG the stability 
o:: t~e entir~ international moneta r y s1st'-"m . At a.~ rat~, the supply of 
resarves i n the present international monet~ry system depends, not. on the 
needs of the .:.nterr.2tional econo~y, but un the international Gconomic 
pol .:.cy o: the r~s-...rve ccrrency countries . 
Tn~ tnL-c criticisr:i of the ?r..;sent .:.:! .. e r n .... ::ionc..l monete;.ry syster.i 
is the so - callee probl....:.r:-. of .idjustmc.nt . W!:' . ..;r. .. cour ..... y ' s balance o: pay-
~cnts is in di::.cquilibriu.n a country should pursul.! those domestic and 
international econo~ic polici~s that are nceued to correct the disequili -
I~ trJJitio~al ~cono~ic t~eory ~ ?Olicy;n~k~r is ~dvis-...c t o in-
~la-.:e to corr~ct a sur ?lus anc LO deflate to correct a de:icit . Under 
the ?res~nt international mon~tary system, however, a balance of payments 
d~ficit c..in occur during a p~riod of doml.!stic deflation <rnd a surplus car. 
occl.r ~urL.g c.. period of in= latio'"·· In st.ch cas~s the surplus country 
w~ll cry to accu~ulate reserves for as long as poss ible ~nd thereby ag -
gravute th~ problem of the o~ficit country . Such a dilemma occurs b~­
c~us~ Cu?itul movements w~r~ trdJicionally :ree or c ontrol in the present 
.5yst"".u (th<..:.u...,h so::-.e restrictions arc being ~)lac'-"d on them now) and the 
n~t ~al~~ce 0n c"'pital account in che balc..nc~ of payu.~nts is not dcte:::- -
ninc.d by an influ. tionary or def 1.. .. t::.onary co::..~stic government pol icy . 
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Gencr~l a~ GJullc is particularly concerned with one asp~ct of the ad -
justr::<!nt problem, the problem of involuntary foreign l~':1ding . 
In the pr~sent international monetary system , foreign cLntral banks 
~bsor~ ~ny ~xccss su?ply of U. S. dollars abrocid (due to a U. S . balance 
of p~yments deficit) . These excess dollars in Europe are created by U. S. 
purchases or investments there which are not covered by U. S. sales or 
borrowin.; there . The European Ce:1tral Banks do not want: much of this ex-
cess supply of dollars , and they can do one of two things with them. 
Tney can lend them on the U. S. s hort - term market or they can cash them 
in for U. S . gold . It they cash them in for gold the value of the dollar 
would be jeopardized and so would the entire international monetary sys -
te~ . Thus chey are fo rced (involuntarily) to lend them on the U. S . 
money market . General de Gaulle , however , feels that if this was the 
most profitable place to employ these dollars they would never have gone 
to Europe in the f irst place . Secondly he dislikes having to pursue a 
policy which he feels i s just helping to finance a U. S . balance of pay-
ments deficit . To prevent involuntary foreign lenuing he suggested a 
return to the Gold Bullion Standard . This could be re- introduced by 
the U. S . if she r aised the price of gold, bought back her short term 
liabilities to foreigners with gold and used only gold to settle her 
in~ernational payments . 
Tne French cannot have been too pleased with the system either, 
however , 1 though it would solve the problem of involuntary foreign 
le~cing . Raising the price of gold would lead to widespr~ad specula -
tion that it would be raised again and so would create a significant 
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agsr~v~tion of the confidence probl~m . The d..;cision whether to in-
rl~t¢ further if a surplus was accumulated in an inflationary period , 
or to deflate further if a deficit was accumulatea in a deflationary 
period , would be automatically taken in the affirmat ive with very harm-
ful politica consesuences for all governments , including the French . 
Th¢ loss of reserve currencies as reserves, and the speculation that 
go_c hoa ~ding might pay off in the long run would ser iou sly aggravate 
th~ probl~m of international liquidity . But, the French decision to 
require gold LO settle deficits in the balance of payments was reached 
because there se~med to be no better alternat~ve . 
Tne problem of involuntary foreign lending caused the Fr ench to 
rej~ct the pr esent international monetary system. The French also 
rejected the system of .;.ntroducing composite. reserve. units , CRU • s . 
If the. CRU schemG was not tied to gold then it would ~ave no auto-
matic disciplinary mechanism to force the U. S. to reduce the def icit 
in ter balance of payments , thence involuntary foreign lending . 
However, if the CRU scheme was tied to gold th~n either all countries 
would have to be members and the s cheme. would not be meaningful, or 
only a small group of countries were not members , but then the 
scheme would cnuse a run on the dollar . This would occLr because 
gold would be more expensive among the participants then outside . 
It al 1 countri..;s were members of the scheme and it was ti.~d to golc 
then the underdeveloped countries who have no gold would ncv.!r 
b~ ab~e to use their allotment of CRU ' s . Yet , if all coun-
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tri~s w~rc n0t m~mbcrs it would pay the non- members to cash in their 
dollars for gold and then sell the gold to the members . This would 
cv~ntua.lly ca.use a run on the dollar as the U. S . r eserves were exhausted . 
For tnese reasons , no support was forthcoming for the CRU scheme based on 
gold and it was abandoned by the French . 
The French also re jected flexible exchanges as an alternative in-
ternational monetary system . Economists generall y favor flexible ex-
ch~n~e rates but grant that exchange rates determined in f r ee foreign 
exchange mark~ts might be unstable and chaos might be caused by excessive 
speculation . However, national monetary authorities , General de Gaulle 
arao~g them , object to flexible exchange rates on the g r ounds that , with-
out the constr a int of maintaining external equilibrium, the most import -
ant res i stance to domestic inflation would crumble and the international 
monetary system would explode . I n additio~ , unstable exchange r a-ces 
wou:d introduce another element of uncertainty in an already uncert:ain 
world . Finally, the pragma tists suggest that flexible exchange rates 
with " spot" or " futures" markets would be extremely difficult to introduce . 
An international central bank wa s rejected by the French because it 
would be a federalist institution entail ing the loss of French na:ional 
indGpendence and security . It would not solve the problem of adjustment , 
in particu lar , of involuntary foreign lending wi thout acting against the 
wishes of at least one of its member states . Such authority the F=ench 
w~re not willing to give any one . Thus General de Gaulle was forced by 
the process of elimination to advocate a return to the Gold Bullion 
Stanctlrd . He realized that a Gold Bullion Standard is not politically 
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reasib:~ in th~ n~ar future, but he was determined to do his p~rt in 
forcir12, the U . ::L to balz.nce her payments a:-ld ?re.vent involuntary fore ign 
lencins at the expense of France . 
u. S. for~ign inv~stmcnt in France , not only leads to involuntary 
for~i6n lending by the French but a lso to the d~n~er of the loss of 
~z.r. ~on~l indep~ndence c~d security . For t~is r~ason, in 1963 the French 
decic~ct to control foreign direct investment. ~o particular industry or 
r~Jion should b~come dominated by fo rei0 n enter?ris~ . This decision was 
irr=iediately cau sed by the sudden action of 2 U. S . firms, in France, which 
c.:n.::>~d .... public outcry . Subsidiaries of bot:h General l-lotors and RGmin_s -
ton Rund who in 1963 announced the laying off of s~veral hundred workers 
in ~r~nce in pr~paration for the Comnon ~:C:.rket . This caused a public 
outcry in Franc~ . 
U. S. private assets and investment abroad have increased by 1403 
sir.ce 1957 . Lon~ term private investment abroad account s for over 703 
of t otal investment abroad . Direct investment accounts for about 70~ 
o: lo~J term private investment and was $50 billion in 1 9o5 . 
Between 1957 and 1965, the percentage of U. S. private direct foreign 
invesr.~ent that went to Europe rose f r om 103 to 303, amounting to $14 
billion in 1965 . The EEC countries increased th~ir share of this f rom 
4~~ :o ~7% , or $0 billion in 1965 . However the distribution of this 
investment chang~d . Germany ' s s hare went from 323 to 38% ($2 . ~ billion) 
~s the Fr~nch share declined from 293 to 253 ($1 . 6 billion) and the 
Dur.ch s~are f~ll from 14% to 11% ($0 . 7 billion) . Thus it seems likely 
tha~ t~~ French decision to control foreig~ ~nvestm~nt haa soree e:fect 
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on wh~re the Arr.~ricans invested in Euro?~ · 
The pctrol~um industry is a traditioncll plac~ for U. S. direct in-
vestment ~n Eur ope, but during th~ period it was r~plac~d in importance 
by rr.~.1ufac~~ring industry . In Franc~ the percentage share of the petrole-
u~ incustry in L. S . direct inv~stment declined f r om 323 in 1957 to 163 
~n 19o5 ($0 . 3 billion) . Yne percentage share of manufacturing industry 
rose from 533 to 683 (~1 . 1 billion) . 
For~ign nssets and investments in the U. S. amounted to $58 million 
in 19o5, or about 5 03 of U. S. assets and investments abroad . How~ver , 
553 o: the foreign investment in t he U. S . is in short term securities 
comp~red to a figure of 303 for U. S . investment abroad . In addition, 
almost 303 of foreig n investment in t he U. S . i s owned by foreign govern-
ments, an indication of the position of the U. S. as a reserve currency 
and perhaps of involuntary fo reign lending . Foreign direct investment 
in the U. S. amounted to $9 million in 1965, of which 213 orig inat~d in 
the EEC countries . The major share (7 0%) of the EEC ' s direct investment 
is accounted for by the Nether lands . Since 1962, French direct invest -
m~nt in the U. S. has inc~eased only slightly to $0 . 2 billion in 19o5 . 
Finance and the insurance industry accounted for 223 of foreign invest -
QC~t ~n the U. S. while manufacturing industry amounted to only 30~ . 
Thi s contrasts to the situation in Europe where insurance and fin~nce 
is negli~ible and manufacturing industry is very important for foreign 
investment . 
Although national independence may be threatened by uncontro.led 
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foreign investment, foreign investment is, in general, helpful both to 
the inv~sting country and the recipient . If a capital intensive country 
invests in a l~bor intensive country, it is likely to ob~ain a higher 
ra~c of =cturn than at home . Simi:arly thG productivity of labor in the 
receivinJ country is raised . In addition, the foreign firm will bring 
new procuction and marketing technology which will benefit the receiving 
country . U. S . firms like to invest in Europe rather than to export to 
it because of a high tariff wall and lower costs of production than in 
the c .s. Also there i s an incentive to oligopolists to invest abroad 
because this enables them to grow without ret&liation . 
For the particular case of U. S . foreign investment in Europe 
Kindieberger hypothesized that it merely reflected differences in liquid -
ity preferences between inhabitants in the two areas . Europeans have 
a high liquidity preference which leads them to lend shorter than they 
want to borrow; Americans have a low liquidity preference which leads 
them to borrow shorter than they lend . Thus the U. S . exports long term 
capital to Europe and imports short term capital from them. Trif f in, 
however, observes that European long term investment in the U. S . is about 
the same as American long term investment in Europe . A greater propor-
t:ion of U. S . long term investment is dire.ct, however, which probably 
reflects the difficulties experienced by smaller European f irms taking 
over their American counterparts in the fa ce of legal discrimination and 
the buy A~erican policy of the U. S . goverth~ent . Thus the reason why 
the Europeans are net creditors in short term investment is because of 
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the r~servc currency status of th~ U. S . dollar and perhaps involuntary 
for<!.:.gn lendin0 • 
In sur:unnry, i~ c~n b~ said thut the r~th~~ substantial benefits of 
£or~ign invest~~nt are welcomed by th~ French provided som~ national 
contrul is exercL~ed and provided it is not financed by involuntary 
for~ign lending . In 19o3 foreign investment w~s contr olled by the French 
and in 1965 t he French began to buy gold to prevent involuntary foreign 
lend in.; . 
The aecisions of Fr~nch international econo~ic policy which have 
be~n analyz~d in this study shar e many charact~ristics . They w~re all 
taken by the same policy maker , General Charles de Gaulle , and reflect 
h~s perception of France's r ole in the international economy . Economics 
is subordinate to politics and international economic poiicy must further 
the goals of French foreign policy . The political objective o~ Gaullism, 
an ~ndependent France within an ind~pendent Europe , is a?plied also to 
economic policy . The aim is an independent French economy within an 
in~~penrle~t European economy . It is conclude.a that i ndependence fo r 
France (and Europe) means a heavy weight on the. goal of security i:1 
Gaullist intern~tional economic policy decisions . 
~ost institutions of the international economy are established by 
int~r:1ational cooperation . In order to ensure French national security , 
Frunce d~mands that she have a veto on the operdtions of those institu -
tions ~hen they oake decisions which are vital to French welfare . A 
co:.~aon externa 1 tariff in a Western European Trading Association would 
~nsure th~t no particip~nt could reduc~ its tariffs unil.ltcrally against 
t:1e rest of the world "'nd severely damage Frcncl .. intern:cd.i.nte. cost pro-
duction t.nlcss the com;non tariff was rl..!dUcl."!d . Howuvcr , this tariff would 
not be reduceu u. l ess :-rancl..! did not use her veto . The retention o: her 
v~to p~~cr in the Ex~cutive Counci~ of the EEC assured France that the 
otner p~rticipants could not negate the benefits of the CAP to France , or 
err.bark on som~ new course of action over the opposition of and against 
the inter~sts of France . The decision to buy gold and prcv~nt involun-
tary foreign lending was an attempt to remove the depenccnce of the 
international monetary system on the U. S. dollar for stability and l i -
quidity . Tte contr ol of U. S . investment in France prevent~d any one 
2rench indJstry or region from becoming too d~pendent on the servants 
of a foreign power . 
Secondary to the go~l of security , but also of ~ajor concern to 
G~n~ral ce Gaulle as an international econom~c policy maker is the goal 
of Lquity, r eciprocity or justice . It is evident that General de Gaulle 
bel~eves that an equitable distribution of the gains c~e to international 
cooperation in the international economy would occur only if France 
sh~r~d in the gains in at least the same proportions as she shar~d in 
t~~ cost . It is not enough that Franc~ have a net gain . The French 
econo~y is smaller than the U. S. or British economies so there is no 
point in helping these nations to widen the gap . France rejectec a fr~~ 
tr~d~ area in w~stern Eur ope because she felt that Britain baincd a 
t,ri..c.lt.;r propon:ion than she sc.crificed, while Franc~ ga ined 1-::ss than she 
s~cr~iiced, proportionately . By excluding agriculture a~d r~taining her 
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"s?.._c.:. ..... 1 relationship" with the Commonwealth Britain was obtaining the 
o~xir.rurn bLn~fit . Franco ' s bcnecit would be smaller because of th~se 
exc_Lsions a~c her sacrifices would be ~argcr because of her trddi-
t~01 • .:il ly prot.~ctionist pol icie::; . 
In th~ Treaty of Rome a com:non mark .... t in industrial products and a 
co~~on :narket in ~Jricultural products were ~nvisaged . By 1965, the 
co ..... on market in industrial products was being irnpleo~nt.:.d ah..!ad o: 
::.ch.cdLle, and the common r..arket in agricul tur"l products was behind . 
r.gricul ture i s a ver y in'.portant industry in France, and a large share of 
her gains from the EiZC would be. in this sector . To ensure that the 
a~ricultLr~l co~non mar~ .... t would catch up to the industrial co~~on ruarket, 
France was asked to mak.c political concessions . Thus France w~s asked 
to incur extra costs in a sensitive are.a to ensu r e her " fair" share of 
the benefits ot European Econorr.ic Cooperation . 
The present int~rnc:. tional monetary sys terr. is se1: up to favor the 
i~terests of the Anglo- Saxon Powers . The benefits are not shared equally . 
Tte U. S. and the U. K. benefit from involuntary foreign lending at the 
expcn ... e of othvr countril!s including France . London and New Yor!" a re 
th~ l~r6es~ financial c.cnters in the worl~ and profi1: from financing al -
most all of world trad~ . To maintain chis system France is asked to 
hold s~erling und dollar balances and not to CJSh them in for gold . From 
G~n~ral de Gaulle ' s viewpoint , the gains from the present international 
rnon~~ary syst~m are not distribut~d in the same proportion as are the 
co~~s o: maintaining it . To ~ove to grGat~r use o~ golc pr obably wo~ld 
h"'mp .... r world trade and hence the c:.conomic growth of Fr ance . but cgain 
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equity ~nd security scc~~d more i~port~nt to de G~ulle . 
Thus we s~~ the pr~occup~tion of French internation~l economic 
policy with ttc goals of ~utional indepcna~nce ~nd intern~tional recip-
r-oci.:y, .:u::-ing ::.he p.::?.rioJ 1955- 65 . All the decisiuns involved a sacri-
f i.cc of sane growth of national income to achieve indepGndence and recip-
rocity . All th~ decisions were ta~en in a storm of controversy and bittar-
ly c ondemned in the Anglo- Saxon countries . All the deci~ions a~finitely 
appear , hcwever, ~s parts of a consistent international economic policy . 
This policy is t:c r esult of the consistent application of a stable 
choicG function which refused to ignore Fr~nch n~tional interests in pre-
serving her national identity and in ensuring intc:national reciprocity 
as well as obtaining economic growth . Tne analysis seews to have much 
to t~ach other international economic policymakers and perhaps even 
eco~omists who wish to advise governments on the optimum international 
cco:iomic policy . 
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